Defeating the Austerians of the warfare state: French arms policy through the lens of the Programmatic Action Framework

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Abstract
This article contributes to the development of the Programmatic Action Framework (PAF) based on the case study of the procurement of the French Rafale fighter jet rather than the American F-18 by the French government in the 1980s. This decision making dilemma is explained by revealing the competition between two “programmatic cliques.” The “sovereignist” programmatic clique that defends the French option embodies the Custodians of the nation state. The “liberal” programmatic clique that supports the American alternative represents the Austerians of the nation state. The defeat of the Austerians of the French nation warfare state is explained by the ties weakness available to the liberal programmatic clique at the political level of decision making. To this end, 89 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the political-military and industrial arms actors.

KEYWORDS
civil-military relations, arms policy, France, political economy, Programmatic Action Framework (PAF), rafale

Who governs public policy? According to Genieys, Hassenteufel, and their colleagues, the formulation, implementation, and transformation of public policy are less the result of exceptional external shocks (such as oil price shocks, the end of the Cold War, the financial crisis, or Brexit) than of the ordinary work of “programmatic actors” and the professional relations between them (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012; Genieys & Smyrl, 2008; Hassenteufel, Smyrl, & Genieys, 2010; Hornung & Bandelow, 2018). This actor-centered, endogenous, and relational approach in public policy is known
as the Programmatic Action Framework (PAF). The PAF was developed from the study of France’s health and armament policies (Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2005, 2006), and more recently through the analysis of Britain’s, Germany’s, and Spain’s health policy (Hassenteufel et al., 2010; Hornung & Bandelow, 2018).

Programmatic actors bring together the state’s administrative and political elites, which can be supported by experts (consultants and academics) from the private sector. They embody a “relatively small group (on the order of 30–50 individuals) of significant decision-makers, with a much smaller inner core of policy architects” [...] “behaving as collective actor” (Hassenteufel et al., 2010:528–30). Therefore, programmatic actors represent a broader category of analysis than “policy entrepreneurs” (Kingdon, 1984) and a more restrictive one than “policy networks” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) or “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Moreover, programmatic actors “are those who make decisions” (Hornung & Bandelow, 2018:5) while “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992) bring together experts who advise decision makers. Programmatic actors work on a “programme for change,” that is, a collection of measures that aims “to guide and define the content of actions in the public sphere” (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012:95). Programmatic actors are not mainly structured according to institutional or personal interests like their careers (Kingdon, 1984; see also actor-centered institutionalism, Scharpf, 1997; Lindenberg, 2001) or beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Rather, they share the “same goal,” a professional experience and “social identities” (Hornung, Bandelow, & Vogeler, 2019), through a “policy programme” defined as “a coherent proposal bringing together a set of specific instruments” (Hassenteufel et al., 2010:528; Hornung & Bandelow, 2018:3).

Beyond the main characteristics of the PAF which distinguish it from other institutionalist approaches in policy process analysis, it should be pointed out that programmatic actors do not share the same relationship with the state and do not have the same configuration. Two opposing groups of programmatic actors—the “Custodians and Austerians of the state”—have structured and transformed the welfare state in Europe (Genieys, 2010; Genieys & Joana, 2015). The Custodians of the state endeavor to defend public power in order to preserve the authority of the state, whereas the “Austerians of the state” strive to reduce public spending in order to limit the state’s capabilities (Genieys & Joana, 2015:75). This rivalry between the Custodians and Austerians of the state relates in a new way, to the question of the liberalization of Western states since the 1970s. The configuration of programmatic actors also differs between state and historical contexts (Hassenteufel et al., 2010:535; Hornung & Bandelow, 2018; see Table 1). A typology of programmatic actors has been built up, based on how long they have taken part in the policy process and their socio-professional homogeneity. The “programmatic elite” relates to the French, German, and Spanish cases (1980s), the “programmatic coalition” relates to the German and Spanish cases (2000s), and the “programmatic team” to the British case.

The objective of this article is to develop the PAF and to extend its results by an empirical study of the French warfare state (Béraud-Sudreau, 2014; Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2005, 2006; ; Meijer, 2015), and more precisely, by analyzing the acquisition of the Rafale naval fighter by France in 1988. The choice of this case study can be justified on three grounds.

First, despite the development of European co-operation starting in the 1980s (Jones, 2007), 80% of arms, such as the Rafale naval fighter, are still produced autarkically in the XXIst century, that is, made in France (De la Brosse, 2017:2). The challenge of national production in defence industry, therefore, goes beyond the context of the Cold War. Indeed, Dassault Aviation was the main contractor on the Rafale naval fighter programme, and the Société nationale d’étude et de construction de moteurs d’aviation (Snecma) [National company for researching and building aviation engines] was in charge of the aircraft’s M88 engines.
Second, with almost €43 billion spent by the French state, the Rafale was not only an arms procurement “big programme” but the most costly the French state had taken part in since the end of the World War Two (Irondelle, 2011:67), which has had political and industrial effects on other decisions taken by the French state to this day (Faure, 2019). Moreover, an armaments programme spanning several decades, so that the Rafale programme is the direct predecessor of the bargaining under way in Europe since the end of the 2010s. Indeed, the SCAF programme defended by France, Germany, and Spain is opposed to the Tempest programme supported by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Sweden (Faure, 2019). There is, therefore, a direct interest in understanding the policy process in the 1980s for anyone interested in the future combat air system, and more broadly advanced military technology.

Third, there is an “air force” version and a “naval” version, destined, respectively, for the air force and the navy, two discrete components of the French armed forces. Numerous studies have been made of the European negotiations that ended with the decision by the French state in 1985 to retain the national option of the Rafale to meet the needs of the air force, whereas the German, British, and Italian states chose the European alternative of the Typhoon (DeVore & Weiss, 2014; Droit, 2010; Faure, 2019; Hoeffler & Mérand, 2015; Oldfield, 2000). By contrast, no study—with the exception of a very few empirical analyses (Cohen, 1994:32)—has dealt with the decision taken by the French state in 1998 to acquire the French Rafale, rather than the American F-18, to supply the navy. The period 1986–1988, analyzed in this article, did not see a particular political configuration, but rather an ordinary political sequence with certain constants (the head of state, the Cold War) and certain variables (cohabitation and the death of Marcel Dassault).

To explain who governed the French arms policy in the 1980s, the research questions are formulated as follows: How did programmatic actors shape the decision making process leading to France’s choice to acquire the French Rafale naval fighter rather than the American F-18 in 1988? Did the competition between the Custodians and Austerians of the state make it possible to understand why France decided to invest billions of euros and make Navy officers wait—whereas their Crusader fighters were so old that they became dangerous to fly with—when importing the American F-18 represented a cheap and rapid alternative? This research answers these questions by making two main contributions.

First, this article reveals a conflict between two programmatic cliques: the “sovereignist” one defending the national choice of the Rafale naval fighter, and the “liberal” one supporting the American alternative—importing the F-18. Beyond the negotiations pertaining to arms procurement policy, this clash is the embodiment of the rivalry between the Custodians and Austerians of the state. Certain state actors strive to regulate, or even oppose, the dynamic of the warfare state’s liberalization, whereas others support it (Hoeffler, 2013; Joana & Mérand, 2014). The case of the acquisition of the Rafale naval fighter revealed the victory of the Custodians of the state and the defeat of the Austerians of the state.

Second, the typology of the three models of programmatic actors does not make it possible to identify what type of actors take part in this decisional process, leading to the formulation of a fourth model, named the “programmatic clique.” A programmatic clique is a collection of actors characterized both by long-standing participation in the policy process (such as the programmatic elite and

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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Welfare state in Europe: Three types of programmatic actors</th>
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<td>Programmatic elite</td>
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<td>Longevity</td>
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<td>Case studies</td>
<td>France, Germany, Spain</td>
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Sources: Hassenteufel et al. (2010:535, table 1); Hornung and Bandelow (2018).
coalition models) and by a low level of socio-professional homogeneity (like the programmatic team model). In the process, this article demonstrates that the PAF can be useful for studying an object of political economy, incorporating not only bureaucratic ties (Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2005, 2006) and civilian-military relations (Cohen, 1994; Daho, 2019; DeVore, 2019), but also relations between the state and industry (Faure 2019; DeVore & Weiss, 2014).

This article is divided into three parts. In the first part, the validity of using the PAF to study an object of industrial policy is explained, after which its methodological operationalization is clarified. In the second part, two rival programmatic cliques are described, explaining the process how the French state decided to acquire the French Rafale naval aircraft rather than the American F-18 aircraft. In the third part, the defeat of the Austerians and the victory of the Custodians of the French state of war is explained by the shift in analysis from the bureaucratic level of decision making to the political level.

1 | ANALYZING THE FRENCH ARMS POLICY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PROGRAMMATIC ACTION FRAMEWORK

The aim of this first part is not only to describe the benefits of the PAF in explaining the ressorts workings of French arms procurement policy, but also to suggest an extension to the PAF with the aim of including private actors in the analysis. It also looks in greater detail at the inductive methodology used to operationalize the PAF.

1.1 | Determining factors in French arms procurement policy

In order to analyze the acquisition by the state of arms such as a fighter aircraft, the liberal theory of international relations demonstrates the determining effect of the defence industry on the formulation of the state's decision (Moravcsik, 1990, 1991). The state, embodied in France by the president of the republic and the defence ministry, is a “transmission belt” (Moravcsik, 1997:518) used by industrial actors to impose their economic and commercial interests. According to Moravcsik, the president was forced to strike a balance between two types of interest. He showed himself to be receptive to the arguments made by the officers of the French armed forces to ensure national security was safeguarded (general interest). Nevertheless, he aimed, above all, to retain his national political position, over which specific private economic interests, promoted by the main national defence companies, wielded an influence. French arms policy was governed by the defence industry, and the decision taken by the French state to acquire the Rafale naval fighter was thus the result of the impact of Dassault Aviation and Snecma. However, in that same context of the 1980s, according to an in-depth study of another large arms procurement programme—the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter—the decision taken was less the result of lobbying by industry than of work on the part of state actors, senior politicians, and military officers (Krotz, 2011). Furthermore, the state and industry are conceptualized by liberal theory as two strictly distinct entities, which are at variance with the political and institutional situation observed in France during the 1980s. Indeed, Snecma—which is considered to be “industry”—was part of the defence ministry, because it was a state company.

DeVore and Weiss (2014) deal with this analytical difficulty in describing the movement of arms sector actors between the state and industry by proposing a rational choice institutionalist approach, derived from the school of the varieties of capitalism. The state's decision in favor of the Rafale naval aircraft was determined by a “statist” political economy, which reflected a specific collection of rules, organizations, and market-regulating institutions produced by the state. The rules, organizations, and
institutions were used by the state, which was acting with the aim of “maximising the effectiveness of defence industry,” and by defence companies with the goal of “overturning government decisions that differed from their preferences” (DeVore & Weiss, 2014:522). The central hypothesis of the statist political economy model postulates that the close interdependence that ties the state—embodied by the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) [French government defence procurement agency]—to the defence industry (embodied by Dassault Aviation and Snecma) endows the latter with powerful leverage for shaping the decision making process. Dassault Aviation and Snecma were, therefore, in the decision making “driving seat,” thanks to the use these companies made of the informal network of armament engineers who linked them to the DGA. Together, they formed a “technocratic engineering culture” (DeVore & Weiss, 2014:507). Thanks to their training within the same elite higher education establishments, followed by their entry into large state entities and their practice of switching from the public to the private sector, “the heads of companies and political decision-makers possessed an inherent capacity for co-ordinating their activities and influencing each other” (DeVore & Weiss, 2014:507). Like Moravcsik, DeVore and Weiss reach the same conclusion: the defence industry was the main determining factor in the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft by the French state.

Because it makes it possible to render certain relations of interdependence between the state and defence industry, this rational choice institutionalist approach contributes to the interpretation of French arms procurement policy through the analysis of its political economy. However, this choice of analysis leaves two blind spots for describing the formulation of the state’s decision making. First, the sector-wide scale of public action considered by the rational choice institutionalists gives an overall view of state-industry relations through a parcimonious argument. Nevertheless, since the state is reduced to the armament engineers of the DGA, military actors, as well as the relations they have with political actors, are not taken into account. Second, the work of DeVore and Weiss, like that of Moravcsik, does not draw on any primary sources, which risks favoring an empirically disembodied analysis, and even to fall into the scholastic trap (Austin, 1962:3; Bourdieu, 2017:33–6). The result is functional (the president of the republic) and broad (the DGA) categories of analysis, without any actor being able, after all, to disturb or even play a part in this linear narrative. The PAF can helpfully extend this rational choice institutionalist study of defence capitalism in Europe, using French arms procurement policy.

1.2 Beyond the state-industry divide, the programmatic actors

At the same time as it was acquiring the Rafale naval aircraft, the French state decided, during the 1980s, to acquire the Leclerc battle tank, made in France (Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2005). This state decision can be explained by the action of a small group of individual actors (about 10) with similar career paths and homogeneous profiles (they were educated at the same establishments and pursued careers within the state), despite their different roles (military, administrative, and industrial). These actors, described by Genieys and Michel (2006:137) as a “programmatic elite,” shared four characteristics. They pursued (a) a “programme for change,” that is, a collection of measures that aimed to “orientate and define the content of public action” (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012:95). They implemented it thanks to (b) a set of multiple resources, which they brought into play through (c) a “learning dynamic.” Public action was also shaped by (d) the interactions they had with other programmatic actors, as well as with “intermediary actors” and “veto” actors. In the case of Leclerc, the programmatic elite shared the belief that the French battle tank was the “world’s best tank” (Genieys & Michel, 2006:119), creating a “path dependency” in favor of putting together an autarkic programme, without other programmatic, intermediary, or veto actors being able to redirect or even to
block the making of this decision. While Moravcsik, DeVore, and Weiss emphasize the logic of consequences (the effect of interests) as determining public action, Genieys and Michel reveal the role of social representation as the basis of action by the programmatic elite (the effect of ideas).

However, this analysis does not explain the position of political actors, actors who made up the “counter” programmatic elite, who opposed the acquisition of the Leclerc tank, and private companies. Béraud-Sudreau (2014) completes this first development of the PAF for the purpose of analyzing French arms procurement policy, using the subject of the arms trade. Changes in legislation relating to export controls during the 2000s are interpreted by Béraud-Sudreau as a competition within the state between two types of programmatic actors, divided by a partisan and bureaucratic rift. On one side, “pro-control” programmatic actors, close to left-wing governments and the direction des Affaires stratégiques (DAS) [strategic affairs directorate] of the defence ministry, advocated a strict separation of the administrative functions of the support and control of exports. On the other side, “pro-support” actors, who had close relations with right-wing governments and the direction du Développement international (DI) [international development directorate], championed a plan to bring together the functions of support and control within the DI.

Béraud-Sudreau’s study develops the PAF by incorporating political actors and revealing two rival groups of programmatic actors. However, the analysis of the French state’s decision in favor of the Rafale naval aircraft requires the incorporation of private (Dassault Aviation) and international (the American company McDonnell Douglas) industrial actors—which neither Béraud-Sudreau nor Genieys and Michel do. In their study of the Leclerc programme, Genieys and Michel (2004, 2006) take into account the Groupement industriel des armements terrestres (GIAT) [land-based weapons industry group]. The main industrial contractor on the Leclerc programme, GIAT was a public company whose sole shareholder was the state, under the administration of the defence ministry. Given that Snecma—which was in charge of the development and production of the Rafale naval aircraft’s M88 engines—was the same type of public company as GIAT, it is necessary to complete the PAF by adding private companies such as Dassault Aviation, including international companies such as the American McDonnell Douglas, which produced the F-18.³ Meijer (2015) contributes to the development of the PAF on the international level, studying the United States’ export control policy for strategic goods, without taking into account industrial actors. Consequently, this article aims to continue the development of the PAF using an object of political economy.

1.3 | From a programmatic “elite” to programmatic “cliques”

Apart from the need to take into account private industrial actors (Dassault Aviation and McDonnell Douglas) in order to analyze the French state’s decision in favor of the Rafale naval aircraft, the type of programmatic actors needs to be specified. In fact, Béraud-Sudreau and Meijer confine themselves to describing “competing groups of actors” (Meijer, 2015:104, see also Béraud-Sudreau, 2014:81). However, in their research on the welfare state in Europe, Hassenteufel et al. (2010:530–4; see also Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012:104–5) propose a typology of three programmatic actor models: the “programmatic elite,” the “programmatic coalition,” and the “programmatic team.” Each programmatic actor model is defined according to two criteria: the longevity of their participation in the policy process, and their socio-professional homogeneity (Table 1).

In the study devoted to the Leclerc arms procurement programme, Genieys and Michel (2005) identify the French programmatic actors as belonging to the programmatic elite. In the case of the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft, the longevity criterion is confirmed: the programmatic actors are “long-timers”⁴ (Darviche, Genieys, & Hoeffler, 2013:9). However, the longevity criterion is at
variance with observed reality in so far as the actors that took part in this decision making process
were not confined, as in the case of the reform of the armed forces during the 1990s, to “civilian elites
in the defence ministry” (Genieys & Joana, 2015:72; see also Ixondelle, 2011). Within the state, mil-
itary actors, as well as civilian actors from the finance ministry, took part in negotiations connected
with the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft. Moreover, the majority of the industrial actors that
worked for Dassault Aviation and all of those in McDonell Douglas had a career outside the state.
In order to take into account this empirical truth, which does not fit with the proposed typology, and
thus to enrich the latter, a fourth programmatic actor model, called the “programmatic clique,” is
suggested (Table 2). A programmatic clique is a group of programmatic actors characterized by both
long-standing participation in the policy process (like the “programmatic elite and programmatic co-
alition models”), and by a low level of socio-professional homogeneity (like the programmatic team
model).

In the case of the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft by the French state in 1988, there were two
programmatic cliques—one “sovereignist,” the other “liberal.” These two programmatic cliques stood
out for their political priority: whereas the sovereignist programmatic clique prioritized the role of the
state and the national territory where the new armament was to be produced, the liberal clique wanted
to reduce the cost of this acquisition, even if that meant importing it. By its very nature, the sover-
eignist programmatic clique supported the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft. By contrast, the
clique of actors that favored a liberal public action programme chose the American option of the F-18.

This conflict between the sovereignist and liberal programmatic cliques is reminiscent of the rift
between the “Custodians of the state” and “Austerians of the state,” which structures the welfare state
(Genieys, 2010; Genieys & Joana, 2015; Hornung & Bandelow, 2018). Indeed, Genieys and Joana
(2015:68) note that Leclerc, a French arms procurement programme developed, like the Rafale naval
aircraft, during the 1980s, is a “good example of the assertion of the role of the guardians of state pol-
icy.” According to these writers, the Custodians of the state, also described as “social (welfare) elite,”
endeavor to defend public authority in order to preserve the power of the state. As for the “Austerians
of the state,” who belong to the “fiscal elite” their goal is the reduction of public spending in order
to limit the capability of the state (Genieys & Joana, 2015:75). In the case of the acquisition of the
Rafale naval aircraft, the Custodians of the state were receptive to the argument concerning security
of the supply chain with regard to the United States, whereas the Austerians of the state saw the acqui-
sition of a new fighter aircraft as a financial issue (“best value for money”). Consequently, the former,
who belonged to the sovereignist programmatic clique, advocated a “made in France” product, like
the Rafale naval aircraft. By contrast, the latter, who belonged to the liberal programmatic clique, pre-
ferred an American off-the-shelf acquisition (Table 3). Indeed, the rivalry between these sovereignist
and liberal programmatic cliques completes the classic rift between Custodians and Austerians of the
state through the issue of national territory: the sovereignist programmatic clique was made up of de-
defenders not only of the state’s arms procurement policy (policy warfare state), but also of the territory
where it was implemented (the nation). It seems more appropriate, therefore, to speak of Custodians
and Austerians of the nation state.

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<th>TABLE 2 An update of the programmatic actors typology</th>
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<td>Programmatic elite</td>
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Moreover, the actors that belonged to these two programmatic cliques acted less according to a specific logic of action to defend the sovereignist or liberal programme of public action than according to several kinds of logic of action, which need to be described (Faure, 2019; Rayroux, 2017; see Table 4). The logic of consequences points to interests and strategies as the determining factors in a programme of public action (Woll & Jacquot, 2010), while the logic of appropriateness corresponds to the effect of ideas, norms, and social representation (Mérand, 2008). As for the logic of practicality, it is defined by the influence of professional routines and habits on the development of the decision making process (Pouliot, 2017).

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<th>Table 3</th>
<th>The custodians and the Austerians of the French warfare state</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State elite</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Custodians</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmatic clique</td>
<td>Sovereignist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy programme</td>
<td>To defend the nation's territory in order to produce domestically</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision preference</td>
<td>Rafale naval aircraft</td>
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1.4 Identifying and interviewing programmatic actors

Before describing the rivalry at work between the two programmatic cliques, namely the Custodians and the Austerians of the state, it is necessary to describe the survey protocol that allowed the operationalization of the PAF. Establishing the decisional positions adopted by state and defence industry representatives regarding the acquisition of a fighter aircraft to meet the operational needs of the navy during the 1980s required a 2-year field survey (2012–2014). Secondary sources (specialist press, expert studies, and parliamentary reports) contain useful empirical data. However, they do not offer an adequate explanation for the decisional process that led to the French state to acquire the French Rafale naval aircraft rather than the American F-18 aircraft. As for the Centre des archives de l'armement et du personnel civil (CAAPC) [France's arms and civilian personnel archives center] in Châtellerault, material dating back less than 30 years is, as with all other archives of the defence ministry, classified. Moreover, access is still restricted to “sensitive” programmes dating back more than 30 years, such as the Rafale naval aircraft.

To overcome this difficulty, 89 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors who had taken an active part in the state's decision to choose the Rafale naval aircraft. Aside from the actors working at a bureaucratic level (Béraud-Sudreau, 2014; Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2006; Hoeffler, 2013), interviews were conducted with the highest level political (the defence ministry), military (CEMA [chief of staff of the armed forces], chief of staff of the president of the republic, chief of staff of the air force), and administrative (DGA [Direction générale de l'armement—the defence ministry's arms procurement agency]) officials of the state (Cohen, 1994; Irondelle, 2011), as well

| Table 4 | The decision making drivers of programmatic actors |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Logics of action** | **Consequences** | **Appropriateness** | **Practicality** |
| Concepts | Interests | Social representations | Practice |
as of the defence industry (CEOs or advisers to successive CEOs of Dassault Aviation and Snecma). In doing so, it is the most comprehensive qualitative study on one of the biggest French armaments programmes since the end of the Second World War.

In extending the work of Genieys and Hassenteufel (2012:99–101) and Béraud-Sudreau (2014:85), the population of actors interviewed was identified according to four criteria: one deductive (positional), and the other three inductive (reputational, sociographic, and participatory). First, two institutional indicators were employed to identify actors’ positions: belonging to a minister’s staff, and holding a management post in a central administration or its equivalent in the industrial sector (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012:99). Actors who had participated, through their professional responsibilities, in the formulation of the decision regarding the Rafale naval aircraft programme were incorporated into this population. Subsequently, this population also included actors who had not appeared in the organizational charts of successive French governments or of companies, but who had been named by actors who were interviewed as having played a strategic role in the formulation of the decision (reputational criterion). Then, the list thus obtained—numbering several hundred actors—was doubly filtered, by identifying their longevity and their level of participation, via a study of their career paths (sociographic criterion) and their activity (participatory criterion) within the arms sector. An actor who worked for less than 6 years in arms acquisition in France, or who had not regularly taken part in decisional activities connected with the development of the Rafale naval aircraft programme (such as team meetings, working groups, or restricted meetings) was excluded from the population (Darviche, Genieys, & Hoeffler, 2013).

1.5 | Sovereignist versus liberal: A competition between two programmatic cliques

Having put into context the decision taken by the French state in 1988 to choose the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft rather than the F-18, the makeup of the two rival programmatic cliques is described using the programmes they advocated. The clique that championed a liberal programme of public action, and represented the Austerians of the state, was in favor of importing the F-18. By contrast, the clique that championed a sovereignist programme of public action and embodied the Custodians of the state advocated the “made in France” production of the Rafale naval aircraft.

1.6 | Flying Rafale: The choice for a “made in France” fighter jet

The decision taken in 1985 by the French state to acquire the French Rafale aircraft rather than the European Typhoon aircraft to equip the air force did not meet the need that the officers of the navy expressed at the same time. A decisional dilemma that faced the French civilian/military actors consisted of a two contrasting decisional options: the development of a “made in France,” “navy” version of the Rafale, and the import of the American F-18 aircraft, described as “off the shelf.” In 1986, the financing of the Rafale programme was a matter of conflict between French industry actors and the Defence Minister, André Giraud, who was drawing up the loi de programmation militaire (LPM) [military programme law] for the years 1987–1991. “When André Giraud concocted his law [the LPM], it was clear in his mind that not a cent would be available for the development of a Rafale version specifically for the navy” (Schwartzbrod, 1992:169). In order to deal with the dilemma of acquiring fighter aircraft that met the operational needs of the
navy while at the same time keeping costs down, Defence Minister Giraud implemented several projects at once.

The main one of these was support for the acquisition of the American F-18 aircraft. In the summer of 1986, Defence Minister Giraud visited the United States, where he met with his American counterpart, Caspar Weinberger, and management of the McDonnell Douglas company. In the same way as the acquisition of the Crusader by the French state in the early 1960s, this project was shaped by the programme for the import of military aircraft. Moreover, with a view to seeking a “made in France” programme, Defence Minister Giraud required French industrial actors to finance 25% of the development costs: “The 25%, that was Giraud in 1987, much to annoyance of the manufacturers, who said: ‘We’re being fleeced!’” Although 75% of non-recurring—so-called “development”—costs were covered by the state, the 25% threshold was higher than was standard practice during the 1980s, which was for the state to cover costs in their entirety. A former air force chief of staff (CEMAA) explained: “The state said: we commit to buying it in 1996 on condition that the manufacturers cover 25% of the development. For their part, the manufacturers were keen on the 1996 date, for reasons connected with exports.”

In June 1987, Prime Minister Chirac announced, at the Le Bourget air show, the launch not only of the tactical fighter (ACT), as had been decided in 1985, but also of the naval fighter (ACM). The ACT and ACM are, respectively, the “air” and “naval” versions of the Rafale: this “made in France” programme had prevailed over the programme for importing the American F-18. Following this announcement, the Direction des constructions aéronautiques (DCAé) [aeronautical construction directorate] of the DGA received a document containing the military characteristics of the ACT required by the air force. In September 1987, Dassault Aviation provided a response from the industry. In December 1987, the navy in turn gave the DGA (DCAé) the characteristics of ACM, after which the French administrative (the DCAé of the DGA) and military (air force) actors approved the technical specification of the ACT.

In January 1988, Prime Minister Chirac confirmed to an inter-ministerial committee that development of the French aircraft had begun. In April 1988, 3 days before the first round of the presidential election, Prime Minister Chirac informed Dassault Aviation and Snecma that the development contract—comprising the design and construction of five Rafale prototypes and the order of an aircraft for 10 billion francs—had been signed (Schwartzbrod, 1992:182). Why did the state choose the sovereignist programme for the production of the “made in France” Rafale over the liberal programme for importing the American F-18, which was cheaper and allowed faster delivery to the French armed forces? To answer this question, it is necessary to describe the two programmatic cliques which were competed during the years 1986–1988 over this highly strategic political and industrial issue: one favored the import of American aircraft (the liberal programme), whereas the other worked to secure a “made in France” product (the sovereignist programme).

1.7 | The American option favored by the liberal programmatic clique: The Austerians of the nation state

At the national level, the liberal programmatic clique, which supported the import of the American F-18, consisted of the Austerians of the nation state. It brought together civilian-military actors who worked within the defence ministry, navy admirals, particularly Admiral Louzeau, who then headed the Navy staff (EMM), and some of the DGA’s armament engineers including the DGA [general arms delegate] Jacques Chevallier (Table 5). Senior civil servants at the finance ministry working on defence issues were also part of the liberal programmatic clique. These actors shared a dual concern:
the acquisition of a fighter aircraft quickly, and at the lowest cost (the logic of consequences). The fighter aircraft the navy had imported from the United States during the 1960 (Crusaders) were badly aging. It was planned to retire them from the navy in 1993: “We were the last to be using Crusaders. Even the Filipinos had stopped! It was therefore urgent to replace them by buying the F-18 off the shelf.” For the officers of the navy, fighter aircraft were not an armament as strategic as aircraft carriers or frigates—on the contrary, they were equipment that was not central to their arsenal (the logic of appropriateness).

This acquisition of fighter aircraft was thus viewed by officers of the navy less as an issue of technology and national independence and more as a financial issue: “The navy wanted an off-the-shelf purchase of F-18s because the aircraft were available. This [buying off the shelf] thus enabled them to meet an immediate need, at a reasonable cost.” As for the officers of the air force, the majority were in favor of the sovereignist programme, as is demonstrated below. However, a number of individuals pointed out that some of the air force general staff (EMAA) were reluctant to develop the naval Rafale because of its prohibitive cost, as one French diplomat explained: “We knew that the fighter aircraft we were building [the Rafale] would be the last to be built in France, and that it was very expensive. But we were already behind [‘en arrière de la main’], and we should not build the aircraft. At that time, the air force managed its resources on its own, independently of the CEMA.”

These military actors in the navy and air force were closely connected to some of the administrative actors in the defence ministry (DGA), including the DGA [general arms delegate?] Jacques Chevallier (1987–1989), and some senior officials in the finance ministry. This liberal programmatic clique shared the concern about costs: “Within the defence ministry and the DGA there were some who were hostile [to the Rafale], and also at Bercy [the finance ministry], which worked hard to torpedo the programme. I think those who were pro-Rafale were in the minority […] The Rafale programme was costly; it was a huge white elephant.”

Finally, a distance was observed between these state actors—especially officers in the navy—and state (the naval construction and arms directorate) and private industrial actors: “We need to be clear that the navy was not close to Dassault like the air force was.”

The corollary of this relational distancing between the navy and French industrial actors at a national level was the closeness that linked the navy to the American company McDonell Douglas at an international level. Indeed, the French navy had had close links with the American defence industry.

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmatic actors</th>
<th>The Custodians of the nation state embodied by the sovereignist programmatic clique</th>
<th>The Austerians of the nation state embodied by the liberal programmatic clique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Political</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Defence Minister André Giraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DGA (some of its engineers)</td>
<td>DGA [general arms delegate] Jacques Chevallier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Achille Lerche (CEMAA)</td>
<td>Admiral Bernard Louzeau (CEMM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Air force officers</td>
<td>Navy officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>Dassault Aviation</td>
<td>McDonnell Douglas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Snecma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisional preference</td>
<td>Rafale naval aircraft (French option)</td>
<td>F-18 (American option)</td>
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</table>

TABLE 5 Rivalry between two programmatic cliques for the acquisition of a new fighter aircraft during the 1980s (institutional level)
since the acquisition of the Crusader by the French state in the 1960s: “The navy has always been relatively pro-American, pro-NATO.”23 This relationship, which brought together French military actors in the navy and some of the American industrial actors in the aeronautics sector, was institutionalized during the 1970s and 1980s, which generated shared professional practices: “The navy were used to having American aircraft ever since they had the Crusader and the Corsair. There was a tradition of American aircraft in the navy.”24 This closeness was confirmed by a senior Dassault Aviation manager: “Unquestionably, the navy was used to working and co-operating with the Americans. They really liked working with the US navy; it was prestigious for them”25 (the logic of practicality).

1.8 The French option favored by the sovereignist programmatic clique: The Custodians of the nation state

The sovereignist programmatic clique, which supported the acquisition of the “made in France” Rafale naval aircraft, consisted of the Custodians of the nation state. It brought together certain officers of the air force, and armament engineers of the DGA, as well as managers and engineers from the research divisions of Dassault Aviation and Snecma. For the officers of the air force, unlike those of the navy, fighter aircraft were a strategic type of armament that embodied a “certain idea” of France (the logic of appropriateness): “The argument made by the navy was that it is not as if buying 15 or 20 F-18s [that is, a small proportion of the target total] we were compromising the Rafale programme. They did not see that attached to the acquisition of these “few” F-18s lay the prestige of fighter aircraft for a state, for its foreign policy, for the symbol of the state’s independence.”26 In so far as fighter aircraft were not seen as military equipment like any other by the majority of the air force's officers, the latter opposed the acquisition of the F-18 because buying off the shelf did not guarantee this strategic autonomy: “[…] the terms and conditions for the use of American hardware were extremely restrictive […] To use American armaments, you had to request authorisation from the United States.”

The officers of the air force were connected to some of the armament engineers at the DGA who were in charge of aeronautical programmes. Together, they worked to promote the autarkic Rafale naval aircraft programme and opposed the liberal programmatic clique: “Admiral Louzeau [who was CEMM (navy chief of staff) from 1987 to 1990] had swallowed his sword [meaning, was furious] that the DGA would promote the Rafale naval aircraft. He reacted with outrage: ‘What does that mean? The DGA exists to meet the needs of the armed forces, not of manufacturers!’”28 This analysis throws light on the conflictive relations that pitted the sovereignist programmatic clique against the liberal programmatic clique. This rivalry was not confined to the civil-military rift between the political-administrative actors (“acquisition community”) on the one hand, and the military actors (war fighters) on the other.29 In other words, collaborative relations brought together the political-administrative actors and the military actors at the same time as there were conflictive relations between them (Table 5). This sovereignist programmatic clique extended beyond the state through the close relations of interdependence that the air force and the DGA had with Dassault Aviation and Snecma: “[…] the manufacturers were dead set [against the navy].”30 In order to do this, the managers and engineers at Dassault Aviation emphasized the development, during the 1980s, of their technical expertise in the manufacture of a fighter aircraft that could land on the deck of a short aircraft carrier, something the French company did not possess during the 1960s—and which led to the importation of the American Crusader aircraft. For a former CEMA, “a single nation could not afford the luxury of going it alone. But then there was Dassault, which said, and repeated with confidence, ‘I can do it’.”31 A former DGA [general arms delegate] confirmed this.32 Moreover, the industrial actors at Dassault Aviation made use of two other strategies to appeal to—many would say lobby—state
actors: job creation in France, and anti-Americanism (the logic of consequences). Thus, an administrative actor explained: “This [anti-Americanism] always has resonance in France. The air force did not want it [the F-18]. There was a veritable campaign against the F-18 in France, because it came from the United States.”

At the international level, this case is symptomatic of the distant and conflictive relations between Dassault Aviation and its American competitor McDonnell Douglas. In the winter of 1987, Bruno Revellin-Falcoz, vice-president in charge of co-operation at Dassault Aviation, was invited to McDonnell Douglas's headquarters in Saint-Louis, United States. The American aircraft manufacturer's management proposed to Dassault Aviation that it take part in the development of the successor to the F-18. Bruno Revellin-Falcoz refused: “The United States were taking the mickey, telling us ‘You take 300 aircraft, and we'll take 3,000, so we'll give you 3% of the aircraft [in terms of the share of the work] because you are spending very little money.’” In the spring of 1987, a meeting was set up between John McDonnell, Serge Dassault, Charles Edelstenne, and Bruno Revellin-Falcoz. The American boss hoped to persuade his French competitor of the value of Franco-American co-operation in order to produce a successor to the F-18 together, but the French company's bosses again replied in the negative.

In the autumn of 1987, Bruno Revellin-Falcoz returned to the United States, at the request of Defence Minister Giraud, but yet again “[...] the Americans came up against a brick wall” (Schwartzbrod, 1992:180). This wall, erected by Dassault Aviation, was reinforced by Snecma, which demanded to be put in charge of the engine or at least of the “hot section” [the most strategic and complicated part of the engine] and significantly weakened the relations between the French and American companies. Despite the existence of collaborative relations between Defence Minister Giraud, the admirals of the navy, and the bosses of McDonnell Douglas, the conflictive relations between Dassault Aviation and McDonnell Douglas—and the fact that the navy occupied a peripheral position in the international negotiations over the acquisition of a fighter aircraft—did not favor a decision by the French state in favor of the F-18: “If the navy played a role at all, it was a minor one. You don't listen to the navy much when you want to buy fighter aircraft.”

Finally, the survey describes the relatively balanced relations of strength between the two cliques that were competing to impose their programme to meet the navy's request for the acquisition of a new fighter aircraft—either by importation or autarkically (Table 5). On one side, the liberal programmatic clique, which supported the import of the F-18, was supported by Defence Minister Giraud and DGA [general arms delegate] Chevallier, as well as the officers of the navy and some of the armament engineers of the DGA. On the other side, the sovereignist programmatic clique, which championed the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft, comprised officers of the air force, who had close links to some of the DGA’s armament engineers, as well as with Dassault Aviation and Snecma. However, as one air force general pointed out, “The navy did not want the Rafale naval aircraft, but the rather F-18. But the navy had the Rafale naval aircraft imposed upon it.” By whom did the navy have “the Rafale naval aircraft imposed upon it,” given that it had the support of the Defence Minister and the DGA, the two highest civilian authorities in the defence ministry? In order to understand what remains an enigma at the institutional level of analysis, it is necessary to shift our focus, zooming in on the interpersonal relationships within the sovereignist and liberal programmatic cliques.

1.9 The defeat of the Austerians and the victory of the Custodians

The French state did not import the F-18 from the United States because the liberal programmatic clique did not have any interpersonal connection, at the political level of the decision, with political
or industrial actors, with the exception of the Defence Minister, André Giraud, who found himself isolated in defending the American decisional option. By contrast, the sovereignist programmatic clique, which championed the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft, was not limited to institutional relations between the navy, the DGA, and French companies. President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Chirac, and Marcel and subsequently Serge Dassault, who maintained close interpersonal relations—in public but also privately—supported the French decisional option. The result of these power relations favorable to the sovereignist programmatic clique was the defeat of the Austerians and the victory of the Custodians of the nation state.

1.10  |  Defence Minister Giraud, the liberal clique's only political connection

Defence Minister Giraud, who had a close relationship with his “very great friend”\(^{37}\) the DGA [general arms delegate] Chevallier,\(^{38}\) supported the acquisition of the F-18. This position in favor of importing an American fighter aircraft was motivated by budgetary considerations: “Giraud supported the same arguments [as the navy]: to obtain equipment quickly and at the lowest cost.”\(^{39}\) One armament engineer, who belonged to the staff of Defence Minister Giraud, clarified his position: “He [André Giraud] had written a note that impressed me, setting out two scenarios for the acquisition of new fighter aircraft: the scenario featuring the ‘air’ and ‘naval’ Rafale, and the scenario with the ‘air’ Rafale and the F-18. He demonstrated that the second scenario was cheaper, and that this would have enabled the navy to buy \(x\) frigates. There was a huge disparity”\(^{40}\) (the logic of consequences).

For this reason, Defence Minister Giraud was firmly opposed to the manufacture of a naval version of the Rafale: “It works [the F-18], so we’re not going to bother [with the Rafale].”\(^{41,42}\) This position was taken in the context of the drafting of the LPM [military programme law] by Defence Minister Giraud, which imposed budgetary restrictions: “The real issue at that point was the budget,”\(^{43}\) one air force captain said. “It was necessary to reduce the pressure on the budget,”\(^{44}\) an armament engineer added. Against this background, the F-18 represented, for Defence Minister Giraud, a chance to meet the urgent demand for capacity made by the officers of the navy while at the same time remaining within budgetary constraints.

The position taken by Defence Minister Giraud in favor of the F-18 was not determined only by the constraints of the budget, but also by his technocrat's background and a liberal conception of arms procurement policy (the logic of appropriateness), which set him apart from other Defence Ministers of the time (Hoeffler, 2013; Muller, 1989).

On the one hand, several interviewees emphasized Defence Minister Giraud's technician's background rather than his position as a minister: “Giraud was more an engineer than a politician,”\(^{45}\) a former DGA [general arms delegate] said, a statement that was confirmed by a member of the minister's staff, for whom “Giraud had no constituency.”\(^{46}\) A graduate of the École Polytechnique [an elite higher education establishment] and the corps des Mines [a French state body for training top scientists], his professional legitimacy stemmed from his technical expertise, which led him to work at the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique [French atomic energy commission] and in the private sector (the logic of practicality). These experiences in the nuclear sector reinforced, as they did for the DGA [general arms delegate] Chevallier, their professional ties to the United States: “It must be said that he [Giraud] had relations of great trust with the United States because he came from a nuclear background.”\(^{47}\)

On the other hand, the liberal approach that Defence Minister Giraud adopted toward arms procurement policy was determined by the principle of “best value for money.” His position in favor of importing the F-18 was not an anomaly. Indeed, during the same period, Defence Minister Giraud
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decided to buy, off the shelf, the American Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and
military transport aircraft (C-130). This liberal conception of arms procurement policy valued market
competition, and consequently produced conflictive relations with Dassault Aviation, as one political
actor explained: “The only [defence minister] to be against Dassault was Giraud, who was liberal […]
Giraud did not like the idea that there should be a state within the state, because it was through the
state that Dassault had become what it was.”  

A former CEMA agreed with this analysis, as did
another military actor, who explained that “[…] there had been heated personal exchanges between
Serge Dassault and André Giraud starting in 1986.”

At the international level, sustained and co-operative relations between French navy officers and
the American bosses of the McDonnell Douglas company were used by Defence Minister Giraud (the
logic of consequences). John McDonnell, the CEO of McDonnell Douglas, was received by Defence
Minister Giraud in Paris in the autumn of 1987. The latter, who felt that “in budgetary terms, Dassault
is screwing us with the Rafale,” was committed to the acquisition off the shelf of the American F-18,
which cost 12 billion francs (€2.9 billion) less than developing the Rafale naval aircraft, and which,
moreover, could be leased (Schwartzbrod, 1992:179). At that point, the information that the navy was
interested in the F-18 was sensitive. A specialized periodical published an article which reported the
rapprochement between the French navy and the American company McDonnell Douglas, which
manufactured the F-18. The journalist who wrote the article recalled the fierce reaction of Dassault
Aviation’s CEO, Serge Dassault: “We published the article, having had confirmation from McDonnell
Douglas and having re-read the piece 20 times to make sure it was totally balanced. The next day I was
summoned by Serge Dassault, who told me: ‘You are scum, a scoundrel!’ There followed a violent
argument. I left [his office] under a barrage of insults.”

On the basis of the survey conducted, this writer considers that Defence Minister Giraud “played
an important part” in the formulation of the decisional process. However, the fact remains that he
was the only political actor to defend the liberal programme for the importation of the American
F-18, which the navy’s admirals, some armament engineers—including the DGA [general arms dele-
gate]—and the American company McDonnell Douglas were striving for (Table 6). The defeat of the
Austerians of the nation state was embodied by this liberal programmatic clique.

1.11 | Within the sovereignist clique, close ties between political actors

In contrast to the isolation of the Defence Minister, the sovereignist programmatic clique, which sup-
ported the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft, brought together officers of the air force and some
armament engineers in the DGA with several political and industrial agents who enjoyed a highly
central position. It was these numerous connections that enabled the Custodians of the nation state,
represented by this sovereignist programmatic clique, to prevail (Table 6).

Relations between President Mitterrand and Marcel Dassault were distant and conflictive. The
former was a socialist, European, and had opposed General de Gaulle ever since the beginning of
the French Fifth Republic. The latter was conservative, sovereignist, and had entered politics in 1951
at the request of General de Gaulle. In his programme for the 1981 presidential election (the “110
propositions”), François Mitterrand aimed to nationalize several companies in the industrial sector,
including Dassault Aviation, which was high on the list (proposition 21). However, the family-owned
business was not nationalized in 1981, after Marcel Dassault sold 26% of the shares in Dassault
Aviation to the state. Moreover, President Mitterrand was favorable to Franco-German co-operation
with regard to the Tiger attack helicopter programme, but did not adopt a clear position regarding
the European fighter aircraft (the Eurofighter Typhoon programme). It should also be noted that
President Mitterrand was in regular contact with Defence Minister Giraud during the cohabitation period (1986–1988). However, the former did not support the latter, either against Serge Dassault, who wanted to be appointed CEO of Dassault Aviation in 1986, or in favor of the acquisition of the F-18. These non-decisions, which seem surprising, can be explained by the significant role played by Pierre de Bénouville, who enjoyed a unique position of “intermediarity” between François Mitterrand and Marcel Dassault.

François Mitterrand had been friends since childhood with Pierre de Bénouville, leading the latter to assert that “François was part of me” (de Bénouville, 2002:347). This friendship endured till the end of François Mitterrand’s life. “Like a common theme, it never broke,” despite their ideological differences (Perrier, 2005:232). Indeed, Pierre de Bénouville supported a monarchy and the nationalist right of Maurice Barrès, which led him to take part in the riots of 6 February 1934, write for the anti-Semitic newspaper Le Pays libre from 1936 to 1938, and support Marshal Pétain’s Révolution nationale, until in late 1942 he joined the French Resistance, where he again met François Mitterrand. After World War Two, Pierre de Bénouville approached General de Gaulle, and became a member of parliament for the Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF) [Rally of the French People] in 1951, the same year as Marcel Dassault. During the 1950s, Pierre de Bénouville became close friends with Marcel Dassault, and was his godfather at his baptism, when Marcel Dassault converted to Christianity in 1957. As well as spiritual ties through Catholicism, political ones through Gaullism, and the friendship between Pierre de Bénouville and Marcel Dassault, the two men developed professional relations in the media and the defence industry: “He [Pierre de Bénouville] had permanent access to his office—he could meet him, talk to him, any time he felt it necessary. Marcel Dassault consulted him over delicate issues and entrusted him with important tasks. He was his missus dominicus,” (Carlier, 1992:375). During the 1970s, Pierre de Bénouville became a director of Dassault Aviation. He offered Marcel Dassault the opportunity to use his connections, especially the networks he had formed while in the Resistance: “[…] he was the unavoidable gatekeeper for anyone who wanted to make contact with the industrialist […] [by virtue of] his fabulous network of connections both in France and abroad, ‘Pierrot’ was an irreplaceable link.” (Perrier, 2005:185–6).

Secondary sources reveal the use made of Pierre de Bénouville’s position as an intermediary by Marcel and later Serge Dassault. This strategy was used to remind President Mitterrand of Dassault

\[TABLE\ 6\  \text{Rivalry between two programmatic cliques for the acquisition of a new fighter aircraft during the 1980s (interpersonal scale)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmatic actors</th>
<th>The Custodians of the nation state embodied by the sovereignist programmatic clique</th>
<th>The Austerians of the nation state embodied by the liberal programmatic clique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>President François Mitterrand&lt;br&gt;Prime Minister Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>Defence Minister André Giraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>DGA [general arms delegate]&lt;br&gt;Jacques Chevallier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>General Achille Lerche (CEMAA)&lt;br&gt;General Bernard Norlain&lt;br&gt;Admiral Yves Goupil</td>
<td>Admiral Bernard Louzeau (CEMM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>Marcel Dassault&lt;br&gt;Serge Dassault&lt;br&gt;Pierre de Bénouville</td>
<td>John McDonnell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisional preference</td>
<td>Rafale naval aircraft (French option)</td>
<td>F-18 (American option)</td>
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Aviation’s opposition to the nationalization plan in 1981—as Pierre de Bénouville himself confirmed (2002:329)—and subsequently to champion Serge Dassault’s bid for the post of CEO of the family business in 1986 (the logic of consequences). This survey demonstrates the use of the same mechanism in the decisional process that pitted the sovereignist programme for the Rafale naval aircraft against the liberal programme for the F-18: “This happened at the Elysée, with the president. It was either the CEO of the company in question who was taking these steps in person, or a certain number of people who took on the task. Each side had its emissaries, who aimed to point out the advantages and drawbacks of one or other option.”

In fact, the CEO Serge Dassault did not enjoy privileged access to President Mitterrand. On the contrary Serge Dassault, like his father, had distant, conflictive relations with President Mitterrand. As Pierre de Bénouville revealed: “François Mitterrand never received Serge Dassault in private. Whenever I suggested a meeting to him, he would say: ‘Serge Dassault is interested only in things that do not interest me. He has you. That’s enough!’” (Claude, 2002:228). For this reason, Pierre de Bénouville brought his “personal relationship” with the president into play, in order to discuss the issue with him regularly: “Dassault used the usual means in this kind of situation, namely de Bénouville. He enjoyed immediate access to Mitterrand.” Indeed, Pierre de Bénouville himself confirmed this: as well as his weekly meetings with the head of state, which took place at the Elysée Palace on Saturday mornings, he would be received almost immediately for a meeting with President Mitterrand when he needed one, without having to make an appointment (de Bénouville, 2002:330).

Pierre de Bénouville also showed himself to be active with regard to Prime Minister Chirac: “In March 1988, I accompanied Serge Dassault to see Pic [Prime Minister Chirac’s chief of staff]. We found the 25% [that companies had to pay for the development of Rafale] hard to swallow. He [de Bénouville] intervened to have it scrapped, but for once he failed. The goal was for him to put pressure on Chirac,” explained an actor from Dassault Aviation who was working on the Rafale programme at the time. A political actor confirmed the closeness between Pierre de Bénouville and Prime Minister Chirac, which influenced the formulation of the decision to choose the sovereignist programme embodied by the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft: “I know that de Bénouville often went to see him [Chirac] and that this had a big impact on the decision. That was not the case with Rocard.” Prime Minister Chirac could count, within his staff, on two military actors who also championed the sovereignist programme of the Rafale naval aircraft: General Norlain and Admiral Goupil. More specifically, Prime Minister Chirac had a close political relationship with Pierre de Bénouville, not a friendship as de Bénouville had with François Mitterrand: “With Chirac, it was more about ideas, and a conservative, sovereignist political direction.” On this subject, one French political actor recalled that Jacques Chirac was “[…] a historical Gaullist; he was never a European. I’m telling you – there’s no doubt about it.” In 1977, when Jacques Chirac became mayor of Paris, Pierre de Bénouville was elected a city councillor for the 12th arrondissement [district]. His deputy was Olivier Dassault, grandson of Marcel and son of Serge Dassault, who succeeded Pierre de Bénouville after the latter’s resignation.

Thus, the sovereignist programmatic clique was not confined to institutional relations between the air force, the DGA, Dassault Aviation, and Snecma. It also comprised interpersonal relations, public and private, between President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Chirac, Marcel and later Serge Dassault, and Pierre de Bénouville, which explain the victory of the Custodians of the nation state.

2 | CONCLUSION

Based on exclusive data that required a 2-year field survey, the French state’s decision taken in 1988 to acquire the Rafale naval fighter aircraft, rather than the F-18, has been explained by the PAF. Two
programmatic cliques clashed over this highly strategic political and industrial issue: one was striving for a sovereignist public action programme and supported the French option of the Rafale naval aircraft, whereas the other championed a liberal programme and supported the off-the-shelf purchase of the American F-18. With these aims in mind, all these actors acted via three logics of action that have been analyzed: the effect of political strategies through the logic of consequences, the effect of social standards through the logic of appropriateness, and the effect of professional habits through the logic of practicality (Table 4).

Having rendered the relatively balanced institutional relations of power that pitted the sovereignist programmatic clique against the liberal programmatic clique, and their logic of action, the analysis has revealed closer, more numerous, and more collaborative interpersonal ties enjoyed—at the political level of decision making—by the actors of the sovereignist programmatic clique than by those of the liberal programmatic clique. The latter could count only on the support of Defence Minister Giraud, who found himself isolated in defending the American option of the F-18: it was defeat for the Austerians of the nation state. By contrast, the sovereignist programme that aimed to acquire the "made in France" Rafale naval aircraft received support from President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Chirac, Marcel and subsequently Serge Dassault, and their adviser, Pierre de Bénouville: it was victory for the Custodians of the nation state.

This analysis makes two analytical contributions to the development of the PAF. First, it has demonstrated the value of the PAF for analyzing an object of political economy such as French arms procurement policy. In order to do this, the typology of programmatic actors has been added to with a fourth model, that of the programmatic clique. The model of the programmatic clique takes into account two types of actors hitherto absent from analyses, namely private industrial actors and individual actors. The decisional process that led to the acquisition of the Rafale naval aircraft could not have been explained without taking into account certain individual actors, which confirms some previous research on French defence policy that is part of the bureaucratic politics approach (Cohen, 1994; Irondelle, 2011). Nevertheless, the bureaucratic politics approach focuses on organizational conflicts between political decision makers, senior officials, and military officers within the state, thus failing to take into account the effect of industrial actors on the crafting of the decision making process.

Second, this research has complemented the study of liberalization of the state by a sociology of its elites. In an extension of the analysis of the French Leclerc programme (Genieys & Joana, 2015:68), the victory of the Custodians of the state and the defeat of the Austerians of the state has been revealed: the French state preserved its authority and prerogatives through the acquisition of the French Rafale naval aircraft. However, this conflict between programmatic actors was not played out only over the defence of the state's authority and resources but also over the territory within which this
state authority was applied. Consequently, as a result of this study of French arms procurement policy, it is more accurate to alter the expression to “the Custodians and Austerians of the nation state.” This essential clarification makes it clear how non-state actors, such as the French company Dassault Aviation, position themselves, for strategic reasons (winning a large arms contract), as Custodians of the nation state. It was already known that state actors could be Austerians of the state in defending the neo-liberal turn “by and within the state” (Darviche & Genieys, 2018:121). This analysis tells us that some Custodians of the state are not exclusively state actors: the preservation of the state's capability can also happen “by and within the defence industry.”

This result contributes to the study of political change in defence policies in Europe (Hoeffler, 2013; Irondelle, 2011; Joana & Mérand, 2014). In doing so, it challenges the argument of path dependence (Pierson, 2000), which insists on the inertia of armament policies in Europe (DeVore, 2012; Genieys & Michel, 2004:87). In the case of the Rafale Marine, France's decision not to retain the F-18 goes against historical neo-institutionalist forecasts, in so far as the fighter jet used by French naval officers since the 1960s is the American Crusader, and not a French aircraft.

Finally, this research could be pursued in two ways: first, by analyzing a decision which saw the Custodians of the state fail, such as, for example, the off-the-shelf purchase of the American Reaper military drone by the French state in 2013; second, by comparing the actors of arms procurement policy in two states, such as during the negotiations begun in 2017 between France and Germany regarding the joint production of a fighter aircraft (SCAF), a military drone (RPAS), and a tank (MGCS). So there is plenty of work to do for those who want to develop the PAF and at the same time understand what governs arms procurement policy and the defence-industrial capitalism in Europe.

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ENDNOTES
1 The dilemma between national sovereignty and international interdependence is at the center of President Macron’s key speeches on defence policy (Macron, 2017, 2020).
2 17 April 1986.
3 This step is akin to that taken by Muller (1989, p. 11, 189) which explains how Airbus Industrie “[...] allowed a heterogeneous group of public and private actors to shape the system”.
4 This category of analysis echoes that of “permanent” actors—as opposed to “intermittent” actors—developed using the case of agents of the European Union (Georgakakis, 2012).
5 The term “clique” is used in the sociology of social networks (Lazega, 1998; Mercklé, 2011) to denote a cohesive social group (cluster) comprising heterogeneous units (individuals or organizations).
6 This division between “social elite” and “fiscal elite” can be compared to the state's “left hand” and “right hand” (Bourdieu, 2012:581–2).
7 Indeed, French elites represented the state as a nation state and not as a member state according to Bickerton’s concept (2012).
8 Access was particularly difficult, confirming the difficulties encountered by similar studies in the past (Cohen, 1994; Irondelle, 2011). Three-quarters of the interviews were conducted during the last 6 months of the survey. Two vectors
were essential for eventually creating a “snowball” effect: securing interviews with several former defence ministers and conducting two consulting missions (Faure, 2020).

9 Interview 61, Industrialist, Dassault Aviation, 4 June 2014, Paris.
10 Interview 57, Military Adviser, prime minister’s staff, 10 April 2014, Paris.
11 Interview 17, General (air force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 14 January 2014, Neuilly-sur-Seine.
12 Interview 61, Industrialist, Dassault Aviation, 4 June 2014, Paris.
13 Interview 45, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, DGA, 29 July 2013, Paris.
14 Interview 26, Captain (Air Force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 18 February 2014, Paris.
15 Interview 9, Colonel (Army), Defence Ministry, EMA, 2 December 2013, Paris.
16 Interview 57, Military Adviser, Prime Minister’s staff, 10 April 2014, Paris.
17 Interview 22, Senior Civil Servant, Foreign Ministry, 11 February 2014, Paris, op. cit.; see also (Chambost, 2007, p. 96) the interview with general Achille Lerche, then chief of staff in the air force (1986–1989).
19 Interview 57, Military Adviser, Prime Minister’s staff, 10 April 2014, Paris.
20 Interview 45, Senior Civil Servant, Defence MINISTRY, EMAA, 25 March 2014, Arcueil.
21 Interview 9, Colonel (army), Defence MINISTRY, EMA, 2 December 2013, Paris.
22 Interview 43, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, DGA, 21 July 2013, Paris; Interview 53, Senior Civil Servant, Defence MINISTRY, DGA, 12 September 2013, Paris; Interview 44, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, Minister’s staff, 24 March 2014, Paris.
24 Interview 1, Member, National Assembly, 12 November 2013, Paris.
26 Interview 26, Captain (Air Force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 18 February 2014, Paris.
27 Interview 58, Colonel (Air Force), Defence Ministry, EMAA, 19 September 2013, Paris.
29 Interview 45, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, EMAA, 15 March 2014, Arcueil.
30 Interview 26, Captain (Air Force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 18 February 2014, Paris.
33 Interview 11, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, DGA, 20 July 2012, Paris.
34 Interview 61, Industrialist, Dassault Aviation, 4 June 2014, Paris.
35 Interview 51, General Arms Delegate, Defence Ministry, DGA, 6 September 2013.
37 Interview 57, Military Adviser, Prime Minister’s staff, 10 April 2014, Paris.
38 “Chevallier was very close to Giraud, who had appointed him to this post.” Interview 26, Captain (air force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 18 February 2014, Paris.
39 Interview 57, Military Adviser, Prime Minister’s staff, 10 April 2014, Paris.
41 Interview 10, Senior Civil Servant, Defence Ministry, DGA, 12 December 2013, Paris.
42 “About the Rafale naval aircraft, he [André Giraud] said it was bloody stupid.” Interview 51, General Arms Delegate, Defence Ministry, DGA, 4 March 2014, Paris.
43 Interview 26, Captain (Air Force), Defence Ministry, EMA, 18 February 2014, Paris.
The Franco-German co-operation agreement for the development of the Tiger was signed by the defence ministers Hernu and Wörner in May 1984 (Krotz, 2011, p. 90–4).

Marcel Dassault died on 17 Avril 1986; Serge Dassault became CEO of Dassault Aviation on 29 October 1986.

This case study therefore disproves the left/right split described by a study connected to the support and control of the arms trade (Béraud-Sudreau, 2014).

REFERENCES


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