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Defence Policy: Temporal and Spatial Differentiation within Reformed Bandwagoning

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Post-Cold War European cooperation in defence displays significant spatial differentiation. The borders of cooperation in matters of 'hard' security are defined by Russian power in the east.¹ At the same time, a diverse set of intergovernmental arrangements have arisen within these territorial boundaries (Tables 22.4 and 22.5). They include '*à la carte*', 'variable-geometry' and 'multiple-speed' initiatives in joint military capability procurement programmes and the cross-national generation of crisis-management forces. However, the main institutions of European security, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO, display stronger complementarity in membership.² Apart from Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden, all EU states are members of NATO.³ Of the 24 European NATO members, only Denmark,⁴ Turkey and Norway are not full participants in ESDP (see Table 22.1).

Nevertheless, at first glance, there appears to be differentiation in preferences to route cooperation through NATO or ESDP. UK defence policy remains firmly anchored within NATO and committed to capability acquisition, ensuring interoperability with the USA, despite an incremental shift towards embeddedness within ESDP (Dover, 2007: 88; Farrell, 2008: 781–2; Jones, 2007: 223; Miskimmon, 2004). Contemporary French defence policy prioritizes ESDP and capability procurement, seeking an autonomous European capacity for military action (Brenner, 2003; Irondelle, 2003; Lungu, 2004b). It is, however, increasingly Atlanticized, symbolized by France's return to NATO's integrated military command in 2009 (Sutton, 2008: 307–11). The institutional forums of German defence policy cohere around a 'bridge' role, between British and French preferences and, until recently, Germany has been a relative laggard in the development of interoperable crisis-management capabilities (Dyson, 2005: 373–6). Similar differentiation is evident amongst Europe's smaller states. Whilst Finland and Sweden prefer to route defence cooperation through ESDP, Denmark, Norway, the Baltic States, east-central European (CEE) states, and Balkan states are more Atlanticist (Jones, 2007: 238; Lansford and Tashev, 2005).

This differentiation raises the question of what broader function these initiatives serve. Are European states moving towards common or divergent policy objectives through ESDP, NATO, and bi/plurilateral initiatives? Determining the level of

Table 22.1 Membership of the core institutions of European security

State	ESDP	EDA	ESA	ESC ¹	WEU	OSCE	NATO
Austria	x	x	x	x	3	x	1
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Bulgaria	x	x		x	4	x	x
Cyprus	x	x		x		x	
Canada			1			x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	1	x	2	x	x
Denmark			x	x	3	x	x
Estonia	x	x		x	4	x	x
Finland	x	x	x	x	3	x	
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Hungary	x	x	1	x	2	x	x
Iceland					2	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	3	x	
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Latvia	x	x		x	4	x	x
Lithuania	x	x		x	4	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Malta	x	x		x		x	
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Norway		1	x		2	x	x
Poland	x	x	1	x	2	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Romania	x	x	1	x	4	x	x
Slovakia	x	x		x	4	x	x
Slovenia	x	x		x	4	x	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x	x	2	x	
Switzerland			x			x	
Turkey					2	x	x
UK	x	x		x	x	x	x
USA						x	x

KEY

1 = Cooperation Agreement

2 = Associate Members

3 = Observer Members

4 = Associate Partners

complementarity between these arrangements, particularly NATO and ESDP, is central in establishing the level and significance of differentiated cooperation.

This chapter will highlight how NATO and ESDP are converging around increasingly similar functions: a new form of ‘forward defence’ tackling threats to international instability at source (Ben-Ari, 2005; Kaitera and Ben-Ari, 2008; Farrell, 2008: 798–9). This convergence in function has been accompanied by spatial differentiation. ESDP focuses on Europe’s geopolitical neighbourhood, whilst NATO increases emphasis on global instability. Consequently, NATO is increasingly acting as a forum for developing capabilities of benefit to ESDP. Likewise, the

European Defence Agency (EDA) and Headline Goals 2010 are fostering capability and doctrinal developments of use to Atlantic Alliance missions. The greatest divergence exists in the 'provision' or 'consumption' of security.

This chapter begins with an analysis of complementarity and differentiation in the function, territoriality and temporality of ESDP/NATO initiatives and other post-Cold War instances of defence cooperation. It then demonstrates the analytical leverage of neo-classical realism in explaining these patterns: that is, the powerful effects exerted by international structure, combined with the important intervening role of unit-level factors in shaping the temporality, territoriality and functional scope of cooperation.

Functional, spatial and temporal complementarity and differentiation: a case of duplication?

The EU's longer-term development as an increasingly militarized actor since the launch of ESDP in December 1999 appears to herald the development of a rival security organization to NATO (Art, 2004; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Posen, 2006). Whilst NATO is an institution of collective defence, both institutions have emerged as forums for coordinating similar objectives: tackling threats to international instability at source, through low-intensity, expeditionary crisis-management operations.

The European Rapid Reaction Force was created in 1999, consisting of 60,000 troops deployable at 60 days' notice, sustainable for up to one year, capable of undertaking lower-intensity tasks and of sustaining one medium-to-high-intensity operation (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 804–5). The December 1999 European Council also established three main institutions to support ESDP, reflecting NATO's intergovernmental political–military structures: the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff. Since 2004 there has been a clear attempt to establish structures facilitating robust, higher-intensity tasks, notably the Headline Goal 2010 and the May 2004 Battlegroup Initiative that created up to 15 Battlegroups, each consisting of 1500 troops, deployable within 15 days (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 804; Howorth, 2007: 107; Ulriksen, 2004: 469–70). This development has been accompanied by steps to ensure a 'comprehensive approach' to the planning and conduct of military operations, integrating civilian and military instruments.

NATO's development as a focal point for expeditionary operations began in earnest at the April 1999 Washington Summit, which resulted in an updated Strategic Concept outlining crisis-management as a core function. This concept was given concrete form at the November 2002 Prague Summit through the NATO Response Force (NRF): a high-readiness, technically advanced joint air, naval and infantry force of 21,000 troops, deployable within five to 30 days for up to three months, drawn predominantly from NATO's European members and designed to undertake high-intensity war-fighting tasks, disaster relief and peace-keeping (King, 2005: 331).

The November 2006 Riga Summit endorsed Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) that built upon the 1999 Strategic Concept by identifying the core threats

to NATO as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), failed/failing states, regional crises, misuse of technologies and disruption of resource flows. The Riga Declaration is significant as it outlines the requirement for a shift in force structures and capabilities to permit simultaneous combat, stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian missions; notably the strengthening of NATO's crisis-management instruments and cooperation with the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors in the conduct and planning of military operations.⁵

Hence the EU is gradually developing the institutional mechanisms and instruments to facilitate more robust missions at the higher end of the conflict spectrum and appears to represent a growing competitor to NATO, which is at the inception of developing its peace-support capabilities (Kaitera and Ben-Ari, 2008: 7–8). This apparent functional duplication is evident in the December 2003 European Security Strategy, which outlines a similar set of challenges to CPG.⁶

This picture of competition is, however, misleading. It is more accurate to point to increasing complementarity and cooperation in military capacity, command facilities and force planning and to growing strategic coherence between NATO and ESDP (Mowle and Sacko, 2007: 597–618; Rynning, 2005: 155, 172; Ulriksen, 2004: 468). This is evident in the March 2003 Berlin-Plus Agreement, facilitating the inclusion of EU outsiders into ESDP structures and providing the EU with access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and assets. Furthermore, Berlin Plus included arrangements to facilitate mutually reinforcing capability acquisition, establishing the EU–NATO Capability Group in May 2003, supplemented by regular meetings between EU and NATO officials (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 814–18). Moreover, in October 2005 a permanent NATO liaison within the EU Military Staff and a permanent EU planning cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) were established (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 812).

Whilst the EU is developing the capacity to undertake higher-intensity tasks, the NRF remains heavier, more rapidly deployable and more focused on full-spectrum tasks than the Battlegroups (Kaitera and Ben-Ari, 2008; Howorth, 2007: 14–15; Rynning, 2005: 157).⁷ This functional difference is reflected in ESDP missions, which have largely been at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Furthermore, NATO and the EU are emerging as organizations characterized by spatial differentiation. Although the strategic radius of EU operations has expanded significantly since 1999, ESDP missions are predominantly focused on the EU geo-strategic neighbourhood, whilst NATO's deployments have been ever more global (Jones, 2007: 216).

European capability initiatives and the gradual emergence of military isomorphism

It is possible to distinguish an increasingly distinct model of military convergence amongst Europe's Great Powers that is being reflected in capability cooperation: the development of joint, flexible, military forces capable of expeditionary missions on the full range of the conflict spectrum. Capability investment in Britain,

France, Germany⁸ – and to a more limited extent in lesser-rank European states, particularly Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden – forms a partial and selective emulation of the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 58–83; T. Dyson, 2008: 729–37; Flournoy and Smith, 2005: 91).

Crucially, European military isomorphism does not support the ‘technological determinism’ that has defined US reform (Reynolds, 2007). European states are in the process of undertaking a modest emulation of the core concepts underpinning US ‘transformation’ in the form of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) (T. Dyson, 2008: 729–37).⁹ Capability acquisition, not least of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and precision-guided munitions, reflects the desire to augment their capacity to undertake stand-off, high-intensity war-fighting operations against peer or near-peer competitors, alongside the USA and each other. At the same time convergence is focused on crisis-management operations of varying intensity and the limitations of technology. Reforms have also emphasized the effective integration of civilian and military instruments in low-medium intensity peace-support operations (the ‘Comprehensive Approach’) (Farrell, 2008: 793; Kaitera and Ben-Ari, 2008: 7). This isomorphism, led by Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, has been accompanied by the development of niche capabilities by smaller (largely west European) NATO/EU states, in support of low-high intensity crisis-management operations (Reynolds, 2007: 364).

ESDP capability procurement initiatives: from civilian crisis-management to C4ISR

European military isomorphism is increasingly reflected in ESDP initiatives. The Battlegroup Initiative was supplemented by the EDA’s establishment in July 2004. Whilst inter-governmental and deficient in enforcement mechanisms, the EDA is an important step towards cross-European acquisition (Posen, 2006: 181; Reynolds 2007: 375).¹⁰ It is the first EU-level agency charged with identifying European capability needs, promoting armaments cooperation, coordinating research on defence technology, and strengthening Europe’s defence industry. The organization has taken responsibility for leading up the Headline Goals 2010, which outlined interoperability, sustainability and deployability as the core capabilities necessary to permit several simultaneous Battlegroup operations (Cornish and Edwards, 2005: 804; Howorth, 2007: 109).

Of particular note is the 2006 ‘Long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs (LTV)’, outlining the C4ISR capabilities required for ESDP, and forming the basis for a more detailed Capabilities Development Plan that is currently under negotiation.¹¹ The EDA’s ‘Comprehensive Capabilities Development Process’ has also highlighted several areas of joint procurement required to facilitate Battlegroup missions.¹² Furthermore, the EDA has instigated numerous collaborative ‘à la carte’ projects in R&T, including a Joint Investment

Programme on Force Protection (JIP-FP) beginning in January 2007, and resulting in eight C4ISR projects.¹³ In May 2008 a second, two-year JIP was launched, investigating Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies (JIP-ICET) (see Table 22.2). An additional EDA R&T programme is the 'Miracle' Project on Micro-Satellite Cluster Technology (transferred from the West European Armaments Group in June 2007). Miracle investigated the technologies necessary for the use of SAR cluster (Synthetic Aperture Radar) and ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) satellites in military operations as a basis for European ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities.¹⁴

Another important development within the EDA is the July 2006 Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement (CoC), establishing a European Defence Equipment Market

Table 22.2 Major 'multiple speed' capability initiative within the EDA

State	Software Defined Radio	21st Century Soldier Systems	JIP-FP	JIP-IECT	MIRACLE	Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement
Austria		X	X		X	X
Belgium			X		X	X
Bulgaria						X
Cyprus			X	X		X
Czech Republic			X		X	X
Estonia			X			X
Finland	X	X	X		X	X
France	X		X	X	X	X
Germany		X	X	X	X	X
Greece			X	X	X	X
Hungary			X	X	X	X
Iceland						
Ireland			X			X
Italy	X	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia						X
Lithuania						X
Luxembourg					X	X
Malta						X
Netherlands			X		X	X
Norway			X	X	X	
Poland	X		X	X	X	X
Portugal		X	X		X	X
Romania						
Slovakia			X	X		X
Slovenia			X	X		X
Spain	X		X	X	X	X
Sweden	X	X	X		X	X
Turkey					X	
UK					X	X

and Europe-wide tenders for defence contracts. Whilst voluntary, the CoC is an important step towards an internationally competitive European armaments market and builds upon progress during the 1990s in consolidating Europe's defence-industrial base. In 1990 the European defence industry was characterized by a plethora of small and medium-sized national firms. It is now possible to identify three major defence firms: BAE systems, Thales and EADS. However, when compared to the USA, whose industry is dominated by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, Europe's defence industry remains relatively fragmented (Guay and Callum, 2002: 763).

Furthermore, in November 2003 the European Space Agency (ESA) entered into a Framework Agreement with the European Commission's Directorate-General Transportation. A particularly important ESA initiative is the Galileo global navigation system that, by 2013, will enhance NEC in Battlegroup and NRF operations, having proceeded in close cooperation with the USA to ensure complementarity with the Global Positioning System. Cooperation in space policy is 'multiple speed', as ESA membership is dependent upon a state's space industry capacity and contribution to the ESA budget (see Howarth, Chapter 16 in this volume). Europe's space technology development has also been supported by the January 2002 incorporation of the European Satellite Centre (ESC) into the EU.

Finally, the December 2004 European Council established the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 that improved EU civilian crisis-management capacity by developing rapid-response capabilities, including Civilian Response Teams, Integrated Police Teams and Formed Police Units.¹⁵ In November 2007 CHG 2008 was re-launched as CHG 2010, outlining several new priority areas for crisis-management capability development.¹⁶

In short, capability investment programmes under the auspices of the EU have not only bolstered the civilian dimension of ESDP, but have also begun to foster interoperability in C4ISR and develop the foundations to equip the Battlegroups with the necessary capabilities for network-enabled 'robust' crisis-management operations.

NATO *à la carte* capability procurement initiatives: improving C4ISR and interoperability

Recent developments within NATO are increasingly centred on improving Europe's capacity to undertake full-spectrum operations (see Table 22.3). Although NATO does not yet enjoy a common C2 (command and control) capability, the Alliance instigated several important (largely *à la carte*) programmes during the 1990s that developed the building blocks for NEC.

Firstly, the Allied Command Europe Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) facilitated a common operational picture, supported by the December 2000 NATO Command, Control and Communications NATO Technical Architecture Initiative (NC3TA), outlining the short-term technical requirements to enhance C3 interoperability (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2008: 87). Secondly, the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) of 1999 was integrated into national militaries in 2008. Thirdly, a NATO General Purpose Communications System

Table 22.3 Major post-Cold War capability initiatives within NATO

State	ACCIS	ACCS	NGCS	MIDS	CAESAR	CoE	SAIS	SAC	Sea lift	NH 90	AGS	MAJIIC	ALT BMD	Satcom	NM EC	RTO
Austria																
Belgium	x	x	x			x				x	x		x			x
Bulgaria	x	x	x					x			x		x			x
Cyprus																
Canada	x	x	x				x		x		x	x	x		x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	x			x	x	x			x		x			x
Denmark	x	x	x				x		x		x		x			x
Estonia	x	x	x			x		x			x		x			x
Finland								x		x						
France	x	x	x	x		x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x		x(3)	x			x	x	x	x		x	x
Greece	x	x	x							x	x		x			x
Hungary	x	x	x			x	x	x	x		x		x			x
Iceland	x	x	x								x		x			
Ireland																
Italy	x	x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Latvia	x	x	x					x			x		x			x
Lithuania	x	x	x					x			x		x			x
Luxembourg	x	x	x				x				x		x			
Malta	x	x	x								x		x			
Netherlands	x	x	x			x(2)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Norway	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Poland	x	x	x				x	x			x		x			x
Portugal	x	x	x				x		x	x	x		x			x
Romania	x	x	x			x		x			x		x			x
Slovakia	x	x	x			x	x				x		x			x
Slovenia	x	x	x			x	x	x			x		x			x
Spain	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Sweden							x	x		x						
Switzerland																
Turkey	x	x	x			x	x				x		x			x
UK	x	x	x						x			x	x	x	x	x
USA	x	x	x		x	x		x				x	x		x	x

(NGCS) permitted the communication of data and voice information. Finally, the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), a 'multiple-speed' initiative, was initiated in 1991 and fostered cross-platform telecommunications interoperability.¹⁷

NATO also took strides to develop ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities in the late 1990s. Since July 1996 the coordination of NATO's C4ISR initiatives has been facilitated by the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) (Flournoy and Smith, 2005: 65–6).¹⁸ One particularly notable project within NC3A is the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) programme testing national and NATO air-and-space-based C4ISR systems with the aim of creating a single system (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2008: 91). National development of interoperable C4ISR technology and its application in crisis-management operations has also been facilitated by the 1998 establishment of the Research and Technology Organisation (RTO), providing an important forum for exchanging technical information and bolstering cooperation in the development and operationalization of defence technologies.

The November 2002 Prague Summit formed a landmark in the development of NEC. The ability of European states to furnish the NRF with strategic lift, logistical and C4ISR capabilities emerged as critical for the initiative's viability. In its streamlining of NATO Command Structures, the Prague Summit established a Strategic Command for Transformation (the US-based Allied Command Transformation [ACT]) tasked with improving training, capabilities and doctrine in EBAO and NEC. Subordinate structures are distributed across Europe, augmented by national and multi-nationally funded Centres of Excellence (CoE) dispersed across NATO's European members.¹⁹

The core function of ACT is to lead up the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which outlined specific commitments and timetables for the acquisition of capabilities necessary to deploy the NRF.²⁰ The main projects are Strategic Air and Sea Lift Capabilities, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). Improvements in airlift have taken the form of two initiatives: the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SAIS) and acquisition of three Boeing C-17 transport aircraft to develop NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). Sealift capabilities are being developed by a consortium led by Norway.

Improvements in airlift build upon developments during the 1990s such as the NH90 Naval and Tactical Helicopters, which entered production in June 2000 and came into service after 2006. The core NATO programme in ISR is AGS, involving the development of manned and unmanned radar platforms (Flournoy and Smith, 2005: 33).²¹ ISR has also been supplemented by the Multi-Sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Programme (MAJIC), a five-year technology demonstrator launched in 2005.²² The current NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) fleet is also being updated (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 91).

The PCC also included a commitment to TMD that will link with ACCIS to protect NATO troops on out-of-area deployments, taking the form of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Defence System (ALTBMD) a 'system of systems' with a range of 3000km. Furthermore, the Alliance's satellite communications capabilities

have been updated through the Satcom Post-2000 Programme, initiated in May 2004 and operable from January 2005.²³ Finally, ACT has provided a forum for the NATO NEC Project (NMEC) launched in November 2003 and completed in 2005. This study examined the utility of NEC in the NRF and the implications for future NATO procurement, resulting in a 'roadmap' for NEC adopted by ACT as the basis for future capability acquisition.²⁴

In summary, following the Prague Summit, European NATO members have made important strides to enhance capabilities and interoperability with the USA and each other in C4ISR. This process has been led by the USA, in tandem with a group of European NATO states (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain), which have assumed the responsibility to push ahead with capabilities to be put to the service of the Alliance as a whole (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 105).

Defence procurement initiatives outside NATO and EU frameworks: *à la carte*, multiple-speed and variable-geometry cooperation

NATO and ESDP initiatives build upon the achievements of numerous sub-regional '*à la carte*' capability procurement programmes, improving the capacity of the west European Great Powers to undertake joint high-intensity expeditionary warfare.

The Eurofighter Typhoon, a project whose roots lie in the Cold War, involves the development of an air-to-surface, multi-role combat aircraft.²⁵ The Eurofighter's NEC capabilities have been enhanced through the Meteor radar-guided air-to-air missile that enters service in 2010 and the addition of automated laser-guided weaponry.²⁶ The PzH 2000 Armoured Howitzer has been under development since the early 1990s. The Howitzer's tactical mobility makes it suitable for high-intensity expeditionary crisis-management operations, illustrated by its deployment by the Dutch in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. However, the Howitzer's weight has created problems of strategic mobility, reflecting its original design for territorial defence.²⁷ Finally, the 'nEU-ROn' Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle is a demonstrator project, maintaining and developing European skills in strategic technologies. Originally launched by France as an autonomous project in 1999, nEUROn has, since 2005, involved the delegation of 50 per cent of work to European partners (see Table 22.4).

Established in November 1996, the Organization for Joint Armament Coordination (OCCAR) manages collaborative armaments programmes by Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Membership is open to other European NATO/EU members, who may also participate in a procurement programme under a cooperative agreement. OCCAR has coordinated several joint ventures, augmenting its participants' capacities to undertake crisis-management operations within NATO/ESDP: FSAF (the Future Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile Family); the A-400 M transport aircraft; the Tiger multi-role attack helicopter; the Boxer multi-role armoured utility vehicle; COBRA (Counter Battery Radar) and FREMM (multi-role frigate).²⁸

Table 22.4 Major bi/pluri-lateral capability procurement initiatives outside EU/NATO frameworks

State	Eurofighter	nEUROn	PzH 2000	OCCAR	FSAF	A-400 M	Tiger	Boxer	COBRA	FREMM	LOI	Galileo	Pleiades
Austria	x											x	x
Belgium				x		x						x	x
Bulgaria													
Cyprus													
Canada												x	
Czech Republic												x	
Denmark												x	
Estonia												x	
Finland												x	
France		x		x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x		x	x		x	x	x			x	x	
Greece		x	x									x	
Hungary												x	
Iceland													
Ireland												x	
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x
Latvia													
Lithuania													
Luxembourg				1		x						x	
Malta													
Netherlands			x	1				x				x	
Norway												x	
Poland												x	
Portugal												x	
Romania												x	
Slovakia													
Slovenia												x	
Spain	x	x		x		x	x				x	x	x
Sweden		x									x	x	x
Switzerland		x											
Turkey				1		x							
UK	x				2	x			x			x	
USA													

KEY

1 = Participation under cooperative agreement

2 = The UK is participating in the Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS).

The development of OCCAR has been supplemented by the signature of a letter of intent (LOI) in 1998 by Europe's major armament-producing states aimed at integrating Europe's defence market. This 'variable-geometry' initiative was followed by a 2001 Framework Agreement between LOI states on compatibility in defence supply, export control, security of information, military research and technology, technical information, military requirements and R&D (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 114).

French leadership has also been evident in the development of Europe's space-based assets. These comprise three '*à la carte*' initiatives: the SAR-Lupe and the Pleiades programmes, and the 'Common Operational Requirements'. The Pleiades Programme is a civilian and military Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation Satellite system initiated on 29 January 2001 by France and Italy (Flournoy and Smith, 2005: 91). Pleiades led to the launch of radar satellites in 2005 and high-resolution optical satellites in 2007 which have a global imaging capability and operate jointly with the French Helios 2 optical reconnaissance satellite and Italian COSMO-Skymed satellite system.²⁹ SAR Lupe is a German reconnaissance satellite project (operational from 2008), involving the development of five satellites and one ground segment providing worldwide, all-weather information, operating jointly with the Helios 2, Skymed and Pleiades satellites (Flournoy and Smith, 2005: 91). This pooling of space assets is being augmented through the French-led Common Operational Requirements, creating a group of data-providers and users responsible for gathering and disseminating satellite imaging (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 129). Together, these multi-national arrangements form significant steps towards developing the space technology necessary to conduct networked operations.

***À la carte*, multiple-speed and variable-geometry force generation initiatives outside NATO/EU frameworks**

Several French-led, sub-regional *à la carte* multinational initiatives arose during the 1990s, aimed at developing high-readiness joint forces capable of participation in both NATO and ESDP missions (see Table 20.5). They included the Franco-German Brigade (established 1987) and renamed EUROCORPS in 1992, reflecting EUROCORPS' openness to all European NATO/EU members. EUROCORPS formed an NRF headquarters, as well as contributing to an EU Battlegroup.³⁰ The EUROFORCES were established in 1995 by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain to facilitate troop contributions for the Petersburg tasks (humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping and peace-making tasks set out at the Petersburg declaration of 1992), but now operate under the auspices of ESDP. They are composed of two components: EUROMARFOR (European naval force) and EUROFOR (the European Operational Rapid Force) capable of deploying up to a Light Division in support of Battlegroup operations. The same states created the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) in September 2004, capable of robust policing missions under military command (up to 800 police deployable within 30 days). The EGF has not only bolstered the EU's civilian

crisis-management functions, but has also contributed to NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. The German-Netherlands Corps was activated in August 1995 and has been an NRF headquarters since 2004 (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 53).

The European Amphibious Initiative (EAI), established in December 2000 (open to all European NATO members and EU Member States), is aimed at enhancing the interoperability of forces under both NRF and Battlegroup missions. The European Air Group, launched by Britain and France in June 1996, serves a similar function: the enhancement of interoperability between participating EU/NATO airforces.³¹ The Sealift Coordination Centre (SCC) was initiated in June 2001 by members of NATO's High-Level Steering Group's Working Group on Strategic Sealift and formed a framework for the provision of strategic sealift assets (roll on/roll off ships) to NATO and the coordination of chartering of private/military ships to the EU, UN or *ad hoc* coalitions of NATO/EU states.³² The European Airlift Centre (EAC) was a Franco-German initiative of 2001, designed to coordinate the military airlift of European NATO Member States and create a common European air fleet.³³ The work of the SCC and EAC were brought under one roof in July 2007 with the creation of the *à la carte* Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), supporting EU and NATO operations.³⁴

The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) is an example of 'multiple-speed' cooperation that focuses on improving interoperability in doctrine, operational planning, NEC and C4ISR capabilities of 'vanguard' NATO Member States through working groups and the conduct of 'Multinational Experiments', including the annual 'Combined Endeavour' exercises (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 100).³⁵ The May 2008 exercise included 40 partner states, as well as NATO and the Multinational Peace Force South (MPFSEE). Finally, the 'multiple-speed' Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) was established in April 1998 to deal with interoperability issues relating to C2IS (command, control and information systems).³⁶

It is also possible to identify three sub-regional institutions of 'variable geometry': NORDCAPS, Baltic Defence Cooperation and the MPFSEE. NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support) was established in 1997.³⁷ It forms a mechanism for enhanced cooperation between Nordic nations in the planning and conduct of crisis-management missions. Baltic Defence Cooperation comprises four projects: BALTBEAT (a Baltic Battalion, established 1994); BALTRON (a Baltic Naval Squadron, established 1997); BALTNET (the Baltic Air Surveillance Network, established 1996) and BALTDEFCOL (the Baltic Defence College, established 1998).³⁸ These arrangements are primarily designed to enhance the ability of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to contribute to NATO-led expeditionary crisis-management operations by developing C2 capabilities and training. Finally, MPFSEE was initiated in August 1999. Although initially designed for deployment within the Balkans under the auspices of NATO, the EU, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the UN, MPFSEE contributed to NATO's ISAF mission from February to October 2006.

Table 22.5 À la carte, multiple-speed and variable-geometry force generation initiatives outside EU/NATO

State	Battlegroup Initiative	Eurocorps	Euroforces	EGF	EAI	MMCE	MIC	MIP	BDC	NORDCAPS
Austria	x	x						1		
Belgium	x	x			x	x		1		
Bulgaria	x							1		
Cyprus	x									
Canada						x	x	x		
Czech Republic	x							1		
Denmark		x			x	x			x	x
Estonia	x					x				
Finland	x					x		1		x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Germany	x	x				x	x	x		
Greece	x	x						1		
Hungary	x					x				
Iceland										x
Ireland	x									
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x		x		
Latvia	x					x			x	
Lithuania	x							x	x	
Luxembourg	x	x				x				
Malta										
Netherlands	x				x	x		x		
Norway	x	x				x		x		x
Poland	x	x						1		
Portugal	x		x	x						
Romania	x							1		
Slovakia	x									
Slovenia	x					x		1		
Spain	x	x	x	x	x	x		x		
Sweden	x					x		1		x
Switzerland										
Turkey	x	x				x		x		
UK	x	x			x	x	x	x		
USA							x	x		

Key
1 = Observer Status

Functional complementarity combined with spatial and temporal differentiation

In summary, post-Cold War defence cooperation has taken a distinct territorial form. Its geographical scope to the East is shaped by Russian power, with the emergence of vanguard states within these territorial boundaries. During the mid-late 1990s and early 21st-century 'core' states (Britain, France and Germany) pushed ahead with developing non-excludable public goods through intergovernmental, non-binding institutional arrangements under ESDP/NATO and '*à la carte*', 'variable-geometry' or 'multiple-speed' initiatives outside NATO/EU frameworks. A group of smaller European states, particularly Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Spain and Sweden, coalesced around the ability to make 'niche contributions' to Battlegroup/NRF missions through '*à la carte*'/'variable-geometry' procurement projects and force-generation initiatives. Furthermore, ESDP and NATO are becoming ever more spatially distinct in function: ESDP is emerging as a mechanism for Europe to engage with threats from its geopolitical neighbourhood, NATO as a global actor in crisis management.

Whilst much national duplication continues to exist in armaments procurement, the above initiatives increasingly serve a common function. They represent significant steps towards generating crisis-management forces capable of operating alongside the USA and other European states (Howorth, 2007: 44–5; Ulriksen, 2004: 469–71). The emergence of a 'core' Europe in defence has, however, been characterized by differentiation in temporal sequencing. From 1994 France has most single-mindedly pursued the 'Europeanization' of its security and defence policies and the enhancement of Europe's C2/C4ISR capabilities (Howorth, 2007: 45). France was joined by the UK in strengthening European autonomy following the October 1998 St Malo Accord. These states have been joined by a third regional leader – Germany, Europe's third great power. Whilst Germany, since 2003, has been developing a military capable of enabling it to assume a leadership role, through the 1990s and early 21st century the Federal Republic played a more reactive role in European defence cooperation. Germany displayed temporal lag in the development of the forces necessary to contribute to European/Atlantic 'public goods' in low–high-intensity crisis-management operations (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 47–58; 124; Dyson, 2005).

Neo-realism and differentiation

Neo-realism provides a compelling account of the structural factors determining these patterns of functional complementarity and spatially and temporally differentiated cooperation (Waltz, 1979: 88–93). According to Waltz (1979), the international system is characterized by insecurity and self-help and is therefore highly competitive. States, as rational actors, assess the costs and benefits of different strategies in maximizing their security. The propensity for conflict and cooperation within the international system is dependent upon the balance of capabilities. It is possible to outline four main distributions of power: unipolarity;

bipolarity,³⁹ balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity (Hyde-Price, 2007: 41–4). Under unipolarity, one state enjoys an overriding dominance in economic and military capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001: 44–5). Multipolarity is a power configuration in which three or more great powers exist. It can take two forms: balanced (where these states enjoy relatively similar power capabilities) or unbalanced (inherently unstable, as one state has the potential to strive for regional hegemony).

Post-Cold War Europe: balanced multipolarity situated within offshore balancing

As Hyde-Price (2007: 83–6) and Mearsheimer (2001) demonstrate, the USA's increased willingness to employ pre-emptive unilateral military force presents compelling evidence of offensive unipolarity⁴⁰ (Posen, 2003: 5–6). Situated within this systemic context in which the USA acts as Europe's 'offshore balancer',⁴¹ west and east-central Europe are also subject to a dynamic of 'balanced multipolarity', where a balance of power exists between Britain, France and Germany. Defence cooperation is also subject to the constraints imposed by Russian contestation of US authority in Eastern Europe. As the following section will demonstrate, this context creates a powerful incentive for the development of European defence cooperation on terms that are increasingly complementary with NATO, yet subject to spatial and temporal differentiation.

Explaining complementarity in function: European security cooperation as reformed bandwagoning

Neo-realism suggests that four responses to unipolarity are possible: balancing,⁴² buck-passing,⁴³ aggression,⁴⁴ and bandwagoning. Bandwagoning is defined by Schweller (1997: 928) as: 'Any attempt to side with the stronger, especially for opportunistic gain'. In Europe, 'reformed' bandwagoning is the dominant strategic response as European states strengthen their alliance with the USA in order to maximize their power, influence and, crucially, security (T. Dyson, 2008: 740–1; Schweller, 1998: 67; Walt, 1988). The fear of 'entrapment' into US policy in areas where strategic interests diverge, or 'abandonment' through the withdrawal of the US security guarantee, has incentivized policy leadership by Europe's Great Powers to pool European military resources (Press-Barnathan, 2006: 307–8). European security cooperation therefore represents a European attempt to develop a 'division of labour' strategy within the Atlantic Alliance following the failure of Europe's pursuit of a 'binding' strategy⁴⁵ through NATO during the 2003 Iraq crisis (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005; Press-Barnathan, 2006; Rynning, 2005: 170–5).

Reformed bandwagoning has taken place through a diverse set of initiatives. Firstly, the 'Europeanization' of NATO and creation of the NRF granted increased influence in Washington and access to global high-intensity capabilities. Secondly, the simultaneous development of an increasingly militarized ESDP permitted autonomous European action and collective 'milieu-shaping' in cases of US disinterest (Hyde-Price, 2007: 88–90; Jones, 2007: 219; King, 2005: 331; Posen, 2006: 180;

Reynolds, 2007: 361; Rynning, 2005: 151, 157). Finally, the development of *à la carte*, multiple-speed and variable-geometry initiatives outside the EU/NATO, led by the European Great Powers, sought to enhance national capacity to contribute to NATO and EU-led crisis-management operations.

The form and temporality of ‘clustered convergence’: resource constraints, systemic uncertainty and alliance options

Whilst neo-realism provides a compelling explanation of the increasingly complementary function of the core European institutions of ‘hard’ security, it also delivers substantial, though incomplete, analytical leverage in capturing the processes that determine differentiation in the functional scope, territoriality and temporality of reformed bandwagoning.

International structure acts as a selection mechanism on the basis of ‘competitive effectiveness’: the extent to which a state’s defence policy allows it to maximize its power and influence and ensure its survival, autonomy and prosperity (Resende-Santos, 2007: 63). This systemic pressure leads to a dynamic and clustered military convergence: dynamic because it is consequent upon the constant competition that characterizes international relations, and clustered due to the variegated intensity of competition between particular states and to regional differentiation in the intensity of the security dilemma (Resende-Santos, 2007: 78; Taliaferro, 2006: 478). States are faced with three choices following a significant shift in the balance of capabilities: to emulate ‘best practice’; to innovate in military practices; or to maintain policy stasis (T. Dyson, 2008: 738–9). The central criterion determining what is perceived as ‘best practice’ and the attractiveness of emulation is proven success in Great Power war (Resende-Santos, 2007: 81–2).

Neo-realism points to three factors determining the form and temporality of post-Cold War ‘clustered convergence’ in European military isomorphism. Firstly, in the context of the relative absence of Great Power war and the diverse nature of post-Cold War conflict, it has been difficult for European states to define ‘best practice’. Whilst the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo Conflict, the 2001 attack on Afghanistan and the 2003 attack on Iraq highlighted the utility of technological prowess in high-intensity war-fighting and the success of the RMA, the Iraq conflict post-2003, the NATO ISAF mission and US/European involvement in the former Yugoslavia and Africa during the 1990s demonstrated the dangers inherent in reliance on C4ISR in peace-keeping, post-conflict reconstruction and counter-insurgency operations (Betz, 2006: 507; Cohen, 2004: 402–3; Posen, 2003: 30–6). Hence the emergence of an increasingly concrete model of military emulation is an important factor determining the pace of European capability procurement initiatives within ESDP and NATO (Cohen, 2004: 396–7; T. Dyson, 2008; Sperling, 2004: 456–9).

Secondly, the nature of European states as ‘second- and third-rank’ powers constrains their resource-technological capacity to copy the RMA and magnifies the risks associated with emulation (Resende-Santos, 2007: 73). Emulation of the RMA is most evident in areas of lower cost and risk: the reorganization of military structures and the creation of Joint Reaction Forces in the mid-to-late 1990s in Britain

and France and in the early 21st century in Germany. Consequently, the European Great Powers emerge as the leaders of the process of reformed bandwagoning in these specific functional areas. 'Third-rank', smaller states are net consumers, by virtue of their material capability differential.

The final factor is the presence of alliance options. The threat of abandonment by the USA became particularly evident in the run-up to the Kosovo conflict, which clarified the post-Cold War systemic imperative of the pursuit of a policy of reformed bandwagoning. This explains the timing of the October 1998 St Malo Accord and forms a crucial additional factor determining the recent acceleration of European C4ISR procurement through the EDA and NATO.

The temporality and scope of cooperation: variance in external vulnerability and the alliance security dilemma

Significant divergence exists in the temporal dimension of the commitment of European states to the process of reformed bandwagoning, with leaders and lag-guards evident in ESDP and NATO initiatives (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 21–58). A systemic explanation of this divergence relies upon attention to variation in the 'external vulnerability' of European states, a concept that encompasses territorial size, geographical location and productive capacity (Posen, 2006: 152; Taliaferro, 2006: 467, 479).

For example, in order to understand the comparatively early temporal location of the Europeanization of French defence policy, a focus on France's geographical position is critical. The 'Europeanization' agenda outlined by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in the 1994 Defence White Paper was not only a response to unipolarity but also a means to ensure French influence within its regional milieu as German power and influence increased through European monetary union (Brenner, 2003: 198–99; Howorth, 1998: 139–51; Menon, 1995: 27). This 'Europeanization without the European Union' reflects long-standing French concerns about relative power within the EU and attempts to exert leadership in European defence cooperation, helping explain the routing of France's response to the RMA through ESDP (Brenner, 2003: 198; Irondelle, 2003; Lungu, 2004b: 58–62; Menon, 1995: 22; Utley, 2000: 185). The French-led 'defence circle' would balance the German-led 'monetary circle'.

Variance in external vulnerability also provides a powerful motivation for the emergence of French leadership on sub-regional bi/plurilateral initiatives in the mid-1990s and for French efforts to improve Europe's defence-industrial base. Nevertheless, in line with the predictions of neo-realism, the threat of abandonment by the USA has led to increased willingness by France to ensure complementarity between ESDP and NATO. By virtue of its geographical position, Britain was less acutely concerned with the regional power balance in the immediate post-Cold War era and emerged as a co-leader of reformed bandwagoning after the October 1998 St Malo initiative, only once the threat of abandonment by the USA became acutely pressing (T. Dyson, 2008: 765–71).

There continues, however, to be a high level of duplication in capability acquisition. On average, 70 per cent of European land forces remain focused on territorial

defence, and the relative fragmentation of European defence industries acts as a further barrier to an economy of scale that would foster greater defence spending efficiency (Whitney, 2008: 7). This reticence to specialize derives from the 'alliance security dilemma' within the EU and NATO that acts as an impediment to integration (Snyder, 1984; Siedschlag, 2006). Whilst facing an incentive to pool resources, European states cannot be certain that others will not renege on their promises, promoting the retention of a substantial territorial-defence capacity and capability duplication, in order to guard against the potential loss of power and influence that the non-compliance of other states could cause.

This problem is compounded for central and east European (CEE) states. They face the contradictory imperatives of developing networked, interoperable, expeditionary capabilities to enhance their credibility as Alliance partners, whilst sustaining national defence capabilities to respond to the heightened threat to their territorial integrity posed by Russia (Whitney, 2008: 24). Defence cooperation is therefore focused on demonstrating solidarity with the USA, making CEE states unwilling to champion arrangements that the USA views as threatening to NATO. Consequently, the development of regional initiatives by states at Europe's eastern borders was initially a means with which to prove the worth and loyalty of these states to NATO. However, as ESDP and NATO have become increasingly complementary in function, these structures have also acted as a forum in which to facilitate 'niche' contributions to Battlegroup missions (Whitney, 2008: 28–9).

The fear of strategic miscalculation, the variance in external vulnerability, and the alliance security dilemma mean that, despite increasing convergence in European defence policy objectives under systemic unipolarity and regional balanced multipolarity, the duplication of capabilities and the relatively limited cooperation between national defence industries remain inherent problems in European defence cooperation.

Spatial and temporal differentiation in the provision of non-excludable public goods: variance in external vulnerability and executive autonomy

Structural realism provides a persuasive account of the functional, territorial and temporal dimensions of differentiation in post-Cold War European defence cooperation. Russian contestation of US power in eastern Europe creates a strong incentive for using '*directoire*' differentiation in cases such as Georgia and Ukraine and restricting their cooperation to OSCE, Partnership for Peace, and European–Atlantic Partnership Council membership (Hyde-Price, 2007: 156–61). However, in western and central Europe the presence of the USA as an 'offshore balancer', combined with regionally balanced multipolarity, acts as a powerful force driving isomorphism in defence policy objectives and in the function of NATO and ESDP as institutional forums for 'reformed' bandwagoning on US power. At the same time, a common pattern of defence reform is beginning to emerge in Europe: a partial and selective emulation of the RMA.

This convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defence policy is evidenced by the increasing willingness of states such as France, Finland and Sweden to contribute to the strengthening of NATO's expeditionary capabilities and its 'Europeanization' via the NRF. On the other hand, traditional Atlanticists, like the UK, have increasingly provided the impetus behind the development of ESDP. Consequently, ESDP, NATO and other bi/plurilateral initiatives are acting as institutional venues for the development of increasingly complementary military capability procurement, relating to strategic sea/airlift, C4ISR and other military hardware, and permitting the conduct of low-high-intensity crisis-management operations. Both ESDP and NATO also display an increasing focus on a 'comprehensive approach' to the conduct of military operations that more effectively integrates the civilian and military dimensions of crisis-management missions.

There is an important role for time as an independent variable shaping this growing functional complementarity. States are in a constant process of 'strategic learning' about how best to respond to structural imperatives in order to maximize their power and influence. Following significant power shifts, a temporal lag in responding to systemic imperatives is likely as statesmen require time to become more familiar with their new strategic environment. Far-reaching changes (such as the end of the Cold War) create particular informational uncertainty and flux, requiring the readjustment and fine-tuning of strategy to the new configuration of constraints and opportunities. As Rathburn (2008: 316) notes, 'learning does not proceed smoothly in response to a changing systemic environment, but rather in a manner of fits and starts ... power calculation is a complicated business'.

Differentiation in the territoriality and temporality of defence cooperation (time as the dependent variable) can be partly explained through recourse to variation in external vulnerability. Consequently, the states of greatest capability (Britain, France and Germany) emerge as 'core states' in the provision of 'public goods' (military forces and capabilities) (Whitney, 2008: 59–64). Variance in external vulnerability also provides a powerful explanation for the differentiated temporality of leadership in reformed bandwagoning, as the case of France illustrates. Germany, where domestic material power relations narrow the autonomy of the core executive in defence policy, also demonstrates the limitations of a focus on the systemic level of analysis. The example of the Federal Republic points to the utility of neoclassical realism that focuses on the intervening role played by unit-level variables in delaying conformity to the dictates of international structure (T. Dyson, 2008: 725–74). These restrictions in German executive autonomy derive from the linkages between budgetary, defence and social policy subsystems and the impact of the Federal state on the politics of base closures (T. Dyson, 2005, 2008: 749–58). The core executive also faces great difficulty in constructing new policy narratives in support of radical changes to defence policy as a consequence of the regularity of important *Land* (state) elections, which increase the sensitivity of the governing coalition to public opinion. Consequently German policy leaders have sought to engage in the temporal management of reformed bandwagoning (T. Dyson, 2008: 749–58).

A group of smaller west European/Nordic states emerged as niche contributors of troops and capabilities to the NRF/Battlegroups, notably Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy and Spain (Whitney, 2008: 28). Although 'public goods' in defence are non-excludable, creating a strong potential for free-riding, contributions to reformed bandwagoning are roughly equivalent to European states' relative power. Hence, whilst Kölliker notes in this volume (Chapter 3) that non-excludable public goods create only weak centripetal effects, there is a more complex and contradictory dynamic at work in defence. It reflects a trade-off between power maximization, variance in external vulnerability, and the alliance–security dilemma. Whilst centripetal effects are generated by states' concern with maximizing their power and influence within NATO/ESDP, amongst Europe's 'third-rank' states leaders and laggards exist in the contribution of 'niche capabilities'. Even within the favourable context of regional balanced multipolarity, the alliance security dilemma, combined with the threat posed by Russia to east European states, impedes the pooling of capabilities. These factors have led to the retention of a strong focus on territorial defence amongst east European states and capability duplication.

We should, therefore, be prudent in our expectations of the scope for cooperation in defence and recognize the significance of the steps already taken. Force-generation and capability procurement initiatives are likely to remain intergovernmental and differentiated, allowing the retention of a high degree of national autonomy: either *à la carte* (to enable the participation of outsiders, particularly within force-generation initiatives and capability procurement projects within/outside ESDP/NATO); 'multiple-speed' (to encourage burden-sharing by making membership of 'vanguard' organizations, such as the ESA, MIC and MIP, dependent upon the development of national C4ISR capabilities/space technology), or 'variable-geometry' (in cases of sub-regional force-generation initiatives).

Notes

1. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and European Atlantic Partnership Council permit case-by-case cooperation with non-NATO states in eastern Europe, the Caucasus region, Central Asia, Scandinavia and the Mediterranean region.
2. The WEU's capabilities and functions have been largely incorporated into the EU. The OSCE deals with 'softer' security issues, providing a forum for pan-European dialogue and is consequently characterized by broader membership than NATO/the EU.
3. Sweden and Finland have recently announced their intention to contribute to the NRF.
4. Denmark secured an opt-out on security and defence at the December 1992 European Council.
5. 'Comprehensive Political Guidance', 29 November 2006, pt. 6.
6. 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: ESS', 12 December 2003: 1–5.
7. The Battlegroups lack dedicated airborne and maritime capabilities; the NRF also focuses on collective defence (Kaitera and Ben-Ari, 2008: 7).
8. Whilst Germany lags behind Britain and France in EBAO doctrine and investment in high-technology weapons systems (Sperling, 2004: 457; Lungu, 2004b) it has, since 2003, made significant headway in C4ISR (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 16–17, 53).
9. On NEC and EBAO see Farrell (2008).
10. Input into EDA project decision-making is determined by a state's financial contribution to an initiative. This *'à la carte'* differentiation helps overcome the problems encountered

by NATO's Research and Technology Organization (RTO) that operates on the principle of the equality of nations, thereby disincentivizing Great Power leadership.

11. 'An Initial Long Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs', EDA, October 2006, 25–8.
12. Project areas include Software Defined Radio; Network Enabled Capability; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear ordnance disposal; Maritime Surveillance; 21st Century Soldier System and the development of a European Air Transport Fleet.
13. On JIP-FR projects, see: www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=370
14. NEC Pre-Study, Public Executive Summary, 12 June 2006; Miracle Project Final Report, 12 July 2007.
15. 'Final Report on the CHG 2008', 2.
16. On CHG priority areas see 'CHG 2010', Section III Objectives, 3–5.
17. www.nato.int/issues/accs/index.html
18. www.nc3a.nato.int/organization/index.html
19. <http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE>
20. 'The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation: A Reader's Guide', NATO, 2002, 11.
21. www.nato.int/issues/ags/practice.html
22. 'MAJIC Introduction', NATO C3 Agency, October 2006.
23. www.nato.int/issues/satcom/index.html
24. MAJIC Press Release October 2006, at: www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/pdf/majic.pdf.
25. www.eurofighter.com/news/chapter132.asp
26. Meteor is compatible with the Rafale, JAS-39 Gripen and Joint Strike Fighter.
27. www.kmweg.de/frame.php?page=19
28. www.occar-ea.org/view.php?nid=72
29. <http://smsc.cnes.fr/PLEIADES/>
30. www.eurocorps.org/history/eurocorps_history/
31. www.euroairgroup.org/history.htm
32. The SCC held quarterly coordination boards including representatives of the NATO HQs, NATO Planning Boards and the EUMS. See www.nosu.no/sealift/
33. www.defence.gouv.fr/defence_uk/enjeux_defence/la_defence_dans_l_europe/les_euroforces/cellule_europeenne_de_coordination_aerienne/cellule_europeenne_de_coordination_aerienne_eacc
34. www.mcce-mil.com/
35. www.jcs.mil/j3/mic/
36. 'Statement of Intent for the MIP, 01 October 2001', at: www.mip-site.org/01-Atccis/mip_doc/MIP_SOI.doc
37. www.nordcaps.org/?id=81
38. www.mod.gov.ee/static/sisu/files/baltic_co_2002.pdf
39. Bipolarity is the most stable distribution of power, where two superpowers enjoy equality in capabilities.
40. Offensive realism predicts that the dominant power in a unipolar system will attempt to grasp the opportunity to maximize its power by expanding its influence in areas of strategic importance and eschew cooperation to achieve its ends (Mearsheimer, 2001).
41. An 'offshore balancer' intervenes only to prevent the rise of challengers to its position and protect its vital strategic interests (Hyde-Price, 2007: 45; Layne, 1997; Walt, 2005: 18–19).
42. Defined by Pape (2005: 15) as: 'rearmament or accelerated economic growth to support eventual rearmament'.
43. Buckpassing refers to a situation in which a great power passes the responsibility for balancing to other states.
44. A state can counter a rising hegemon though aggressive, preventative war.
45. 'Binding' refers to the ability of smaller alliance partners to use existing institutional ties to restrain a larger alliance partner (Schweller, 1998: 70–1).