
Chapter One
Introduction

Many in the West seem to believe that "perpetual peace" among the great powers is finally at hand. The end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to the "the end of history."¹

This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations, members of what is sometimes called the "international community." The prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great powers. Even a few adherents of realism, a school of thought that has historically held pessimistic views about the prospects for peace among the great powers, appear to have bought into the reigning optimism, as reflected in an article from the mid-1990s titled "Realists as Optimists."²

Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia. It does so because it recognizes that dangerous rivalries would probably emerge among the major powers in these regions if U.S. troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, including the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively; fear of Japan in Northeast Asia is probably even more profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possibility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared.

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.

There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price.³ At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.
This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor.

Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Given this fear—which can never be wholly eliminated—states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.

This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other—that are merely concerned with their own survival—nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. "Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us," he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should "smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out."4

Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way, it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter's integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe.

Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows.
Offensive Realism

This book offers a realist theory of international politics that challenges the prevailing optimism about relations among the great powers. That enterprise involves three particular tasks.

I begin by laying out the key components of the theory, which I call "offensive realism." I make a number of arguments about how great powers behave toward each other, emphasizing that they look for opportunities to gain power at each others' expense. Moreover, I identify the conditions that make conflict more or less likely. For example, I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states—potential hegemons—are the most dangerous systems of all. But I do not just assert these various claims; I also attempt to provide compelling explanations for the behaviors and the outcomes that lie at the heart of the theory. In other words, I lay out the causal logic, or reasoning, which underpins each of my claims.

The theory focuses on the great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states—great powers and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. For example, politics in almost every region of the world were deeply influenced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990. The two world wars that preceded the Cold War had a similar effect on regional politics around the world. Each of these conflicts was a great-power rivalry, and each cast a long shadow over every part of the globe.

Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world. The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional forces. In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear superiority over all of its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.

My second task in this book is to show that the theory tells us a lot about the history of international politics. The ultimate test of any theory is how well it explains events in the real world, so I go to considerable lengths to test my arguments against the historical record. Specifically, the focus is on great-power relations from the start of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792 until the end of the twentieth century. Much attention is paid to the European great powers because they dominated world politics for most of the past two hundred years. Indeed, until Japan and the United States achieved great-power status in 1895 and 1898, respectively, Europe was home to all of the world's great powers. Nevertheless, the book also includes substantial discussion of the politics of Northeast Asia, especially regarding imperial Japan between 1895 and 1945 and China in the 1990s. The United States also figures prominently in my efforts to test offensive realism against past events.

Some of the important historical puzzles that I attempt to shed light on include the following:

1) What accounts for the three longest and bloodiest wars in modern history—the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), World War I (1914-18), and World War II (1939-45)—conflicts that involved all of the major powers in the system?

2) What accounts for the long periods of relative peace in Europe between 1816 and 1852, 1871 and 1913, and especially 1945 and 1990, during the Cold War?
3) Why did the United Kingdom, which was by far the wealthiest state in the world during the mid-nineteenth century, not build a powerful military and try to dominate Europe? In other words, why did it behave differently from Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, all of which translated their economic might into military might and strove for European hegemony?

4) Why was Bismarckian Germany (1862-90) especially aggressive between 1862 and 1870, fighting two wars with other great powers and one war with a minor power, but hardly aggressive at all from 1871 until 1890, when it fought no wars and generally sought to maintain the European status quo?

5) Why did the United Kingdom, France, and Russia form a balancing coalition against Wilhelmine Germany before World War I, but fail to organize an effective alliance to contain Nazi Germany?

6) Why did Japan and the states of Western Europe join forces with the United States against the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War, even though the United States emerged from World War II with the most powerful economy in the world and a nuclear monopoly?

7) What explains the commitment of American troops to Europe and Northeast Asia during the twentieth century? For example, why did the United States wait until April 1917 to join World War I, rather than enter the war when it broke out in August 1914? For that matter, why did the United States not send troops to Europe before 1914 to prevent the outbreak of war? Similarly, why did the United States not balance against Nazi Germany in the 1930s or send troops to Europe before September 1939 to prevent the outbreak of World War II?

8) Why did the United States and the Soviet Union continue building up their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure second-strike capability against the other? A world in which both sides have an "assured destruction" capability is generally considered to be stable and its nuclear balance difficult to overturn, yet both superpowers spent billions of dollars and rubles trying to gain a first-strike advantage.

Third, I use the theory to make predictions about great-power politics in the twenty-first century. This effort may strike some readers as foolhardy, because the study of international relations, like the other social sciences, rests on a shakier theoretical foundation than that of the natural sciences. Moreover, political phenomena are highly complex; hence, precise political predictions are impossible without theoretical tools that are superior to those we now possess. As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

The Virtues and Limits of Theory

It should be apparent that this book is self-consciously theoretical. But outside the walls of academia, especially in the policy world, theory has a bad name. Social science theories are
often portrayed as the idle speculations of head-in-the-clouds academics that have little relevance to what goes on in the "real world." For example, Paul Nitze, a prominent American foreign-policy maker during the Cold War, wrote, "Most of what has been written and taught under the heading of 'political science' by Americans since World War II has been ... of limited value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct of policy." In this view, theory should fall almost exclusively within the purview of academics, whereas policymakers should rely on common sense, intuition, and practical experience to carry out their duties.

This view is wrongheaded. In fact, none of us could understand the world we live in or make intelligent decisions without theories. Indeed, all students and practitioners of international politics rely on theories to comprehend their surroundings. Some are aware of it and some are not, some admit it and some do not; but there is no escaping the fact that we could not make sense of the complex world around us without simplifying theories. The Clinton administration's foreign policy rhetoric, for example, was heavily informed by the three main liberal theories of international relations: 1) the claim that prosperous and economically interdependent states are unlikely to fight each other, 2) the claim that democracies do not fight each other, and 3) the claim that international institutions enable states to avoid war and concentrate instead on building cooperative relationships.

Consider how Clinton and company justified expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1990s. President Clinton maintained that one of the chief goals of expansion was "locking in democracy's gains in Central Europe," because "democracies resolve their differences peacefully." He also argued that the United States should foster an "open trading system," because "our security is tied to the stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and working with others, not working against them." Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Oxford classmate and deputy secretary of state, made the same claims for NATO enlargement: "With the end of the cold war, it has become possible to construct a Europe that is increasingly united by a shared commitment to open societies and open markets." Moving the borders of NATO eastward, he maintained, would help "to solidify the national consensus for democratic and market reforms" that already existed in states like Hungary and Poland and thus enhance the prospects for peace in the region.

In the same spirit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright praised NATO's founders by saying that "[t]heir basic achievement was to begin the construction of the . . . network of rule-based institutions and arrangements that keep the peace." "But that achievement is not complete," she warned, and "our challenge today is to finish the post-war construction project . . . [and] expand the area of the world in which American interests and values will thrive." These examples demonstrate that general theories about how the world works play an important role in how policymakers identify the ends they seek and the means they choose to achieve them. Yet that is not to say we should embrace any theory that is widely held, no matter how popular it may be, because there are bad as well as good theories. For example, some theories deal with trivial issues, while others are opaque and almost impossible to comprehend. Furthermore, some theories have contradictions in their underlying logic, while others have little explanatory power because the world simply does not work the way they predict. The trick is to distinguish between sound theories and defective ones. My aim is to persuade readers that offensive realism is a rich theory which sheds considerable light on the workings of the international system.

As with all theories, however, there are limits to offensive realism's explanatory power. A few cases contradict the main claims of the theory, cases that offensive realism should be able to explain but cannot. All theories face this problem, although the better the theory, the fewer the anomalies.

An example of a case that contradicts offensive realism involves Germany in 1905. At the time Germany was the most powerful state in Europe. Its main rivals on the continent were France and Russia, which some fifteen years earlier had formed an alliance to contain the
Germans. The United Kingdom had a tiny army at the time because it was counting on France and Russia to keep Germany at bay. When Japan unexpectedly inflicted a devastating defeat on Russia between 1904 and 1905, which temporarily knocked Russia out of the European balance of power, France was left standing virtually alone against mighty Germany. Here was an excellent opportunity for Germany to crush France and take a giant step toward achieving hegemony in Europe. It surely made more sense for Germany to go to war in 1905 than in 1914. But Germany did not even seriously consider going to war in 1905, which contradicts what offensive realism would predict.

Theories encounter anomalies because they simplify reality by emphasizing certain factors while ignoring others. Offensive realism assumes that the international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power, I argue, are what matter most for explaining international politics. The theory pays little attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such as ideology. It tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. For example, it does not matter for the theory whether Germany in 1905 was led by Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler, or whether Germany was democratic or autocratic. What matters for the theory is how much relative power Germany possessed at the time. These omitted factors, however, occasionally dominate a state's decision-making process; under these circumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short, there is a price to pay for simplifying reality.

Furthermore, offensive realism does not answer every question that arises in world politics, because there will be cases in which the theory is consistent with several possible outcomes. When this occurs, other theories have to be brought in to provide more precise explanations. Social scientists say that a theory is "indeterminate" in such cases, a situation that is not unusual with broad-gauged theories like offensive realism.

An example of offensive realism's indeterminacy is that it cannot account for why the security competition between the superpowers during the Cold War was more intense between 1945 and 1963 than between 1963 and 1990.13 The theory also has little to say about whether NATO should have adopted an offensive or a defensive military strategy to deter the Warsaw Pact in central Europe.14 To answer these questions it is necessary to employ more fine-grained theories, such as deterrence theory. Nevertheless, those theories and the answers they spawn do not contradict offensive realism; they supplement it. In short, offensive realism is like a powerful flashlight in a dark room: even though it cannot illuminate every nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the darkness.

It should be apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.

One might ask, if the theory describes how great powers act, why is it necessary to stipulate how they should act? The imposing constraints of the system should leave great powers with little choice but to act as the theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they sometimes—although not often—act in contradiction to the theory. These are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see, such foolish behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.

The Pursuit of Power

Enough said about theory. More needs to be said about the substance of my arguments, which means zeroing in on the core concept of "power." For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them. Power is the currency of
great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations.

This book is organized around six questions dealing with power. First, why do great powers want power? What is the underlying logic that explains why states compete for it? Second, how much power do states want? How much power is enough? These two questions are of paramount importance because they deal with the most basic issues concerning great-power behavior. My answer to these foundational questions, as emphasized above, is that the structure of the international system encourages states to pursue hegemony.

Third, what is power? How is that pivotal concept defined and measured? With good indicators of power, it is possible to determine the power levels of individual states, which then allows us to describe the architecture of the system. Specifically, we can identify which states qualify as great powers. From there, it is easy to determine whether the system is hegemonic (directed by a single great power), bipolar (controlled by two great powers), or multipolar (dominated by three or more great powers). Furthermore, we will know the relative strengths of the major powers. We are especially interested in knowing whether power is distributed more or less evenly among them, or if there are large power asymmetries. In particular, does the system contain a potential hegemon—a great power that is considerably stronger than any of its rival great powers?

Defining power clearly also gives us a window into understanding state behavior. If states compete for power, we learn more about the nature of that competition if we understand more fully what power is, and therefore what states are competing for. In short, knowing more about the true nature of power should help illuminate how great powers compete among themselves.

Fourth, what strategies do states pursue to gain power, or to maintain it when another great power threatens to upset the balance of power? Blackmail and war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire power, and balancing and buck-passing are the principal strategies that great powers use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dangerous rival. With balancing, the threatened state accepts the burden of deterring its adversary and commits substantial resources to achieving that goal. With buck-passing, the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state.

The final two questions focus on the key strategies that states employ to maximize their share of world power. The fifth is, what are the causes of war? Specifically, what power-related factors make it more or less likely that security competition will intensify and turn into open conflict? Sixth, when do threatened great powers balance against a dangerous adversary and when do they attempt to pass the buck to another threatened state?

I will attempt to provide clear and convincing answers to these questions. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no consensus among realists on the answers to any of them. Realism is a rich tradition with a long history, and disputes over fundamental issues have long been commonplace among realists. In the pages that follow, I do not consider alternative realist theories in much detail. I will make clear how offensive realism differs from its main realist rivals, and I will challenge these alternative perspectives on particular points, mainly to elucidate my own arguments. But no attempt will be made to systematically examine any other realist theory. Instead, the focus will be on laying out my theory of offensive realism and using it to explain the past and predict the future.

Of course, there are also many nonrealist theories of international politics. Three different liberal theories were mentioned earlier; there are other nonrealist theories, such as social constructivism and bureaucratic politics, to name just two. I will briefly analyze some of these theories when I look at great-power politics after the Cold War (Chapter 10), mainly because they underpin many of the claims that international politics has undergone a fundamental change since 1990. Because of space limitations, however, I make no attempt at a comprehensive assessment of these nonrealist theories. Again, the emphasis in this study will be on making the case for offensive realism.
Nevertheless, it makes good sense at this point to describe the theories that dominate thinking about international relations in both the academic and policy worlds, and to show how offensive realism compares with its main realist and nonrealist competitors.

Liberalism vs. Realism

Liberalism and realism are the two bodies of theory which hold places of privilege on the theoretical menu of international relations. Most of the great intellectual battles among international relations scholars take place either across the divide between realism and liberalism, or within those paradigms. To illustrate this point, consider the three most influential realist works of the twentieth century:

1) E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, which was published in the United Kingdom shortly after World War II started in Europe (1939) and is still widely read today.
2) Hans Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, which was first published in the United States in the early days of the Cold War (1948) and dominated the field of international relations for at least the next two decades.
3) Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, which has dominated the field since it first appeared during the latter part of the Cold War.

All three of these realist giants critique some aspect of liberalism in their writings. For example, both Carr and Waltz take issue with the liberal claim that economic interdependence enhances the prospects for peace. More generally, Carr and Morgenthau frequently criticize liberals for holding Utopian views of politics which, if followed, would lead states to disaster. At the same time, these realists also disagree about a number of important issues. Waltz, for example, challenges Morgenthau's claim that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems. Furthermore, whereas Morgenthau argues that states strive to gain power because they have an innate desire for power, Waltz maintains that the structure of the international system forces states to pursue power to enhance their prospects for survival. These examples are just a small sample of the differences among realist thinkers.

Let us now look more closely at liberalism and realism, focusing first on the core beliefs shared by the theories in each paradigm, and second on the differences among specific liberal and realist theories.

Liberalism

The liberal tradition has its roots in the Enlightenment, that period in eighteenth-century Europe when intellectuals and political leaders had a powerful sense that reason could be employed to make the world a better place. Accordingly, liberals tend to be hopeful about the prospects of making the world safer and more peaceful. Most liberals believe that it is possible to substantially reduce the scourge of war and to increase international prosperity. For this reason, liberal theories are sometimes labelled "Utopian" or "idealistic."

Liberalism's optimistic view of international politics is based on three core beliefs, which are common to almost all of the theories in the paradigm. First, liberals consider states to be the main actors in international politics. Second, they emphasize that the internal characteristics of states vary considerably, and that these differences have profound effects on state behavior. Furthermore, liberal theorists often believe that some internal arrangements (e.g., democracy) are inherently preferable to others (e.g. dictatorship. For liberals, therefore, there are "good" and "bad" states in the international system. Good states pursue cooperative policies and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad states cause conflicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their way. Thus, the key to peace is to populate the world with good states.
Third, liberals believe that calculations about power matter little for explaining the behavior of good states. Other kinds of political and economic calculations matter more, although the form of those calculations varies from theory to theory, as will become apparent below. Bad states might be motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other states, but that is only because they are misguided. In an ideal world, where there are only good states, power would be largely irrelevant.

Among the various theories found under the big tent of liberalism, the three main ones mentioned earlier are particularly influential. The first argues that high levels of economic interdependence among states make them unlikely to fight each other. The taproot of stability, according to this theory, is the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order that allows for free economic exchange among states. Such an order makes states more prosperous, thereby bolstering peace, because prosperous states are more economically satisfied and satisfied states are more peaceful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have much less motive to initiate war if they are already wealthy. Furthermore, wealthy states with interdependent economies stand to become less prosperous if they fight each other, since they are biting the hand that feeds them. Once states establish extensive economic ties, in short, they avoid war and can concentrate instead on accumulating wealth.

The second, democratic peace theory, claims that democracies do not go to war against other democracies. Thus, a world containing only democratic states would be a world without war. The argument here is not that democracies are less warlike than non-democracies, but rather that democracies do not fight among themselves. There are a variety of explanations for the democratic peace, but little agreement as to which one is correct. Liberal thinkers do agree, however, that democratic peace theory offers a direct challenge to realism and provides a powerful recipe for peace.

Finally, some liberals maintain that international institutions enhance the prospects for cooperation among states and thus significantly reduce the likelihood of war. Institutions are not independent political entities that sit above states and force them to behave in acceptable ways. Instead, institutions are sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These rules are not imposed on states by some leviathan, but are negotiated by states, which agree to abide by the rules they created because it is in their interest to do so. Liberals claim that these institutions or rules can fundamentally change state behavior. Institutions, so the argument goes, can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how their every move affects their relative power position, and thus they push states away from war and promote peace.

Realism

In contrast to liberals, realists are pessimists when it comes to international politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. Creating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it is not a practical one. "Realism," as Carr notes, "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies."

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars. Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign
policies. Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between "good" and "bad" states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government.\(^{27}\) It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.\(^{28}\)

Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states' thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, war is a continuation of politics by other means.\(^{29}\) Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.

Although there are many realist theories dealing with different aspects of power, two of them stand above the others: human nature realism, which is laid out in Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, and defensive realism, which is presented mainly in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. What sets these works apart from those of other realists and makes them both important and controversial is that they provide answers to the two foundational questions described above. Specifically, they explain why states pursue power—that is, they have a story to tell about the *causes* of security competition—and each offers an argument about how much power a state is likely to want.

Some other famous realist thinkers concentrate on making the case that great powers care deeply about power, but they do not attempt to explain why states compete for power or what level of power states deem satisfactory. In essence, they provide a general defense of the realist approach, but they do not offer their own theory of international politics. The works of Carr and American diplomat George Kennan fit this description. In his seminal realist tract, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr criticizes liberalism at length and argues that states are motivated principally by power considerations. Nevertheless, he says little about why states care about power or how much power they want.\(^{30}\) Bluntly put, there is no theory in his book. The same basic pattern obtains in Kennan's well-known book *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*.\(^{31}\) Morgenthau and Waltz, on the other hand, offer their own theories of international relations, which is why they have dominated the discourse about world politics for the past fifty years.

Human nature realism, which is sometimes called "classical realism," dominated the study of international relations from the late 1940s, when Morgenthau's writings began attracting a large audience, until the early 1970s.\(^{32}\) It is based on the simple assumption that states are led by human beings who have a "will to power" hardwired into them at birth.\(^{33}\) That is, states have an insatiable appetite for power, or what Morgenthau calls "a limitless lust for power," which means that they constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states.\(^{34}\) All states come with an "animus dominandi," so there is no basis for discriminating among more aggressive and less aggressive states, and there certainly should be no room in the theory for status quo states.\(^{35}\) Human nature realists recognize that international anarchy—the absence of a governing authority over the great powers—causes states to worry about the balance of power. But that structural constraint is treated as a second-order cause of state behavior. The principal driving force in international politics is the will to power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes each of them to strive for supremacy.

Defensive realism, which is frequently referred to as "structural realism," came on the scene in the late 1970s with the appearance of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*.\(^{36}\) Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz does not assume that great powers are inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to power; instead he starts by assuming that states merely aim to survive. Above all else, they seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power. In particular, anarchy forces security-seeking states to compete with each other for power,
because power is the best means to survival. Whereas human nature is the deep cause of security competition in Morgenthau's theory, anarchy plays that role in Waltz's theory.37

Waltz does not emphasize, however, that the international system provides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power. Instead, he appears to make the opposite case: that anarchy encourages states to behave defensively and to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. "The first concern of states," he writes, is "to maintain their position in the system."38 There seems to be, as international relations theorist Randall Schweller notes, a "status quo bias" in Waltz's theory.39

Waltz recognizes that states have incentives to gain power at their rivals' expense and that it makes good strategic sense to act on that motive when the time is right. But he does not develop that line of argument in any detail. On the contrary, he emphasizes that when great powers behave aggressively, the potential victims usually balance against the aggressor and thwart its efforts to gain power.40 For Waltz, in short, balancing checkmates offense.41 Furthermore, he stresses that great powers must be careful not to acquire too much power, because "excessive strength" is likely to cause other states to join forces against them, thereby leaving them worse off than they would have been had they refrained from seeking additional increments of power.42

Waltz's views on the causes of war further reflect his theory's status quo bias. There are no profound or deep causes of war in his theory. In particular, he does not suggest that there might be important benefits to be gained from war. In fact, he says little about the causes of war, other than to argue that wars are largely the result of uncertainty and miscalculation. In other words, if states knew better, they would not start wars.

Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera buttress the defensive realists' case by focusing attention on a structural concept known as the offense-defense balance.43 They maintain that military power at any point in time can be categorized as favoring either offense or defense. If defense has a clear advantage over offense, and conquest is therefore difficult, great powers will have little incentive to use force to gain power and will concentrate instead on protecting what they have. When defense has the advantage, protecting what you have should be a relatively easy task. Alternatively, if offense is easier, states will be sorely tempted to try conquering each other, and there will be a lot of war in the system. Defensive realists argue, however, that the offense-defense balance is usually heavily tilted toward defense, thus making conquest extremely difficult.44 In sum, efficient balancing coupled with the natural advantages of defense over offense should discourage great powers from pursuing aggressive strategies and instead make them "defensive positionalists."45

My theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory of international politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each other; they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival. Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.46

It should be apparent that both offensive realism and human nature realism portray great powers as relentlessly seeking power. The key difference between the two perspectives is that offensive realists reject Morgenthau's claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A personalities. On the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security. In
other words, survival mandates aggressive behavior. Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival. (Table 1.1 summarizes how the main realist theories answer the foundational questions described above.)

No article or book makes the case for offensive realism in the sophisticated ways that Morgenthau does for human nature realism and Waltz and others do for defensive realism. For sure, some realists have argued that the system gives great powers good reasons to act aggressively. Probably the best brief for offensive realism is a short, obscure book written during World War I by G. Lowes Dickinson, a British academic who was an early advocate of the League of Nations. In The European Anarchy, he argues that the root cause of World War I "was not Germany nor any other power. The real culprit was the European anarchy," which created powerful incentives for states "to acquire supremacy over the others for motives at once of security and domination." Nevertheless, neither Dickinson nor anyone else makes a comprehensive case for offensive realism. My aim in writing this book is to fill that void.

**Power Politics in Liberal America**

Whatever merits realism may have as an explanation for real-world politics and as a guide for formulating foreign policy, it is not a popular school of thought in the West. Realism's central message—that it makes good sense for states to selfishly pursue power—does not have broad appeal. It is difficult to imagine a modern political leader openly asking the public to fight and die to improve the balance of power. No European or American leader did so during either world war or the Cold War. Most people prefer to think of fights between their own state and rival states as clashes between good and evil, where they are on the side of the angels and their opponents are aligned with the devil. Thus, leaders tend to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power. Realism is a hard sell.

Americans appear to have an especially intense antipathy toward balance-of-power thinking. The rhetoric of twentieth-century presidents, for example, is filled with examples of realism bashing. Woodrow Wilson is probably the most well-known example of this tendency, because of his eloquent campaign against balance-of-power politics during and immediately after World War I. Yet Wilson is hardly unique, and his successors have frequently echoed his views. In the final year of World War II, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, "In the future world the misuse of power as implied in the term 'power polities' must not be the controlling factor in international relations." More recently, Bill Clinton offered a strikingly similar view, proclaiming that "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." He sounded the same theme when defending NATO expansion in 1997, arguing that the charge that this policy might isolate Russia was based on the mistaken belief "that the great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century." Instead, Clinton emphasized his belief that "enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways . . . and will compel us to cooperate."

**Why Americans Dislike Realism**

Americans tend to be hostile to realism because it clashes with their basic values. Realism stands opposed to Americans' views of both themselves and the wider world. In particular, realism is at odds with the deep-seated sense of optimism and moralism that pervades much of American society. Liberalism, on the other hand, fits neatly with those values. Not surprisingly, foreign policy discourse in the United States often sounds as if it has been lifted right out of a Liberalism 101 lecture.
Americans are basically optimists. They regard progress in politics, whether at the national or the international level, as both desirable and possible. As the French author Alexis de Tocqueville observed long ago, Americans believe that "man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of improvement." Realism, by contrast, offers a pessimistic perspective on international politics. It depicts a world rife with security competition and war, and holds out little promise of an "escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does." Such pessimism is at odds with the powerful American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can cooperate to solve important social problems. Liberalism offers a more hopeful perspective on world politics, and Americans naturally find it more attractive than the gloomy specter drawn by realism.

Americans are also prone to believe that morality should play an important role in politics. As the prominent sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset writes, "Americans are Utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices." This perspective clashes with the realist belief that war is an intrinsic element of life in the international system. Most Americans tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be abolished from the face of the Earth. It might justifiably be used for lofty liberal goals like fighting tyranny or spreading democracy, but it is morally incorrect to fight wars merely to change or preserve the balance of power. This makes the Clausewitzian conception of warfare anathema to most Americans.

The American proclivity for moralizing also conflicts with the fact that realists tend not to distinguish between good and bad states, but instead discriminate between states largely on the basis of their relative power capabilities. A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior during that conflict. According to realist theory, both sides were driven by their concerns about the balance of power, and each did what it could to maximize its relative power. Most Americans would recoil at this interpretation of the Cold War, however, because they believe the United States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not. Liberal theorists do distinguish between good and bad states, of course, and they usually identify liberal democracies with market economies as the most worthy. Not surprisingly, Americans tend to like this perspective, because it identifies the United States as a benevolent force in world politics and portrays its real and potential rivals as misguided or malevolent troublemakers. Predictably, this line of thinking fueled the euphoria that attended the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. When the "evil empire" collapsed, many Americans (and Europeans) concluded that democracy would spread across the globe and that world peace would soon break out. This optimism was based largely on the belief that democratic America is a virtuous state. If other states emulated the United States, therefore, the world would be populated by good states, and this development could only mean the end of international conflict.

Rhetoric vs. Practice

Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at promoting liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas. Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. In essence, a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.

Prominent realists have often criticized U.S. diplomacy on the grounds that it is too idealistic and have complained that American leaders pay insufficient attention to the balance of power.
For example, Kennan wrote in 1951, "I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years."\(^{62}\) According to this line of argument, there is no real gap between America's liberal rhetoric and its foreign policy behavior, because the United States practices what it preaches. But this claim is wrong, as I will argue at length below. American foreign policy has usually been guided by realist logic, although the public pronouncements of its leaders might lead one to think otherwise.

It should be obvious to intelligent observers that the United States speaks one way and acts another. In fact, policymakers in other states have always remarked about this tendency in American foreign policy. As long ago as 1939, for example, Carr pointed out that states on the European continent regard the English-speaking peoples as "masters in the art of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general good," adding that "this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteristic peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon mind."\(^{63}\)

Still, the gap between rhetoric and reality usually goes unnoticed in the United States itself. Two factors account for this phenomenon. First, realist policies sometimes coincide with the dictates of liberalism, in which case there is no conflict between the pursuit of power and the pursuit of principle. Under these circumstances, realist policies can be justified with liberal rhetoric without having to discuss the underlying power realities. This coincidence makes for an easy sell. For example, the United States fought against fascism in World War II and communism in the Cold War for largely realist reasons. But both of those fights were also consistent with liberal principles, and thus policymakers had little trouble selling them to the public as ideological conflicts.

Second, when power considerations force the United States to act in ways that conflict with liberal principles, "spin doctors" appear and tell a story that accords with liberal ideals.\(^{64}\) For example, in the late nineteenth century, American elites generally considered Germany to be a progressive constitutional state worthy of emulation. But the American view of Germany changed in the decade before World War I, as relations between the two states deteriorated. By the time the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, Americans had come to see Germany as more autocratic and militaristic than its European rivals.

Similarly, during the late 1930s, many Americans saw the Soviet Union as an evil state, partly in response to Josef Stalin's murderous internal policies and his infamous alliance with Nazi Germany in August 1939. Nevertheless, when the United States joined forces with the Soviet Union in late 1941 to fight against the Third Reich, the U.S. government began a massive public relations campaign to clean up the image of America's new ally and make it compatible with liberal ideals. The Soviet Union was now portrayed as a proto-democracy, and Stalin became "Uncle Joe."

How is it possible to get away with this contradiction between rhetoric and policy? Most Americans readily accept these rationalizations because liberalism is so deeply rooted in their culture. As a result, they find it easy to believe that they are acting according to cherished principles, rather than cold and calculated power considerations.\(^{65}\)

**The Plan of the Book**

The rest of the chapters in this book are concerned mainly with answering the six big questions about power which I identified earlier. Chapter 2, which is probably the most important chapter in the book, lays out my theory of why states compete for power and why they pursue hegemony.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I define power and explain how to measure it. I do this in order to lay the groundwork for testing my theory. It is impossible to determine whether states have behaved according to the dictates of offensive realism without knowing what power is and what different strategies states employ to maximize their share of world power. My starting point is to
distinguish between potential power and actual military power, and then to argue that states care deeply about both kinds of power. Chapter 3 focuses on potential power, which involves mainly the size of a state's population and its wealth. Chapter 4 deals with actual military power. It is an especially long chapter because I make arguments about "the primacy of land power" and "the stopping power of water" that are novel and likely to be controversial.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the strategies that great powers employ to gain and maintain power. This chapter includes a substantial discussion of the utility of war for acquiring power. I also focus on balancing and buck-passing, which are the main strategies that states employ when faced with a rival that threatens to upset the balance of power.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the historical record to see whether there is evidence to support the theory. Specifically, I compare the conduct of the great powers from 1792 to 1990 to see whether their behavior fits the predictions of offensive realism.

In Chapter 8, I lay out a simple theory that explains when great powers balance and when they choose to buck-pass, and then I examine that theory against the historical record. Chapter 9 focuses on the causes of war. Here, too, I lay out a simple theory and then test it against the empirical record.

Chapter 10 challenges the oft-made claim that international politics has been fundamentally transformed with the end of the Cold War, and that great powers no longer compete with each other for power. I briefly assess the theories underpinning that optimistic perspective, and then I look at how the great powers have behaved in Europe and Northeast Asia between 1991 and 2000. Finally, I make predictions about the likelihood of great-power conflict in these two important regions in the early twenty-first century.
Chapter Two
Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

Great power, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. This perspective does not allow for status quo powers, except for the unusual state that achieves preponderance. Instead, the system is populated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core.1 This chapter presents a theory that explains this competition for power. Specifically, I attempt to show that there is a compelling logic behind my claim that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power. I do not, however, test offensive realism against the historical record in this chapter. That important task is reserved for later chapters.

Why States Pursue Power

My explanation for why great powers vie with each other for power and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone mandates that states behave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively. In particular, the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states.

How important is it that these assumptions be realistic? Some social scientists argue that the assumptions that underpin a theory need not conform to reality. Indeed, the economist Milton Friedman maintains that the best theories "will be found to have assumptions that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions."2 According to this view, the explanatory power of a theory is all that matters. If unrealistic assumptions lead to a theory that tells us a lot about how the world works, it is of no importance whether the underlying assumptions are realistic or not.

I reject this view. Although I agree that explanatory power is the ultimate criterion for assessing theories, I also believe that a theory based on unrealistic or false assumptions will not explain much about how the world works.3 Sound theories are based on sound assumptions. Accordingly, each of these five assumptions is a reasonably accurate representation of an important aspect of life in the international system.

Bedrock Assumptions

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have "no central authority above them."4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.5 There is no "government over governments."6

The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it.
The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.\(^7\) There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.\(^8\) Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities.

The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist.”\(^9\) States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective.

The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions.

As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

**State Behavior**

Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany.\(^10\)

The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the “9/11” problem—the absence of a central authority to which a threatened state can turn for help—and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them.

The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if
international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great.

States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.

Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible." Survival would then be almost guaranteed.

Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means—economic, diplomatic, and military—to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one state's gain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions.

Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. The idea that a great power might feel secure without dominating the system, provided it has an "appropriate amount" of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to assess how much relative power one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropriate threshold? Or is three times as much power the
magic number? The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever strategies, for example, sometimes allow less powerful states to defeat more powerful foes.

Second, determining how much power is enough becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power will be distributed among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of individual states vary over time, sometimes markedly, and it is often difficult to predict the direction and scope of change in the balance of power. Remember, few in the West anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first half of the Cold War, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventually generate greater wealth than the American economy, which would cause a marked power shift against the United States and its allies. What the future holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power will look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee.

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system.

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

The "security dilemma," which is one of the most well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states. John Herz first introduced the security dilemma in a 1950 article in the journal *World Politics*.

After discussing the anarchic nature of international politics, he writes, "Striving to attain security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on." The implication of Herz's analysis is clear: the best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense. The best defense is a good offense. Since this message is widely understood, ceaseless security competition ensues. Unfortunately, little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy.

It should be apparent from this discussion that saying that states are power maximizers is tantamount to saying that they care about relative power, not absolute power. There is an important distinction here, because states concerned about relative power behave differently than do states interested in absolute power. States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the distribution of material capabilities. In particular, they try to gain as large a power advantage as possible over potential rivals, because power is the best means to survival in a dangerous world. Thus, states motivated by relative power concerns are likely to
forgo large gains in their own power, if such gains give rival states even greater power, for
smaller national gains that nevertheless provide them with a power advantage over their rivals.20
States that maximize absolute power, on the other hand, care only about the size of their own
gains, not those of other states. They are not motivated by balance-of-power logic but instead
are concerned with amassing power without regard to how much power other states control.
They would jump at the opportunity for large gains, even if a rival gained more in the deal.
Power, according to this logic is not a ..........................

**Calculated Aggression**

There is obviously little room for status quo powers in a world where states are inclined to
look for opportunities to gain more power. Nevertheless, great powers cannot always act on
their offensive intentions, because behavior is influenced not only by what states want, but also
by their capacity to realize these desires. Every state might want to be king of the hill, but not
every state has the wherewithal to compete for that lofty position, much less achieve it. Much
depends on how military might is distributed among the great powers. A great power that has a
marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has
the capability as well as the incentive to do so.

By contrast, great powers facing powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider
offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance of power from threats
by their more powerful opponents. Let there be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise
the balance in their own favor, however, and they will take advantage of it. Stalin put the point
well at the end of World War II: “Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can
reach. It cannot be otherwise.” States might also have the capability to gain advantage over a
rival power but nevertheless decide that the perceived costs of offense are too high and do not
justify the expected benefits.

In short, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they
charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On the contrary, before great
powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how
other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely
benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious
moment. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position. As
discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, states sometimes limit defense spending either
because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would
weaken the economy and undermine the state’s power in the long run.23 To paraphrase Clint
Eastwood, a state has to know its limitations to survive in the international system.

Nevertheless, great powers miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make
important decisions on the basis of imperfect information. States hardly ever have complete
information about any situation they confront. There are two dimensions to this problem.
Potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to
conceal their true aims.24 For example, a weaker state trying to deter a stronger state is likely to
exaggerate its own power to discourage the potential aggressor from attacking. On the other
hand, a state bent on aggression is likely to emphasize its peaceful goals while exaggerating its
military weakness, so that the potential victim does not build up its own arms and thus leaves
itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was better at practicing this kind of
deception than Adolf Hitler.

But even if disinformation was not a problem, great powers are often unsure about how their
own military forces, as well as the adversary’s, will perform on the battlefield. For example, it is
sometimes difficult to determine in advance how new weapons and untested combat units will
perform in the face of enemy fire. Peacetime maneuvers and war games are helpful but
imperfect indicators of what is likely to happen in actual combat. Fighting wars is a complicated
business in which it is often difficult to predict outcomes. Remember that although the United States and its allies scored a stunning and remarkably easy victory against Iraq in early 1991, most experts at the time believed that Iraq's military would be a formidable foe and put up stubborn resistance before finally succumbing to American military might.25

Great powers are also sometimes unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies. For example, Germany believed that if it went to war against France and Russia in the summer of 1914, the United Kingdom would probably stay out of the fight. Saddam Hussein expected the United States to stand aside when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Both aggressors guessed wrong, but each had good reason to think that its initial judgment was correct. In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler believed that his great-power rivals would be easy to exploit and isolate because each had little interest in fighting Germany and instead was determined to get someone else to assume that burden. He guessed right. In short, great powers constantly find themselves confronting situations in which they have to make important decisions with incomplete information. Not surprisingly, they sometimes make faulty judgments and end up doing themselves serious harm.

Some defensive realists go so far as to suggest that the constraints of the international system are so powerful that offense rarely succeeds, and that aggressive great powers invariably end up being punished.26 As noted, they emphasize that 1) threatened states balance against aggressors and ultimately crush them, and 2) there is an offense-defense balance that is usually heavily tilted toward the defense, thus making conquest especially difficult. Great powers, therefore, should be content with the existing balance of power and not try to change it by force. After all, it makes little sense for a state to initiate a war that it is likely to lose; that would be self-defeating behavior. It is better to concentrate instead on preserving the balance of power.27 Moreover, because aggressors seldom succeed, states should understand that security is abundant, and thus there is no good strategic reason for wanting more power in the first place. In a world where conquest seldom pays, states should have relatively benign intentions toward each other. If they do not, these defensive realists argue, the reason is probably poisonous domestic politics, not smart calculations about how to guarantee one's security in an anarchic world.

There is no question that systemic factors constrain aggression, especially balancing by threatened states. But defensive realists exaggerate those restraining forces.28 Indeed, the historical record provides little support for their claim that offense rarely succeeds. One study estimates that there were 63 wars between 1815 and 1980, and the initiator won 39 times, which translates into about a 60 percent success rate.29 Turning to specific cases, Otto von Bismarck unified Germany by winning military victories against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870, and the United States as we know it today was created in good part by conquest in the nineteenth century. Conquest certainly paid big dividends in these cases. Nazi Germany won wars against Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, but lost to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. Conquest ultimately did not pay for the Third Reich, but if Hitler had restrained himself after the fall of France and had not invaded the Soviet Union, conquest probably would have paid handsomely for the Nazis. In short, the historical record shows that offense sometimes succeeds and sometimes does not. The trick for a sophisticated power maximizer is to figure out when to raise and when to fold.30

**Hegemony’s Limits**

Great powers, as I have emphasized, strive to gain power over their rivals and hopefully become hegemons. Once a state achieves that exalted position, it becomes a status quo power. More needs to be said, however, about the meaning of hegemony.

A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system.31 No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In
essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system. A state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers. The United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, is sometimes called a hegemon. But it was not a hegemon, because there were four other great powers in Europe at the time—Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia—and the United Kingdom did not dominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, during that period, the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balance of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar.

Hegemony means domination of the system; which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world. It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe particular regions, such as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus, one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate distinct geographical areas. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No other state in the Americas has sufficient military might to challenge it, which is why the United States is widely recognized as the only great power in its region.

My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today. But it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Indeed, there is reason to think that the American military commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia might wither away over the next decade. In short, there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon.

The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. The United States is the only regional hegemon in modern history, although other states have fought major wars in pursuit of regional hegemony: imperial Japan in Northeast Asia, and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany in Europe. But none succeeded. The Soviet Union, which is located in Europe and Northeast Asia, threatened to dominate both of those regions during the Cold War. The Soviet Union might also have attempted to conquer the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, with which it shared a border. But even if Moscow had been able to dominate Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which it never came close to doing, it still would have been unable to conquer the Western Hemisphere and become a true global hegemon.

States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers. Thus the United States, for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power’s backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the distant hegemon.

Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the sidelines. Of course, if the local great powers were unable to do the job, the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state. The United States, as noted, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in the twentieth century, which is why it is commonly referred to as an "offshore balancer."
In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of power. The United States is in that enviable position today; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and there is no hegemon in any other area of the world. But if a regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competitor, it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival. Of course, both regional hegemons would be motivated by that logic, which would make for a fierce security competition between them.

**Power and Fear**

That great powers fear each other is a central aspect of life in the international system. But as noted, the level of fear varies from case to case. For example, the Soviet Union worried much less about Germany in 1930 than it did in 1939. How much states fear each other matters greatly, because the amount of fear between them largely determines the severity of their security competition, as well as the probability that they will fight a war. The more profound the fear is, the more intense is the security competition, and the more likely is war. The logic is straightforward: a scared state will look especially hard for ways to enhance its security, and it will be disposed to pursue risky policies to achieve that end. Therefore, it is important to understand what causes states to fear each other more or less intensely.

Fear among great powers derives from the fact that they invariably have some offensive military capability that they can use against each other, and the fact that one can never be certain that other states do not intend to use that power against oneself. Moreover, because states operate in an anarchic system, there is no night watchman to whom they can turn for help if another great power attacks them. Although anarchy and uncertainty about other states' intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power-maximizing behavior, they cannot account for why sometimes that level of fear is greater than at other times. The reason is that anarchy and the difficulty of discerning state intentions are constant facts of life, and constants cannot explain variation. The capability that states have to threaten each other, however, varies from case to case, and it is the key factor that drives fear levels up and down. Specifically, the more power a state possesses, the more fear it generates among its rivals. Germany, for example, was much more powerful at the end of the 1930s than it was at the decade's beginning, which is why the Soviets became increasingly fearful of Germany over the course of that decade.

This discussion of how power affects fear prompts the question, What is power? It is important to distinguish between potential and actual power. A state's potential power is based on the size of its population and the level of its wealth. These two assets are the main building blocks of military power. Wealthy rivals with large populations can usually build formidable military forces. A state's actual power is embedded mainly in its army and the air and naval forces that directly support it. Armies are the central ingredient of military power, because they are the principal instrument for conquering and controlling territory—the paramount political objective in a world of territorial states. In short, the key component of military might, even in the nuclear age, is land power.

Power considerations affect the intensity of fear among states in three main ways. First, rival states that possess nuclear forces that can survive a nuclear attack and retaliate against it are likely to fear each other less than if these same states had no nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, for example, the level of fear between the superpowers probably would have been substantially greater if nuclear weapons had not been invented. The logic here is simple: because nuclear weapons can inflict devastating destruction on a rival state in a short period of time, nuclear-armed rivals are going to be reluctant to fight with each other, which means that each side will have less reason to fear the other than would otherwise be the case. But as the
Cold War demonstrates, this does not mean that war between nuclear powers is no longer thinkable; they still have reason to fear each other.

Second, when great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies. For example, the stopping power of water explains in good part why the United Kingdom and the United States (since becoming a great power in 1898) have never been invaded by another great power. It also explains why the United States has never tried to conquer territory in Europe or Northeast Asia, and why the United Kingdom has never attempted to dominate the European continent. Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.

Third, the distribution of power among the states in the system also markedly affects the levels of fear. The key issue is whether power is distributed more or less evenly among the great powers or whether there are sharp power asymmetries. The configuration of power that generates the most fear is a multipolar system that contains a potential hegemon—what I call "unbalanced multipolarity."

A potential hegemon is more than just the most powerful state in the system. It is a great power with so much actual military capability and so much potential power that it stands a good chance of dominating and controlling all of the other great powers in its region of the world. A potential hegemon need not have the wherewithal to fight all of its rivals at once, but it must have excellent prospects of defeating each opponent alone, and good prospects of defeating some of them in tandem. The key relationship, however, is the power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the system: there must be a marked gap between them. To qualify as a potential hegemon, a state must have—by some reasonably large margin—the most formidable army as well as the most latent power among all the states located in its region.

Bipolarity is the power configuration that produces the least amount of fear among the great powers, although not a negligible amount by any means. Fear tends to be less acute in bipolarity, because there is usually a rough balance of power between the two major states in the system. Multipolar systems without a potential hegemon, what I call "balanced multipolarity," are still likely to have power asymmetries among their members, although these asymmetries will not be as pronounced as the gaps created by the presence of an aspiring hegemon. Therefore, balanced multipolarity is likely to generate less fear than unbalanced multipolarity, but more fear than bipolarity.

This discussion of how the level of fear between great powers varies with changes in the distribution of power, not with assessments about each other's intentions, raises a related point. When a state surveys its environment to determine which states pose a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential rivals, not their intentions. As emphasized earlier, intentions are ultimately unknowable, so states worried about their survival must make worst-case assumptions about their rivals' intentions. Capabilities, however, not only can be measured but also determine whether or not a rival state is a serious threat. In short, great powers balance against capabilities, not intentions.

Great powers obviously balance against states with formidable military forces, because that offensive military capability is the tangible threat to their survival. But great powers also pay careful attention to how much latent power rival states control, because rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies. Thus, great powers tend to fear states with large populations and rapidly expanding economies, even if these states have not yet translated their wealth into military might.
The Hierarchy of State Goals

Survival is the number one goal of great powers, according to my theory. In practice, however, states pursue non-security goals as well. For example, great powers invariably seek greater economic prosperity to enhance the welfare of their citizenry. They sometimes seek to promote a particular ideology abroad, as happened during the Cold War when the the United States tried to spread democracy around the world and the Soviet Union tried to sell communism. National unification is another goal that sometimes motivates states, as it did with Prussia and Italy in the nineteenth century and Germany after the Cold War. Great powers also occasionally try to foster human rights around the globe. States might pursue any of these, as well as a number of other non-security goals.

Offensive realism certainly recognizes that great powers might pursue these non-security goals, but it has little to say about them, save for one important point: states can pursue them as long as the requisite behavior does not conflict with balance-of-power logic, which is often the case. Indeed, the pursuit of these non-security goals sometimes complements the hunt for relative power. For example, Nazi Germany expanded into eastern Europe for both ideological and realist reasons, and the superpowers competed with each other during the Cold War for similar reasons. Furthermore, greater economic prosperity invariably means greater wealth, which has significant implications for security, because wealth is the foundation of military power. Wealthy states can afford powerful military forces, which enhance a state's prospects for survival. As the political economist Jacob Viner noted more than fifty years ago, "there is a long-run harmony" between wealth and power. National unification is another goal that usually complements the pursuit of power. For example, the unified German state that emerged in 1871 was more powerful than the Prussian state it replaced.

Sometimes the pursuit of non-security goals has hardly any effect on the balance of power, one way or the other. Human rights interventions usually fit this description, because they tend to be small-scale operations that cost little and do not detract from a great power's prospects for survival. For better or for worse, states are rarely willing to expend blood and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses, including genocide. For instance, despite claims that American foreign policy is infused with moralism, Somalia (1992-93) is the only instance during the past one hundred years in which U.S. soldiers were killed in action on a humanitarian mission. And in that case, the loss of a mere eighteen soldiers in an infamous firefight in October 1993 so traumatized American policymakers that they immediately pulled all U.S. troops out of Somalia and then refused to intervene in Rwanda in the spring of 1994, when ethnic Hutu went on a genocidal rampage against their Tutsi neighbors. Stopping that genocide would have been relatively easy and it would have had virtually no effect on the position of the United States in the balance of power. Yet nothing was done. In short, although realism does not prescribe human rights interventions, it does not necessarily proscribe them.

But sometimes the pursuit of non-security goals conflicts with balance-of-power logic, in which case states usually act according to the dictates of realism. For example, despite the U.S. commitment to spreading democracy across the globe, it helped overthrow democratically elected governments and embraced a number of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, when American policymakers felt that these actions would help contain the Soviet Union. In World War II, the liberal democracies put aside their antipathy for communism and formed an alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. "I can't take communism," Franklin Roosevelt emphasized, but to defeat Hitler "I would hold hands with the Devil." In the same way, Stalin repeatedly demonstrated that when his ideological preferences clashed with power considerations, the latter won out. To take the most blatant example of his realism, the Soviet Union formed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939—the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—in hopes that the agreement would at least temporarily satisfy Hitler's
territorial ambitions in eastern Europe and turn the Wehrmacht toward France and the United
Kingdom.\textsuperscript{40} When great powers confront a serious threat, in short, they pay little attention to
ideology as they search for alliance partners.\textsuperscript{41}

Security also trumps wealth when those two goals conflict, because "defence," as Adam
Smith wrote in \textit{The Wealth of Nations}, "is of much more importance than opulence."\textsuperscript{42} Smith
provides a good illustration of how states behave when forced to choose between wealth and
relative power. In 1651, England put into effect the famous Navigation Act, protectionist
legislation designed to damage Holland's commerce and ultimately cripple the Dutch economy.
The legislation mandated that all goods imported into England be carried either in English ships
or ships owned by the country that originally produced the goods. Since the Dutch produced few
goods themselves, this measure would badly damage their shipping, the central ingredient in
their economic success. Of course, the Navigation Act would hurt England's economy as well,
mainly because it would rob England of the benefits of free trade. "The act of navigation," Smith
wrote, "is not favorable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence that can arise
from it." Nevertheless, Smith considered the legislation "the wisest of all the commercial
regulations of England" because it did more damage to the Dutch economy than to the English
economy, and in the mid-seventeenth century Holland was "the only naval power which could
endanger the security of England."\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Creating World Order}

The claim is sometimes made that great powers can transcend realist logic by working
together to build an international order that fosters peace and justice. World peace, it would
appear, can only enhance a state's prosperity and security. America's political leaders paid
considerable lip service to this line of argument over the course of the twentieth century.
President Clinton, for example, told an audience at the United Nations in September 1993 that
"at the birth of this organization 48 years ago . . . a generation of gifted leaders from many
nations stepped forward to organize the world's efforts on behalf of security and prosperity. . . .
Now history has granted to us a moment of even greater opportunity. . . . Let us resolve that we
will dream larger. . . . Let us ensure that the world we pass to our children is healthier, safer and
more abundant than the one we inhabit today."\textsuperscript{44}

This rhetoric notwithstanding, great powers do not work together to promote world order for
its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is likely to
clash with the goal of creating and sustaining stable international orders.\textsuperscript{45} This is not to say that
great powers never aim to prevent wars and keep the peace. On the contrary, they work hard to
deter wars in which they would be the likely victim. In such cases, however, state behavior is
driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power, not by a commitment to build a world
order independent of a state's own interests. The United States, for example, devoted
enormous resources to deterring the Soviet Union from starting a war in Europe during the Cold
War, not because of some deep-seated commitment to promoting peace around the world, but
because American leaders feared that a Soviet victory would lead to a dangerous shift in the
balance of power.\textsuperscript{46}

The particular international order that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self-
interested behavior of the system's great powers. The configuration of the system, in other
words, is the unintended consequence of great-power security competition, not the result of
states acting together to organize peace. The establishment of the Cold War order in Europe
illustrates this point. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intended to establish it, nor
did they work together to create it. In fact, each superpower worked hard in the early years of
the Cold War to gain power at the expense of the other, while preventing the other from doing
likewise.\textsuperscript{47} The system that emerged in Europe in the aftermath of World War II was the
unplanned consequence of intense security competition between the superpowers.
Although that intense superpower rivalry ended along with the Cold War in 1990, Russia and the United States have not worked together to create the present order in Europe. The United States, for example, has rejected out of hand various Russian proposals to make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe the central organizing pillar of European security (replacing the U.S.-dominated NATO). Furthermore, Russia was deeply opposed to NATO expansion, which it viewed as a serious threat to Russian security. Recognizing that Russia’s weakness would preclude any retaliation, however, the United States ignored Russia’s concerns and pushed NATO to accept the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members. Russia has also opposed U.S. policy in the Balkans over the past decade, especially NATO’s 1999 war against Yugoslavia. Again, the United States has paid little attention to Russia’s concerns and has taken the steps it deems necessary to bring peace to that volatile region. Finally, it is worth noting that although Russia is dead set against allowing the United States to deploy ballistic missile defenses, it is highly likely that Washington will deploy such a system if it is judged to be technologically feasible.

For sure, great-power rivalry will sometimes produce a stable international order, as happened during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the great powers will continue looking for opportunities to increase their share of world power, and if a favorable situation arises, they will move to undermine that stable order. Consider how hard the United States worked during the late 1980s to weaken the Soviet Union and bring down the stable order that had emerged in Europe during the latter part of the Cold War. Of course, the states that stand to lose power will work to deter aggression and preserve the existing order. But their motives will be selfish, revolving around balance-of-power logic, not some commitment to world peace.

Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two reasons. First, states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering peace. Certainly, international relations scholars have never reached a consensus on what the blueprint should look like. In fact, it seems there are about as many theories on the causes of war and peace as there are scholars studying the subject. But more important, policymakers are unable to agree on how to create a stable world. For example, at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, important differences over how to create stability in Europe divided Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson. In particular, Clemenceau was determined to impose harsher terms on Germany over the Rhineland than was either Lloyd George or Wilson, while Lloyd George stood out as the hard-liner on German reparations. The Treaty of Versailles, not surprisingly, did little to promote European stability.

Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early days of the Cold War. The key elements for a stable and durable system were in place by the early 1950s. They included the division of Germany, the positioning of American ground forces in Western Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman administration, however, disagreed about whether a divided Germany would be a source of peace or war. For example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, who held important positions in the State Department, believed that a divided Germany would be a source of instability, whereas Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought to end the American commitment to defend Western Europe and to provide West Germany with its own nuclear deterrent. This policy, which was never fully adopted, nevertheless caused significant instability in Europe, as it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961.

Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace because they cannot be sure that their efforts will succeed. If their attempt fails, they are likely to pay a steep price for having neglected the balance of power, because if an aggressor appears at the door there will be no answer when they dial 911. That is a risk few states are willing to run. Therefore, prudence dictates that they behave according to realist logic. This line of reasoning accounts for why collective security schemes, which call for states to put
aside narrow concerns about the balance of power and instead act in accordance with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.52

Cooperation Among States

One might conclude from the preceding discussion that my theory does not allow for any cooperation among the great powers. But this conclusion would be wrong. States can cooperate, although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating.53 Ultimately, great powers live in a fundamentally competitive world where they view each other as real, or at least potential, enemies, and they therefore look to gain power at each other's expense.

Any two states contemplating cooperation must consider how profits or gains will be distributed between them. They can think about the division in terms of either absolute or relative gains (recall the distinction made earlier between pursuing either absolute power or relative power; the concept here is the same). With absolute gains, each side is concerned with maximizing its own profits and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. With relative gains, on the other hand, each side considers not only its own individual gain, but also how well it fares compared to the other side.

Because great powers care deeply about the balance of power, their thinking focuses on relative gains when they consider cooperating with other states. For sure, each state tries to maximize its absolute gains; still, it is more important for a state to make sure that it does no worse, and perhaps better, than the other state in any agreement. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve, however, when states are attuned to relative gains rather than absolute gains.54 This is because states concerned about absolute gains have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, they are getting at least some portion of the increase, whereas states that worry about relative gains must pay careful attention to how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts.

Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. Great powers are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage. This concern is especially acute in the military realm, causing a "special peril of defection," because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balance of power.55 Such a development could create a window of opportunity for the state that cheats to inflict a decisive defeat on its victim.

These barriers to cooperation notwithstanding, great powers do cooperate in a realist world. Balance-of-power logic often causes great powers to form alliances and cooperate against common enemies. The United Kingdom, France, and Russia, for example, were allies against Germany before and during World War I. States sometimes cooperate to gang up on a third state, as Germany and the Soviet Union did against Poland in 1939.56 More recently, Serbia and Croatia agreed to conquer and divide Bosnia between them, although the United States and its European allies prevented them from executing their agreement.57 Rivals as well as allies cooperate. After all, deals can be struck that roughly reflect the distribution of power and satisfy concerns about cheating. The various arms control agreements signed by the superpowers during the Cold War illustrate this point.

The bottom line, however, is that cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core—one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states. This point is graphically highlighted by the state of European politics in the forty years before World War I. The great powers cooperated frequently during this period, but that did not stop them from going to war on August 1, 1914.58 The United States and the Soviet Union also cooperated considerably during World War II, but that cooperation did not prevent the outbreak of the Cold
War shortly after Germany and Japan were defeated. Perhaps most amazingly, there was significant economic and military cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the two years before the Wehrmacht attacked the Red Army. No amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition. Genuine peace, or a world in which states do not compete for power, is not likely as long as the state system remains anarchic.

Conclusion

In sum, my argument is that the structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. I do not adopt Morgenthau's claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired into them. Instead, I assume that the principal motive behind great-power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively. Nor does my theory classify states as more or less aggressive on the basis of their economic or political systems. Offensive realism makes only a handful of assumptions about great powers, and these assumptions apply equally to all great powers. Except for differences in how much power each state controls, the theory treats all states alike.

I have now laid out the logic explaining why states seek to gain as much power as possible over their rivals. I have said little, however, about the object of that pursuit: power itself. The next two chapters provide a detailed discussion of this important subject.
Power in international politics is largely a product of the military forces that a state possesses. Great powers, however, can acquire different kinds of fighting forces, and how much of each kind they buy has important implications for the balance of power. This chapter analyzes the four types of military power among which states choose—indepenent sea power, strategic airpower, land power, and nuclear weapons—to determine how to weigh them against each other and come up with a useful measure of power.

I make two main points in the discussion below. First, land power is the dominant form of military power in the modern world. A state’s power is largely embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that support those ground forces. Simply put, the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies. Therefore, measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound indicator of the relative might of rival great powers.

Second, large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces. When opposing armies must cross a large expanse of water such as the Atlantic Ocean or the English Channel to attack each other, neither army is likely to have much offensive capability against its rival, regardless of the size and quality of the opposing armies. The stopping power of water is of great significance not just because it is a central aspect of land power, but also because it has important consequences for the concept of hegemony. Specifically, the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. Not even the world’s most powerful state can conquer distant regions that can be reached only by ship. Thus, great powers can aspire to dominate only the region in which they are located, and possibly an adjacent region that can be reached over land.

For more than a century strategists have debated which form of military power dominates the outcome of war. U.S. admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan famously proclaimed the supreme importance of independent sea power in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* and his other writings. General Giulio Douhet of Italy later made the case for the primacy of strategic airpower in his 1921 classic, *The Command of the Air.* Their works are still widely read at staff colleges around the world. I argue that both are wrong: land power is the decisive military instrument. Wars are won by big battalions, not by armadas in the air or on the sea. The strongest power is the state with the strongest army.

One might argue that nuclear weapons greatly diminish the importance of land power, either by rendering great-power war obsolete or by making the nuclear balance the essential component of military power in a competitive world. There is no question that great-power war is less likely in a nuclear world, but great powers still compete for security even under the nuclear shadow, sometimes intensely, and war between them remains a real possibility. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, waged an unremitting security competition for forty-five years, despite the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides. Moreover, save for the unlikely scenario in which one great power achieves nuclear superiority, the nuclear balance matters little for determining relative power. Even in a nuclear world, armies and the air and naval forces that support them are the core ingredient of military power.

The alliance patterns that formed during the Cold War are evidence that land power is the principal component of military might. In a world dominated by two great powers, we would expect other key states to join forces with the weaker great power to contain the stronger one. Throughout the Cold War, not only was the United States much wealthier than the Soviet Union, but it also enjoyed a significant advantage in naval forces, strategic bombers, and nuclear warheads. Nevertheless, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and eventually China considered the Soviet Union, not the United States, to be the most powerful state in the system. Indeed, those states allied with the United States against the Soviet Union because they feared the Soviet army, not the American army. Moreover, there is little concern...
about a Russian threat today—even though Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons—
because the Russian army is weak and in no position to launch a major ground offensive.
Should it recover and become a formidable fighting force again, the United States and its
European allies would start worrying about a new Russian threat.

This chapter comprises eight sections. I compare the different kinds of conventional military
power in the first four sections, aiming to show that land power dominates independent sea
power and strategic airpower. In the first section, I describe these different kinds of military
power more fully and explain why land power is the main instrument for winning wars. In the
next two sections, I discuss the various missions that navies and air forces perform and then
consider the evidence on how independent naval and air forces have affected the outcomes of
great-power wars. The role of land power in modern military history is examined in the fourth
section.

The fifth section analyzes how large bodies of water sharply curtail the power-projection
capabilities of armies and thus shift the balance of land power in important ways. The impact of
nuclear weapons on military power is discussed in the sixth section. I then describe how to
measure land power in the seventh section, which is followed by a short conclusion that
describes some implications for international stability that follow from my analysis of power.

**Conquest vs. Coercion**

Land power is centered around armies, but it also includes the air and naval forces that
support them. For example, navies transport armies across large bodies of water, and
sometimes they attempt to project ground forces onto hostile beaches. Air forces also transport
armies, but more important, they aid armies by delivering firepower from the skies. These air
and naval missions, however, are directly assisting the army, not acting independently of it.
Thus, these missions fit under the rubric of land power.

Armies are of paramount importance in warfare because they are the main military
instrument for conquering and controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a
world of territorial states. Naval and air forces are simply not suited for conquering territory.4 The
famous British naval strategist Julian Corbett put the point well regarding the relationship
between armies and navies: "Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues
between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what
your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the
fleet makes it possible for your army to do."5 Corbett's logic applies to airpower as well as sea
power.

Navies and air forces, however, need not act simply as force multipliers for the army. Each
can also independently project power against rival states, as many navalists and airpower
enthusiasts like to emphasize. Navies, for example, can ignore what is happening on the
battlefield and blockade an opponent, while air forces can fly over the battlefield and bomb the
enemy's homeland. Both blockades and strategic bombing seek to produce victory by coercing
the adversary into surrendering before its army is defeated on the battlefield. Specifically, the
aim is to cause the opponent to surrender either by wrecking its economy and thus undermining
its ability to prosecute the war, or by inflicting massive punishment on its civilian population.

The claims of Douhet and Mahan notwithstanding, neither independent naval power nor
strategic airpower has much utility for winning major wars. Neither of those coercive instruments
can win a great-power war operating alone. Only land power has the potential to win a major
war by itself. The main reason, as discussed below, is that it is difficult to coerce a great power.
In particular, it is hard to destroy an enemy's economy solely by blockading or bombing it.
Furthermore, the leaders as well as the people in modern states are rarely willing to surrender
even after absorbing tremendous amounts of punishment. Although blockading navies and
strategic bombers cannot produce victory by themselves, they sometimes can help armies gain
victory by damaging the economy that underpins the adversary's military machine. But even in this more limited capacity, air and naval forces usually do not play more than an auxiliary role.

Land power dominates the other kinds of military power for another reason: only armies can expeditiously defeat an opponent. Blockading navies and strategic bombing, as discussed below, cannot produce quick and decisive victories in wars between great powers. They are useful mainly for fighting lengthy wars of attrition. But states rarely go to war unless they think that rapid success is likely. In fact, the prospect of a protracted conflict is usually an excellent deterrent to war. Consequently, a great power's army is its main instrument for initiating aggression. A state's offensive potential, in other words, is embedded largely in its army.

Let us now look more closely at the different missions that navies and air forces perform in wartime, paying special attention to how blockades and strategic bombing campaigns have affected the outcomes of past great-power conflicts.

**The Limits of Independent Naval Power**

A navy bent on projecting power against a rival state must first gain *command of the sea*, which is the bedrock mission for naval forces. Command of the sea means controlling the lines of communication that crisscross the ocean's surface, so that a state's commercial and military ships can freely move across them. For a navy to command an ocean, it need not control all of the sea all of the time, but it must be able to control the strategically important parts whenever it wants to use them, and deny the enemy the ability to do likewise. Gaining command of the sea can be achieved by destroying rival navies in battle, by blockading them in their ports, or by denying them access to critical sea lanes.

A navy that commands the oceans may have the freedom to move about those moats, but it still must find a way to project power against its rival's homeland; command of the sea by itself does not provide that capability. Navies can perform three power-projection missions where they are directly supporting the army, not acting independently.

**Amphibious assault** takes place when a navy moves an army across a large body of water and lands it on territory controlled by a rival great power. The attacking forces meet armed resistance either when they arrive at their landing zones or shortly thereafter. Their aim is to engage and defeat the defender's main armies, and to conquer some portion, if not all, of its territory. The Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, is an example of an amphibious assault.

**Amphibious landings**, in contrast, occur when the seaborne forces meet hardly any resistance when they land in enemy territory and are able to establish a beachhead and move well inland before engaging enemy forces. The insertion of British troops into French-controlled Portugal during the Napoleonic Wars, discussed below, is an example of an amphibious landing; the landing of German army units in Norway in the spring of 1940 is another.

**Troop transport** by a navy involves moving ground forces across an ocean and landing them on territory controlled by friendly forces, from where they go into combat against the enemy army. The navy effectively serves as a ferry service. The American navy performed this mission in World War I, when it moved troops from the United States to France, and again in World War II, when it moved troops from the United States to the United Kingdom. These different kinds of amphibious operations are considered below, when I discuss how water limits the striking power of armies. Suffice it to say here that invasion from the sea against territory defended by a rival great power is usually a daunting task. Troop transport is a much easier mission.

There are also two ways that navies can be used independently to project power against another state. In *naval bombardment*, enemy cities or selected military targets, usually along a rival's coast, are hit with sustained firepower from guns or missiles on ships and submarines, or by aircraft flying from carriers. The aim is to coerce the adversary either by punishing its cities or...
by shifting the military balance against it. This is not a serious strategy; naval bombardment is
pinprick warfare, and it has little effect on the target state.

Although navies often bombarded enemy ports in the age of sail (1500-1850), they could not
deliver enough firepower to those targets to be more than a nuisance. Moreover, naval gunfire
did not have the range to hit targets located off the coast. Horatio Nelson, the famous British
admiral, summed up the futility of naval bombardment with sailing navies when he said, "A
ship's a fool to fight a fort." The industrialization of navies after 1850 significantly increased the
amount of firepower navies could deliver, as well as their delivery range. But industrialization
had an even more profound effect on the ability of land-based forces to find and sink navies, as
discussed below. Thus, twentieth-century surface navies tended to stay far away from enemy
coastlines in wartime. More important, however, if a great power were to try to coerce an
adversary with a conventional bombing campaign, it would surely use its air force for that
purpose, not its navy.

The two great naval theorists of modern times, Corbett and Mahan, believed that a blockade
is the navy's ace strategy for winning great-power wars. Blockade, which Mahan called "the
most striking and awful mark of sea power," works by strangling a rival state's economy. The
aim is to cut off an opponent's overseas trade—to deny it imports that move across water and to
prevent it from exporting its own goods and materials to the outside world.

Once seaborne trade is severed, there are two ways a blockade might coerce a rival great
power into surrendering. First, it can inflict severe punishment on the enemy's civilian
population, mainly by cutting off food imports and making life miserable, if not deadly, for the
average citizen. If enough people are made to suffer and die, popular support for the war will
evaporate, a result that will either cause the population to revolt or force the government to stop
the war for fear of revolt. Second, a blockade can so weaken an enemy's economy that it can
no longer continue the fight. Probably the best way to achieve this end is to cut off a critical
import, such as oil. Blockading navies usually do not discriminate between these two
approaches but instead try to cut off as much of an opponent's overseas trade as possible,
hoping that one approach succeeds. Regardless, blockades do not produce quick and decisive
victories, because it takes a long time for a navy to wreck an adversary's economy.

States usually implement blockades with naval forces that prevent oceangoing commerce
from reaching the target state. The United Kingdom, for example, has historically relied on its
surface navy to blockade rivals such as Napoleonic France and Wilhelmine Germany.
Submarines can also be used to cut an enemy state's overseas trade, as Germany attempted to
do against the United Kingdom in both world wars, and the United States did against Japan in
World War II. The Americans also used surface ships, land-based aircraft, and mines to
blockade Japan. But navies are not always necessary to carry out a blockade. A state that
dominates a continent and controls its major ports can stop trade between the states located on
that continent and states located elsewhere, thus blockading the outside states. Napoleon's
Continental System (1806-13), which was aimed at the United Kingdom, fits this model.

The History of Blockades

There are eight cases in the modern era in which a great power attempted to coerce another
great power with a wartime blockade: 1) France blockaded the United Kingdom during the
Napoleonic Wars, and 2) the United Kingdom did likewise to France; 3) France blockaded
Prussia in 1870; 4) Germany blockaded the United Kingdom and 5) the United Kingdom and the
United States blockaded Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I; 6) Germany blockaded
the United Kingdom and 7) the United Kingdom and the United States blockaded Germany and
Italy in World War II; and 8) the United States blockaded Japan in World War II. The Union's
blockade of the Confederacy during the American Civil War (1861-65) is a possible ninth case,
although neither side was technically a great power; I will consider it here nonetheless.
In evaluating these cases, two questions should be kept in mind. First, is there evidence that blockades alone can coerce an enemy into surrendering? And second, can blockades contribute importantly to victory by ground armies? Is the influence of blockades on the final outcome of wars likely to be decisive, roughly equal to that of land power, or marginal?

The British economy was certainly hurt by Napoleon's Continental System, but the United Kingdom stayed in the war and eventually came out on the winning side. The British blockade of Napoleonic France did not come close to wrecking the French economy, which was not particularly vulnerable to blockade. No serious scholar argues that the British blockade played a key role in Napoleon's downfall. France's blockade of Prussia in 1870 had hardly any effect on the Prussian economy, much less on the Prussian army, which won a decisive victory over the French army. Germany's submarine campaign against British shipping in World War I threatened to knock the United Kingdom out of the war in 1917, but that blockade ultimately failed and the British army played the key role in defeating Wilhelmine Germany in 1918. In that same conflict, the British and American navies imposed a blockade of their own on Germany and Austria-Hungary that badly damaged those countries' economies and caused great suffering among their civilian populations. Nevertheless, Germany surrendered only after the Kaiser's armies, which were not seriously affected by the blockade, were shattered in combat on the western front in the summer of 1918. Austria-Hungary, too, had to be defeated on the battlefield.

In World War II, Hitler launched another U-boat campaign against the United Kingdom, but again it failed to wreck the British economy and knock the United Kingdom out of the war. The Anglo-American blockade of Nazi Germany in that same conflict had no significant effect on the German economy, which was not particularly vulnerable to blockade. Nor did the Allied blockade cause Italy's economy much harm, and it certainly had little to do with Italy's decision to quit the war in mid-1943. Regarding the American Civil War, the Confederacy's economy was hurt by the Union blockade, but it did not collapse, and General Robert E. Lee surrendered only after the Confederate armies had been soundly defeated in battle. Moreover, Lee's armies were not beaten in battle because they suffered from material shortages stemming from the blockade.

The American blockade of Japan during World War II is the only case in which a blockade wrecked a rival's economy, causing serious damage to its military forces. Moreover, it is the only case among the nine of successful coercion, since Japan surrendered before its Home Army of two million men was defeated in battle. There is no question that the blockade played a central role in bringing Japan to its knees, but it was done in tandem with land power, which played an equally important role in producing victory. Japan's decision to surrender unconditionally in August 1945 merits close scrutiny, because it is a controversial case, and because it has significant implications for analyzing the efficacy of strategic airpower as well as blockades.

A good way to think about what caused Japan to surrender is to distinguish between what transpired before August 1945 and what happened in the first two weeks of that critical month. By late July 1945, Japan was a defeated nation, and its leaders recognized that fact. The only important issue at stake was whether Japan could avoid unconditional surrender, which the United States demanded. Defeat was inevitable because the balance of land power had shifted decisively against Japan over the previous three years. Japan's army, along with its supporting air and naval forces, was on the verge of collapse because of the devastating American blockade, and because it had been worn down in protracted fighting on two fronts. The Asian mainland was Japan's western front, and its armies had been bogged down there in a costly war with China since 1937. Japan's eastern front was its island empire in the western Pacific, where the United States was its principal foe. American ground forces, with extensive air and naval support for sure, had defeated most of the Japanese forces holding those islands and were gearing up to invade Japan itself in the fall of 1945.
By the end of July 1945, the American air force had been firebombing Japan's major cities for almost five months, and it had inflicted massive destruction on Japan's civilian population. Nevertheless, this punishment campaign neither caused the Japanese people to put pressure on their government to end the war nor caused Japan's leaders to think seriously about throwing in the towel. Instead, Japan was on the ropes because its army had been decimated by blockade and years of debilitating ground combat. Still, Japan refused to surrender unconditionally.

Why did Japan continue to hold out? It was not because its leaders thought that their badly weakened army could thwart an American invasion of Japan. In fact, it was widely recognized that the United States had the military might to conquer the home islands. Japanese policymakers refused to accept unconditional surrender because they thought that it was possible to negotiate an end to the war that left Japan's sovereignty intact. The key to success was to make the United States think that it would have to pay a large blood price to conquer Japan. The threat of costly victory, they reasoned, would cause the United States to be more flexible on the diplomatic front. Furthermore, Japanese leaders hoped that the Soviet Union, which had stayed out of the Pacific war so far, would mediate the peace talks and help produce an agreement short of unconditional surrender.

Two events in early August 1945 finally pushed Japan's leaders over the line and got them to accept unconditional surrender. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) and the specter of more nuclear attacks caused some key individuals, including Emperor Hirohito, to push for quitting the war immediately. The final straw was the Soviet decision to join the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, and the Soviet attack on the Kwantung Army in Manchuria the following day. Not only did that development eliminate any possibility of using the Soviet Union to negotiate a peace agreement, but Japan was now at war with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, the rapid collapse of the Kwantung Army at the hands of the Red Army suggested that the Home Army was likely to fall rather quickly and easily to the American invasion force. In short, Japan's strategy for gaining a conditional surrender was in tatters by August 9, 1945, and this fact was widely recognized by the Japanese military, especially the army, which had been the principal roadblock to quitting the war.

The evidence from these cases of blockade suggests two conclusions about their utility for winning wars. First, blockades alone cannot coerce an enemy into surrendering. The futility of such a strategy is shown by the fact that no belligerent has ever tried it. Moreover, the record shows that even blockades used together with land power rarely have produced coercive results, revealing the general inability of blockades to coerce. In the nine cases surveyed above, the blockading state won five times and lost four times. In four of the five victories, however, there was no coercion; the victor had to conquer the other state's army. In the single case of successful coercion, the U.S. navy's blockade of Japan was only partially responsible for the outcome. Land power mattered at least as much as the blockade.

Second, blockades rarely do much to weaken enemy armies, hence they rarely contribute in important ways to the success of a ground campaign. The best that can be said for blockade is that it sometimes helps land power win protracted wars by damaging an adversary's economy. Indeed, the blockade of Japan is the only case in which a blockade mattered as much as land power for winning a great-power war.

**Why Blockades Fail**

Numerous factors account for the limited impact of blockades in great-power wars. They sometimes fail because the blockading navy is checked at sea and cannot cut the victim's sea lines of communication. The British and American navies thwarted Germany's blockades in both world wars by making it difficult for German submarines to get close enough to Allied shipping to

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launch their torpedoes. Furthermore, blockades sometimes become porous over the course of a long war, because of leakage or because neutral states serve as entrepots. The Continental System, for example, eroded over time because Napoleon could not completely shut down British trade with the European continent.

Even when a blockade cuts off virtually all of the target state's seaborne commerce, its impact is usually limited for two reasons. First, great powers have ways of beating blockades, for example by recycling, stockpiling, and substitution. The United Kingdom was heavily dependent on imported food before both world wars, and the German blockades in those conflicts aimed to starve the British into submission. The United Kingdom dealt with this threat to its survival, however, by sharply increasing its production of foodstuffs. When Germany had its rubber supply cut off in World War II, it developed a synthetic substitute. Furthermore, great powers can conquer and exploit neighboring states, especially since the coming of railroads. Nazi Germany, for example, thoroughly exploited the European continent in World War II, greatly reducing the impact of the Allied blockade.

Modern bureaucratic states are especially adept at adjusting and rationalizing their economies to counter wartime blockades. Mancur Olson demonstrates this point in The Economics of the Wartime Shortage, which compares the blockades against the United Kingdom in the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. He notes that "Britain endured the greatest loss of food supplies in World War II, the next greatest loss in World War I, and the smallest loss in the Napoleonic wars." At the same time, the United Kingdom was more dependent on food imports during the twentieth century than it was during the Napoleonic period. Therefore, one would expect "the amount of suffering for want of food" to be greatest in World War II and least in Napoleon's day.

But Olson finds the opposite to be true: suffering due to lack of food in the Napoleonic period "was probably much greater than in either of the world wars." His explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that the administrative abilities of the British state increased markedly over time, so that its capacity to reorganize its economy in wartime and ameliorate the effects of blockade was "least remarkable in the Napoleonic period, more remarkable in World War I, and most remarkable in World War II."

Second, the populations of modern states can absorb great amounts of pain without rising up against their governments. There is not a single case in the historical record in which either a blockade or a strategic bombing campaign designed to punish an enemy's population caused significant public protests against the target government. If anything, it appears that "punishment generates more public anger against the attacker than against the target government." Consider Japan in World War II. Not only was its economy devastated by the American blockade, but Japan was subjected to a strategic bombing campaign that destroyed vast tracts of urban landscape and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. Yet the Japanese people stoically withstood the withering punishment the United States dished out, and they put little pressure on their government to surrender.

Finally, governing elites are rarely moved to quit a war because their populations are being brutalized. In fact, one could argue that the more punishment that a population suffers, the more difficult it is for the leaders to quit the war. The basis of this claim, which seems counterintuitive, is that bloody defeat greatly increases the likelihood that after the war is over the people will seek revenge against the leaders who led them down the road to destruction. Thus, those leaders have a powerful incentive to ignore the pain being inflicted on their population and fight to the finish in the hope that they can pull out a victory and save their own skin.

**The Limits of Strategic Airpower**

There are important parallels in how states employ their air forces and their navies in war. Whereas navies must gain command of the sea before they can project power against rival
states, air forces must gain command of the air, or achieve what is commonly called air superiority, before they can bomb enemy forces on the ground or attack an opponent's homeland. If an air force does not control the skies, its strike forces are likely to suffer substantial losses, making it difficult, if not impossible for them to project power against the enemy.

American bombers, for example, conducted large-scale raids against the German cities of Regensburg and Schweinfurt in August and October 1943 without commanding the skies over that part of Germany. The attacking bombers suffered prohibitive losses as a result, forcing the United States to halt the attacks until long-range fighter escorts became available in early 1944. During the first days-of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) attempted to provide much-needed support to the beleaguered Israeli ground forces along the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights. But withering fire from Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles and air-defense guns forced the IAF to curtail that mission.

Once an air force controls the skies, it can pursue three power-projection missions in support of army units fighting on the ground. In a close air support role, an air force flies above the battlefield and provides direct tactical support to friendly ground forces operating below. The air force's principal goal is to destroy enemy troops from the air, in effect serving as "flying artillery." This mission requires close coordination between air and ground forces. Interdiction involves air force strikes at the enemy army's rear area, mainly to destroy or delay the movement of enemy supplies and troops to the front line. The target list might include supply depots, reserve units, long-range artillery, and the lines of communication that crisscross the enemy's rear area and run up to its front lines. Air forces also provide airlift, moving troops and supplies either to or within a combat theater. These missions, of course, simply augment an army's power.

But an air force can also independently project power against an adversary with strategic bombing, in which the air force strikes directly at the enemy's homeland, paying little attention to events on the battlefield. This mission lends itself to the claim that air forces alone can win wars. Not surprisingly, airpower enthusiasts tend to embrace strategic bombing, which works much like its naval equivalent, the blockade. The aim of both strategic bombing and blockading is to coerce the enemy into surrendering either by massively punishing its civilian population or by destroying its economy, which would ultimately cripple its fighting forces. Proponents of economic targeting sometimes favor striking against the enemy's entire industrial base and wrecking it in toto. Others advocate strikes limited to one or more "critical components" such as oil, ball bearings, machine tools, steel, or transportation networks—the Achilles' heel of the enemy's economy. Strategic bombing campaigns, like blockades, are not expected to produce quick and easy victories.

Over the past decade, some advocates of airpower have argued that strategic bombing can secure victory by decapitating the enemy's political leadership. Specifically, bombers might be used either to kill a rival state's political leaders or to isolate them from their people by attacking the leadership's means of communication as well as the security forces that allow it to control the population. More benign elements in the adversary's camp, it is hoped, would then stage a coup and negotiate peace. Advocates of decapitation also claim that it might be feasible to isolate a political leader from his military forces, making it impossible for him to command and control them.

Two further points about independent airpower are in order before looking at the historical record. Strategic bombing, which I take to mean non-nuclear attacks on the enemy's homeland, has not been an important kind of military power since 1945, and that situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. With the development of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, great powers moved away from threatening each other's homelands with conventionally armed bombers and instead relied on nuclear weapons to accomplish that mission. During the Cold War, for example, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union planned to launch a
strategic bombing campaign against the other in the event of a superpower war. Both states, however, had extensive plans for using their nuclear arsenals to strike each other's territory.

But old-fashioned strategic bombing has not disappeared altogether. The great powers continued employing it against minor powers, as the Soviet Union did against Afghanistan in the 1980s and the United States did against Iraq and Yugoslavia in the 1990s.\(^40\) Having the capability to bomb small, weak states, however, should not count for much when assessing the balance of military might among the great powers. What should count the most are the military instruments that the great powers intend to use against each other, and that no longer includes strategic bombing. Thus, my analysis of independent airpower is relevant primarily to the period between 1915 and 1945, not to the recent past, the present, or the future.

The historical record includes fourteen cases of strategic bombing: five involve great powers attacking other great powers, and nine are instances of great powers striking minor powers. The campaigns between rival great powers provide the most important evidence for determining how to assess the balance of military might among the great powers. Nevertheless, I also consider the cases involving minor powers, because some might think that they—especially the U.S. air campaigns against Iraq and Yugoslavia—provide evidence that great powers can use their air forces to coerce another great power. That is not so, however, as will become apparent.

**The History of Strategic Bombing**

The five cases in which a great power attempted to coerce a rival great power with strategic bombing are in World War I, when 1) Germany bombed British cities; and in World War II, when 2) Germany struck again at British cities, 3) the United Kingdom and the United States bombed Germany, 4) the United Kingdom and the United States attacked Italy, and 5) the United States bombed Japan.

The nine instances in which a great power attempted to coerce a minor power with strategic airpower include 1) Italy against Ethiopia in 1936; 2) Japan versus China from 1937 to 1945; 3) the Soviet Union against Finland in World War II; the United States versus 4) North Korea in the early 1950s, 5) North Vietnam in the mid-1960s, and 6) North Vietnam again in 1972; 7) the Soviet Union against Afghanistan in the 1980s; and the United States and its allies versus 8) Iraq in 1991 and 9) Yugoslavia in 1999.

These fourteen cases should be evaluated in terms of the same two questions that informed the earlier analysis of blockades: First, is there evidence that strategic bombing alone can coerce an enemy into surrendering? Second, can strategic airpower contribute importantly to victory by ground armies? Is the influence of strategic bombing on the final outcome of wars likely to be decisive, roughly equal to that of land power, or marginal?

**Bombing Great Powers**

The German air offensives against British cities in World Wars I and II not only failed to coerce the United Kingdom to surrender, but Germany also lost both wars.\(^41\) Furthermore, there is no evidence that either of those bombing campaigns seriously damaged the United Kingdom's military capability. Thus, if there is a case to be made for the decisive influence of strategic bombing, it depends largely on the Allied bombing of the so-called Axis powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—in World War II.

A good reason to be skeptical about claims that bombing was of central importance to the outcomes of these three conflicts is that, in each case, serious bombing of the target state did not begin until well after it was clear that each was going down to defeat. Germany, for example, went to war with the United Kingdom in September 1939 and with the United States in December 1941. Germany surrendered in May 1945, although it was clear by the end of 1942, if not sooner, that Germany was going to lose the war. The Wehrmacht's last major offensive
against the Red Army was at Kursk in the summer of 1943, and it failed badly. After much
debate, the Allies finally decided at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to launch a
serious strategic bombing campaign against Germany. But the air offensive was slow getting
started, and the bombers did not begin pounding the Third Reich until the spring of 1944, when
the Allies finally gained air superiority over Germany. Even historian Richard Overy, who
believes that airpower played a central role in winning the war against Germany, acknowledges
that it was only "during the last year of the war [that] the bombing campaign came of age."42

Italy went to war with the United Kingdom in June 1940 and the United States in December
1941. But unlike Germany, Italy quit the war in September 1943, before it had been conquered.
The Allied bombing campaign against Italy began in earnest in July 1943, roughly two months
before Italy surrendered. By that point, however, Italy was on the brink of catastrophic defeat. Its
army was decimated and it no longer was capable of defending the Italian homeland from
invasion.43 In fact, the Wehrmacht was providing most of Italy's defense when the Allies invaded
Sicily from the sea in July 1943.

Japan's war with the United States started in December 1941 and ended in August 1945.
The serious pounding of Japan from the air began in March 1945, about five months before
Japan surrendered. At that point, however, Japan had clearly lost the war and was facing the
prospect of surrendering unconditionally. The United States had destroyed Japan's empire in
the Pacific and effectively eliminated what remained of the Japanese navy at the Battle of Leyte
Gulf in October 1944. Moreover, the American naval blockade had wrecked the Japanese
economy by March 1945, an act that had profoundly negative consequences for Japan's army,
a large portion of which was bogged down in an unwinnable war with China.

The fact is that these strategic bombing campaigns were feasible only late in the war when
the Axis powers were badly battered and headed for defeat. Otherwise, the target states would
not have been vulnerable to a sustained aerial assault. The United States, for example, was
unable to conduct a major bombing campaign against Japan until it had destroyed most of
Japan's navy and air force and had fought its way close to the home islands. Only then were
American bombers near enough to make unhindered attacks on Japan. Nor could the United
States effectively employ its strategic bombers against Germany until it had gained air
superiority over the Third Reich. That difficult task took time and was feasible only because
Germany was diverting huge resources to fight the Red Army.

The best case that can be made for the three Allied strategic bombing campaigns is that
they helped finish off opponents who were already well on their way to defeat—which hardly
supports the claim that independent airpower was a decisive weapon in World War II. In
particular, one might argue that those strategic air campaigns helped end the war sooner rather
than later, and that they also helped the Allies secure better terms than otherwise would have
been possible. Except for the Italian case, however, the evidence seems to show that strategic
bombing had little effect on how these conflicts ended. Let us consider these cases in more
detail.

The Allies attempted to coerce Germany into surrendering by inflicting pain on its civilian
population and by destroying its economy. The Allied punishment campaign against German
cities, which included the infamous "firebombings" of Hamburg and Dresden, destroyed more
than 40 percent of the urban area in Germany's seventy largest cities and killed roughly 305,000
civilians.44 The German people, however, fatalistically absorbed the punishment, and Hitler felt
no compunction to surrender.45 There is no doubt that Allied air strikes, along with the
advancing ground forces, wrecked Germany's industrial base by early 1945.46 But the war was
almost over at that point, and more important, the destruction of German industry was still not
enough to coerce Hitler into stopping the war. In the end, the American, British, and Soviet
armies had to conquer Germany.47

The strategic bombing campaign against Italy was modest in the extreme compared to the
pummeling that was inflicted on Germany and Japan.48 Some economic targets were struck, but
no attempt was made to demolish Italy's industrial base. The Allies also sought to inflict pain on Italy's population, but in the period from October 1942 until August 1943 they killed about 3,700 Italians, a tiny number compared to the 305,000 Germans (between March 1942 and April 1945) and 900,000 Japanese (between March and August 1945) killed from the air. Despite its limited lethality, the bombing campaign began to rattle Italy's ruling elites in the summer of 1943 (when it was intensified) and increased the pressure on them to surrender as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the main reason that Italy was desperate to quit the war at that point—and eventually did so on September 8, 1943—was that the Italian army was in tatters and it stood hardly any chance of stopping an Allied invasion. Italy was doomed to defeat well before the bombing campaign began to have an effect. Thus, the best that can be said for the Allied air offensive against Italy is that it probably forced Italy out of the war a month or two earlier than otherwise would have been the case.

When the American bombing campaign against Japan began in late 1944, the initial goal was to use high-explosive bombs to help destroy Japan's economy, which was being wrecked by the U.S. navy's blockade. It quickly became apparent, however, that this airpower strategy would not seriously damage Japan's industrial base. Therefore, in March 1945, the United States decided to try instead to punish Japan's civilian population by firebombing its cities. This deadly aerial campaign, which lasted until the war ended five months later, destroyed more than 40 percent of Japan's 64 largest cities, killed approximately 785,000 civilians, and forced about 8.5 million people to evacuate their homes. Although Japan surrendered in August 1945 before the United States invaded and conquered the Japanese homeland—making this a case of successful coercion—the firebombing campaign played only a minor role in convincing Japan to quit the war. As discussed earlier, blockade and land power were mainly responsible for the outcome, although the atomic bombings and the Soviet declaration of war against Japan (both in early August) helped push Japan over the edge.

Thus coercion failed in three of the five cases in which a great power was the target state: Germany's air offensives against the United Kingdom in World Wars I and II, and the Allied bombing campaign against Nazi Germany. Moreover, strategic bombing did not play a key role in the Allies' victory over the Wehrmacht. Although Italy and Japan were coerced into surrendering in World War II, both successes were largely due to factors other than independent airpower. Let us now consider what happened in the past when the great powers unleashed their bombers against minor powers.

**Why Strategic Bombing Campaigns Fail**

Strategic bombing is unlikely to work for the same reasons that blockades usually fail to coerce an opponent: civilian populations can absorb tremendous pain and deprivation without rising up against their government. Political scientist Robert Pape succinctly summarizes the historical evidence regarding aerial punishment and popular revolt: "Over more than seventy-five years, the record of air power is replete with efforts to alter the behavior of states by attacking or threatening to attack large numbers of civilians. The incontrovertible conclusion from these campaigns is that air attack does not cause citizens to turn against their government. ... In fact, in the more than thirty major strategic air campaigns that have thus far been waged, air power has never driven the masses into the streets to demand anything." Furthermore, modern industrial economies are not fragile structures that can be easily destroyed, even by massive bombing attacks. To paraphrase Adam Smith, there is a lot of room for ruin in a great power's economy. This targeting strategy makes even less sense against minor powers, because they invariably have small industrial bases.

But what about decapitation? As noted, that strategy failed against Iraq in 1991. It was also tried on three other occasions, none of which are included in the previous discussion because they were such small-scale attacks. Nevertheless, the strategy failed all three times to produce
the desired results. On April 14, 1986, the United States bombed the tent of Muammar Qaddafi. The Libyan leader's young daughter was killed, but he escaped harm. It is widely believed that the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland two years later was retribution for that failed assassination attempt. On April 21, 1996, the Russians targeted and killed Dzhokhar Dudayev, the leader of rebel forces in the province of Chechnya.

The aim was to coerce the Chechens into settling their secessionist war with Russia on terms that were favorable to the Kremlin. In fact, the rebels vowed to avenge Dudayev's death, and a few months later (August 1996) the Russian troops were forced out of Chechnya. Finally, the United States launched a brief four-day attack against Iraq in December 1998. "Operation Desert Fox," as the effort was code-named, was another attempt to decapitate Saddam; it failed.67

Decapitation is a fanciful strategy.68 The case of Dudayev notwithstanding, it especially difficult in wartime to locate and kill a rival political leader. But even if decapitation happens, it is unlikely that the successor's politics will be substantially different from those of the dead predecessor. This strategy is based on the deep-seated American belief that hostile states are essentially comprised of benign citizens controlled by evil leaders. Remove the evil leader, the thinking goes, and the forces of good will triumph and the war will quickly end. This is not a promising strategy. Killing a particular leader does not guarantee that one of his closest lieutenants will not replace him. For example, had the Allies managed to kill Adolf Hitler, they probably would have gotten Martin Bormann or Hermann Goering as his replacement, neither of whom would have been much, if any, improvement over Hitler. Furthermore, evil leaders like Hitler often enjoy widespread popular support: not only do they sometimes represent the views of their body politic, but nationalism tends to foster close ties between political leaders and their populations, especially in wartime, when all concerned face a powerful external threat.69

The variant of the strategy that calls for isolating the political leadership from the broader population is also illusory. Leaders have multiple channels for communicating with their people, and it is virtually impossible for an air force to knock all of them out at once and keep them shut down for a long period of time. For example, bombers might be well-suited for damaging an adversary's telecommunications, but they are ill-suited for knocking out newspapers. They are also ill-suited for destroying the secret police and other instruments of suppression. Finally, causing coups that produce friendly leaders in enemy states during wartime is an extremely difficult task.

Isolating a political leader from his military forces is equally impractical. The key to success in this variant of the strategy is to sever the lines of communication between the battlefield and the political leadership. There are two reasons why this strategy is doomed to fail, however. Leaders have multiple channels for communicating with their military, as well as with their population, and bombers are not likely to shut them all down simultaneously, much less keep them all silent for a long time. Moreover, political leaders worried about this problem can delegate authority in advance to the appropriate military commanders, in the event that the lines of communication are cut. During the Cold War, for example, both superpowers planned for that contingency because of their fear of nuclear decapitation.

It seems clear from the historical record that blockades and strategic bombing occasionally affect the outcome of great-power wars but rarely play a decisive role in shaping the final result. Armies and the air and naval forces that support them are mainly responsible for determining which side wins a great-power war. Land power is the most formidable kind of conventional military power available to states.70 In fact, it is a rare event when a war between great powers is not settled largely by rival armies fighting it out on the battlefield. Although some of the relevant history has been discussed in the preceding sections and chapters, a brief overview of the great-power wars since 1792 shows that wars are won on the ground.
The Dominating Influence of Armies

There have been ten wars between great powers over the past two centuries, three of which were central wars involving all of the great powers: the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), World War I (1914-18), and World War II (1939-45); the latter actually involved distinct conflicts in Asia and Europe.

In the wake of the French Revolution, France fought a series of wars over twenty-three years against different coalitions of European great powers, including Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The outcome of almost every campaign was determined by battles between rival armies, not battles at sea. Consider, for example, the impact of the famous naval Battle of Trafalgar on the course of the war. The British navy decisively defeated the French fleet in that engagement on October 21, 1805, one day after Napoleon had won a major victory against Austria in the Battle of Ulm. Britain's victory at sea, however, had little effect on Napoleon's fortunes. Indeed, over the course of the next two years, Napoleon's armies achieved their greatest triumphs, defeating the Austrians and the Russians at Austerlitz (1805), the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt (1806), and the Russians at Friedland (1807).

Furthermore, the United Kingdom blockaded the European continent and Napoleon blockaded the United Kingdom. But neither blockade markedly influenced the war's outcome. In fact, the United Kingdom was eventually forced to send an army to the continent to fight against Napoleon's army in Spain. That British army and, even more important, the Russian army that decimated the French army in the depths of Russia in 1812 were largely responsible for putting Napoleon out of business.

The balance of land power was also the principal determinant of victory in World War I. In particular, the outcome was decided by long and costly battles on the eastern front between German and Russian armies, and on the western front between German and Allied (British, French, and American) forces. The Germans scored a stunning victory in the east in October 1917, when the Russian army collapsed and Russia quit the war. The Germans almost duplicated that feat on the western front in the spring of 1918, but the British, French, and American armies held fast; shortly thereafter the German army fell apart, and with that the war ended on November 11, 1918. Strategic bombing played hardly any role in the final outcome. The Anglo-American blockade of Germany surely contributed to the victory, but it was a secondary factor. "The Great War," as it was later called, was settled mainly by the millions of soldiers on both sides who fought and often died in bloody battles at places like Verdun, Tannenberg, Passchendaele, and the Somme.

The outcome of World War II in Europe was determined largely by battles fought between rival armies and their supporting air and naval forces. Nazi land power was almost exclusively responsible for the tidal wave of early German victories: against Poland in September 1939, France and the United Kingdom between May and June 1940, and the Soviet Union between June and December 1941. The tide turned against the Third Reich in early 1942, and by May 1945, Hitler was dead and his successors had surrendered unconditionally. The Germans were beaten decisively on the battlefield, mainly on the eastern front by the Red Army, which lost a staggering eight million soldiers in the process but managed to cause at least three out of every four German wartime casualties. British and American armies also helped wear down the Wehrmacht, but they played a considerably smaller role than the Soviet army, mainly because they did not land on French soil until June 1944, less than a year before the war ended.

The Allies' strategic bombing campaign failed to cripple the German economy until early 1945, when the war's outcome had already been settled on the ground. Nevertheless, airpower alone did not wreck Germany's industrial base; the Allied armies closing in on the Third Reich also played a major role in that effort. The British and American navies imposed a blockade on the Third Reich, but it, too, had a minor impact on the war's outcome. In short, the only way to defeat a formidable continental power like Nazi Germany is to smash its army in bloody land
battles and conquer it. Blockades and strategic bombing might help the cause somewhat, but they are likely to matter primarily on the margins.

Americans tend to think that the Asian half of World War II began when Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941. But Japan had been on the warpath in Asia since 1931 and had conquered Manchuria, much of northern China, and parts of Indochina before the United States entered the war. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese military conquered most of Southeast Asia, and virtually all of the islands in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Japan's army was its principal instrument of conquest, although its navy often transported the army into combat. Japan conducted a strategic bombing campaign against China, but it was a clear-cut failure (as discussed earlier in this chapter). Also, starting in 1938, Japan tried to cut off China's access to the outside world with a blockade, which reduced the flow of arms and goods into China to a trickle by 1942. Nevertheless, China's armies continued to hold their own on the battlefield, refusing to surrender to their Japanese foes. In short, land power was the key to Japan's military successes in World War II.

The tide turned against Japan in June 1942, when the American navy scored a stunning victory over the Japanese navy at the Battle of Midway. Over the next three years, Japan was worn down in a protracted two-front war, finally surrendering unconditionally in August 1945. As noted earlier, land power played a critical role in defeating Japan. The U.S. navy's blockade of the Japanese homeland, however, was also a deciding factor in that conflict. The firebombing of Japan, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly caused tremendous suffering in the targeted cities, but it played only a minor role in causing Japan's defeat. This is the only great-power war in modern history in which land power alone was not principally responsible for determining the outcome, and in which one of the coercive instruments—airpower or sea power—played more than an auxiliary role.

Seven other great power vs. great power wars have been fought over the past two hundred years: the Crimean War (1853-56), the War of Italian Unification (1859), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the Russian Civil War (1918-21), and the Soviet-Japanese War (1939). None of these cases involved strategic bombing, and only the Russo-Japanese War had a significant naval dimension, although neither side blockaded the other. The rival navies mainly fought for command of the sea, which was important because whichever side dominated the water had an advantage in moving land forces about the theater of operations. All seven conflicts were settled between rival armies on the battlefield.

Finally, the outcome of a major conventional conflict during the Cold War would have been determined in large part by events on the central front, where NATO and Warsaw Pact armies would have clashed head-on. For sure, the tactical air forces supporting those armies would have influenced developments on the ground. Still, the war would have been decided largely by how well the rival armies performed against each other. Neither side would have mounted a strategic bombing campaign against the other, mainly because the advent of nuclear weapons rendered that mission moot. Furthermore, there was no serious possibility of the NATO allies using independent naval power to their advantage, mainly because the Soviet Union was not vulnerable to blockade as Japan was in World War II. Soviet submarines probably would have tried to cut the sea lines of communication between the United States and Europe, but they surely would have failed, just as the Germans had in both world wars. As was the case with Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany, a hegemonic war with the Soviet Union would have been settled on the ground by clashing armies.

**The Stopping Power of Water**

There is one especially important aspect of land power that merits further elaboration: how large bodies of water sharply limit an army's power-projection capability. Water is usually not a
serious obstacle for a navy that is transporting ground forces across an ocean and landing them in a friendly state. But water is a forbidding barrier when a navy attempts to deliver an army onto territory controlled and well-defended by a rival great power. Navies are therefore at a significant disadvantage when attempting amphibious operations against powerful land-based forces, which are likely to throw the seaborne invaders back into the sea. Generally speaking, land assaults across a common border are a much easier undertaking. Armies that have to traverse a large body of water to attack a well-armed opponent invariably have little offensive capability.

**Why Water Stymies Armies**

The basic problem that navies face when conducting seaborne invasions is that there are significant limits on the number of troops and the amount of firepower that a navy can bring to bear in an amphibious operation. Thus, it is difficult for navies to insert onto enemy shores assault forces that are powerful enough to overwhelm the defending troops. The specific nature of this problem varies from the age of sail to the industrial age.

Before the 1850s, when ships were powered by sail, navies were considerably more mobile than armies. Not only did armies have to negotiate obstacles such as mountains, forests, swamps, and deserts, they also did not have access to good roads, much less railroads or motorized vehicles. Land-based armies therefore moved slowly, which meant that they had considerable difficulty defending a coastline against a seaborne invasion. Navies that commanded the sea, on the other hand, could move swiftly about the ocean's surface and land troops on a rival's coast well before a land-based army could get to the beachhead to challenge the landing. Since amphibious landings were relatively easy to pull off in the age of sail, great powers hardly ever launched amphibious assaults against each other's territory; instead they landed where the opponent had no large forces. In fact, no amphibious assaults were carried out in Europe from the founding of the state system in 1648 until steam ships began replacing sailing ships in the mid-nineteenth century.

Despite the relative ease of landing troops in enemy territory, navies were not capable of putting large forces ashore and supporting them for long periods. Sailing navies had limited carrying capacity, and thus they were rarely capable of providing the logistical support that the invading forces needed to survive in hostile territory. Nor could navies quickly bring in reinforcements with the necessary supplies. Furthermore, the enemy army, which was fighting on its own territory, would eventually reach the amphibious force and was likely to defeat it in battle. Consequently, great powers in the age of sail launched remarkably few amphibious landings in Europe against either the homeland of rival great powers or territory controlled by them. In fact, there were none during the two centuries prior to the start of the Napoleonic Wars in 1792, despite the fact that Europe's great powers were constantly at war with each other during that long period. The only two amphibious landings in Europe during the age of sail were the Anglo-Russian operation in Holland (1799) and the British invasion of Portugal (1808). The seaborne forces were defeated in both cases, as discussed below.

The industrialization of war in the nineteenth century made large-scale amphibious invasions more feasible, but they remained an especially formidable task against a well-armed opponent. From the invader's perspective, the most favorable development was that new, steam-driven navies had greater carrying capacity than sailing navies, and they were not beholden to the prevailing wind patterns. Consequently, steam-driven navies could land greater numbers of troops on enemy beaches and sustain them there for longer periods of time than could their predecessors. "Steam navigation," Lord Palmerston warned in 1845, had "rendered that which was before unpassable by a military force [the English Channel] nothing more than a river passable by a steam bridge."
But Palmerston greatly exaggerated the threat of invasion to the United Kingdom, as there were other technological developments that worked against the seaborne forces. In particular, the development of airplanes, submarines, and naval mines increased the difficulty of reaching enemy shores, while the development of airplanes and railroads (and later, paved roads, trucks, and tanks) made it especially difficult for amphibious forces to prevail after they put ashore.

Railroads, which began spreading across Europe and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, played an important role in the German wars of unification against Austria (1866) and France (1870-71), and in the American Civil War (1861-65). Amphibious forces hardly benefit from railroads as they move across large bodies of water. Also, seaborne forces cannot bring railroads with them, and it is difficult to capture and make use of enemy railroads—at least in the short term. Railroads, however, markedly increase a land-based army's ability to defeat an amphibious operation, because they allow the defender to rapidly concentrate large forces at or near the landing sites. Armies on rails also arrive on the battlefield in excellent physical shape, because they avoid the wear and tear that comes with marching on foot.

Furthermore, railroads are an excellent tool for sustaining an army locked in combat with an amphibious force. For these same reasons, the development in the early 1900s of paved roads and motorized as well as mechanized vehicles further advantaged the land-based army against the seaborne invader.

Although airplanes were first used in combat in the 1910s, it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that navies began developing aircraft carriers that could be used to support amphibious operations. Nevertheless, the territorial state under assault benefits far more from airpower than do the amphibious forces, because many more aircraft can be based on land than on a handful of aircraft carriers. A territorial state is essentially a huge aircraft carrier that can accommodate endless numbers of airplanes, whereas an actual carrier can accommodate only a small number of airplanes. Therefore, other things being equal, the territorial state should be able to control the air and use that advantage to pound the amphibious forces on the beaches, or even before they reach the beaches. Of course, the seaborne force can ameliorate this problem if it can rely on land-based aircraft of its own. For example, the assault forces at Normandy in June 1944 relied heavily on aircraft stationed in England.

Land-based air forces also have the capability to sink a rival navy. It is actually dangerous to place naval forces near the coast of a great power that has a formidable air force. Between March and December 1942, for example, Allied convoys sailing between British and Icelandic ports and the Soviet port of Murmansk passed close to Norway, where substantial German air forces were located. Those land-based aircraft wreaked havoc on the convoys until late 1942, when German airpower in the region was substantially reduced. Thus, even if a navy commands the sea, it cannot go near a territorial state unless it also commands the air, which is difficult to achieve with aircraft carriers alone, because land-based air forces usually outnumber sea-based air forces by a large margin.

Submarines were also employed for the first time in World War I, mainly by Germany against Allied shipping in the waters around the United Kingdom and in the Atlantic. Although the German submarine campaign ultimately failed, it demonstrated that a large submarine force could destroy unescorted merchant ships with relative ease. German submarines also seriously threatened the United Kingdom's formidable surface navy, which spent the war playing a cat-and-mouse game in the North Sea with the German navy. In fact, the commanders of the British fleet lived in constant fear of German submarines, even when they were in home port. But they were especially fearful of venturing into the North Sea and being drawn near the German coast, where submarines might be lying in wait. "The submarine danger," as naval historian Paul Halpern notes, "had indeed contributed the most toward making the North Sea for capital ships somewhat similar to the no-man's-land between the opposing trench systems on land. They would be risked there, but only for specific purposes." The submarine threat to surface ships has important implications for navies bent on launching amphibious assaults against a rival's
coast. In particular, an opponent with a formidable submarine force could sink the assaulting forces before they reached the beaches or sink much of the striking navy after the assaulting forces had landed, thereby stranding the seaborne troops on the beaches.

Finally, naval mines, fixed explosives that sit under the water and explode when struck by passing ships, increase the difficulty of invading a territorial state from the sea.88 Navies used mines effectively for the first time in the American Civil War, but they were first employed on a massive scale during World War I. The combatants laid down roughly 240,000 mines between 1914 and 1918, and they shaped the course of the war in important ways.89 Surface ships simply cannot pass unharmed through heavily mined waters; the minefields must be cleared first, and this is a difficult, sometimes impossible, task in wartime. A territorial state can therefore use mines effectively to defend its coast against invasion. Iraq, for example, mined the waters off the Kuwaiti coast before the United States and its allies began to amass forces to invade in the Persian Gulf War. When the ground war started on February 24, 1991, the U.S. marines did not storm the Kuwaiti beaches but remained on their ships in the gulf.90

Although amphibious operations against a land mass controlled by a great power are especially difficult to pull off, they are feasible under special circumstances. In particular, they are likely to work against a great power that is on the verge of catastrophic defeat, mainly because the victim is not going to possess the wherewithal to defend itself. Furthermore, they are likely to succeed against great powers that are defending huge expanses of territory. In such cases, the defender's troops are likely to be widely dispersed, leaving their territory vulnerable to attack somewhere on the periphery. In fact, uncontested amphibious landings are possible if a defending great power's forces are stretched thinly enough. It is especially helpful if the defender is fighting a two-front war, because then some sizable portion of its force will be pinned down on a front far away from the seaborne assault.91 In all cases, the invading force should have clear-cut air superiority over the landing sites, so that its air force can provide close air support and prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the beachheads.92

But if none of these circumstances applies and the defending great power can employ a substantial portion of its military might against the amphibious forces, the land-based forces are almost certain to inflict a devastating defeat on the seaborne invaders. Therefore, when surveying the historical record, we should expect to find cases of amphibious operations directed against a great power only when the special circumstances described above apply. Assaults from the sea against powerful land forces should be rare indeed.

**Continental vs. Insular Great Powers**

The historical record illustrates in another way the difficulty of assaulting a great power's territory from the sea compared to invading it over land. Specifically, one can distinguish between insular and continental states. An insular state is the only great power on a large body of land that is surrounded on all sides by water. There can be other great powers on the planet, but they must be separated from the insular state by major bodies of water. The United Kingdom and Japan are obvious examples of insular states, since each occupies a large island by itself. The United States is also an insular power, because it is the only great power in the Western Hemisphere. A continental state, on the other hand, is a great power located on a large body of land that is also occupied by one or more other great powers. France, Germany, and Russia are obvious examples of continental states.

Insular great powers can be attacked only over water, whereas continental powers can be attacked over land and over water, provided they are not landlocked.121 Given the stopping power of water, one would expect insular states to be much less vulnerable to invasion than continental states, and continental states to have been invaded across land far more often than across water. To test this argument, let us briefly consider the history of two insular great powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, and two continental great powers, France
and Russia, focusing on how many times each has been invaded by another state, and whether those invasions were by land or sea.

Until 1945, the United Kingdom had been a great power for more than four centuries, during which time it was involved in countless wars. Over that long period, however, it was never invaded by another great power, much less a minor power. For sure, adversaries sometimes threatened to send invasion forces across the English Channel, yet none ever launched the assault boats. Spain, for example, planned to invade England in 1588. But the defeat of the Spanish Armada that same year in waters off England’s coast eliminated the naval forces that were supposed to have escorted the Spanish army across the English Channel. Although both Napoleon and Hitler considered invading the United Kingdom, neither made an attempt.

Like the United Kingdom, the United States has not been invaded since it became a great power in 1898. Britain launched a handful of large-scale raids against American territory during the War of 1812, and Mexico raided Texas in the War of 1846-48. Those conflicts, however, took place long before the United States achieved great-power status, and even then, neither the United Kingdom nor Mexico seriously threatened to conquer the United States. More important, there has been no serious threat to invade the United States since it became a great power at the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, the United States is probably the most secure great power in history, mainly because it has always been separated from the world's other great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The story looks substantially different when the focus shifts to France and Russia. France has been invaded seven times by rival armies since 1792, and it was conquered three of those times. During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), rival armies attacked France on four separate occasions (1792, 1793, 1813, and 1815), finally inflicting a decisive defeat on Napoleon with the last invasion. France was invaded and defeated by Prussia in 1870-71 and was paid another visit by the German army in 1914, although France narrowly escaped defeat in World War I. Germany struck once again in 1940, and this time it conquered France. All seven of these invasions came across land; France has never been invaded from the sea.

Russia, the other continental state, has been invaded five times over the past two centuries. Napoleon drove to Moscow in 1812, and France and the United Kingdom assaulted the Crimean Peninsula in 1854. Russia was invaded and decisively defeated by the German army in World War I. Shortly thereafter, in 1921, Poland, which was not a great power, invaded the newly established Soviet Union. The Germans invaded again in the summer of 1941, beginning one of the most murderous military campaigns in recorded history. All of these invasions came across land, save for the Anglo-French attack in the Crimea.

In sum, neither of our insular great powers (the United Kingdom and the United States) has ever been invaded, whereas our continental great powers (France and Russia) have been invaded a total of twelve times since 1792. These continental states were assaulted across land eleven times, but only once from the sea. The apparent lesson is that large bodies of water make it extremely difficult for armies to invade territory defended by a well-armed great power.

The discussion so far has focused on conventional military forces, emphasizing that land power is more important than either independent naval power or strategic airpower for winning great-power wars. Little has been said, however, about how nuclear weapons affect military power.

**Nuclear Weapons and the Balance of Power**

Nuclear weapons are revolutionary in a purely military sense, simply because they can cause unprecedented levels of destruction in short periods of time. During much of the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy each other as functioning societies in a matter of days, if not hours. Nevertheless, there is little
agreement about how nuclear weapons affect great-power politics and, in particular, the balance of power. Some argue that nuclear weapons effectively eliminate great-power security competition, because nuclear-armed states would not dare attack each other for fear of annihilation. The preceding discussion of conventional military power, according to this perspective, is largely irrelevant in the nuclear age. But others make the opposite argument: because nuclear weapons are horribly destructive, no rational leader would ever use them, even in self-defense. Thus, nuclear weapons do not dampen security competition in any significant way, and the balance of conventional military power still matters greatly.

I argue that in the unlikely event that a single great power achieves nuclear superiority, it becomes a hegemon, which effectively means that it has no great-power rivals with which to compete for security. Conventional forces matter little for the balance of power in such a world. But in the more likely situation in which there are two or more great powers with survivable nuclear retaliatory forces, security competition between them will continue and land power will remain the key component of military power. There is no question, however, that the presence of nuclear weapons makes states more cautious about using military force of any kind against each other.

**Nuclear Superiority**

In its boldest and most well-known form, nuclear superiority exists when a great power has the capability to destroy an adversary's society without fear of major retaliation against its own society. In other words, nuclear superiority means that a state can turn a rival great power into "a smoking, radiating ruin" and yet remain largely unscathed itself. That state could also use its nuclear arsenal to destroy its adversary's conventional forces, again without fear of nuclear retaliation. The best way for a state to achieve nuclear superiority is by arming itself with nuclear weapons while making sure no other state has them. A state with a nuclear monopoly, by definition, does not have to worry about retaliation in kind if it unleashes its nuclear weapons.

In a world of two or more nuclear-armed states, one state might gain superiority if it develops the capability to neutralize its rivals' nuclear weapons. To achieve this superiority, a state could either acquire a "splendid first strike" capability against its opponents' nuclear arsenals or develop the capability to defend itself from attack by their nuclear weapons. Nuclear superiority does not obtain, however, simply because one state has significantly more nuclear weapons than another state. Such an asymmetry is largely meaningless as long as enough of the smaller nuclear arsenal can survive a first strike to inflict massive punishment on the state with the bigger arsenal.

Any state that achieves nuclear superiority over its rivals effectively becomes the only great power in the system, because the power advantage bestowed on that state would be tremendous. The nuclear hegemon could threaten to use its potent arsenal to inflict vast destruction on rival states, effectively eliminating them as functioning political entities. The potential victims would not be able to retaliate in kind—which is what makes this threat credible. The nuclear hegemon could also use its deadly weapons for military purposes, like striking large concentrations of enemy ground forces, air bases, naval ships, or key targets in the adversary's command-and-control system. Again, the target state would not have a commensurate capability, thereby giving the nuclear hegemon a decisive advantage, regardless of the balance of conventional forces.

Every great power would like to achieve nuclear superiority, but it is not likely to happen often, and when it does occur, it probably is not going to last for a long time. Non-nuclear rivals are sure to go to great lengths to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own, and once they do, it would be difficult, although not impossible, for a great power to reestablish superiority by insulating itself from nuclear attack. The United States, for example, had a monopoly on nuclear weapons from 1945 until 1949, but it did not have nuclear superiority in any meaningful
sense during that brief period. Not only was America's nuclear arsenal small during those years, but the Pentagon had not yet developed effective means for delivering it to the appropriate targets in the Soviet Union.

After the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device in 1949, the United States tried, but failed, to gain nuclear superiority over its rival. Nor were the Soviets able to gain a decisive nuclear advantage over the Americans at any time during the Cold War. Thus, each side was forced to live with the fact that no matter how it employed its own nuclear forces, the other side was still likely to have a survivable nuclear retaliatory force that could inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker. This "Texas standoff" came to be called "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), because both sides probably would have been destroyed if either initiated a nuclear war. However desirable it might be for any state to transcend MAD and establish nuclear superiority, it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Military Power in a MAD World

A MAD world is highly stable at the nuclear level, because there is no incentive for any great power to start a nuclear war that it could not win; indeed, such a war would probably lead to its destruction as a functioning society. Still, the question remains: what effect does this balance of terror have on the prospects for a conventional war between nuclear-armed great powers? One school of thought maintains that it is so unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used in a MAD world that great powers are free to fight conventional wars almost as if nuclear weapons did not exist. Former secretary of defense Robert McNamara, for example, argues that "nuclear weapons serve no useful military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless—except only to deter one's opponent from using them." Nuclear weapons, according to this logic, have little effect on state behavior at the conventional level, and thus great powers are free to engage in security competition, much the way they did before nuclear weapons were invented.

The problem with this perspective is that it is based on the assumption that great powers can be highly confident that a large-scale conventional war will not turn into a nuclear war. In fact, we do not know a great deal about the dynamics of escalation from the conventional to the nuclear level, because (thankfully) there is not much history to draw on. Nevertheless, an excellent body of scholarship holds that there is some reasonable chance that a conventional war among nuclear powers might escalate to the nuclear level. Therefore, great powers operating in a MAD world are likely to be considerably more cautious when contemplating a conventional war with one another than they would be in the absence of nuclear weapons.

A second school of thought argues that great powers in a MAD world have little reason to worry about the conventional balance because nuclear-armed great powers are simply not going to attack each other with conventional forces because of fear of nuclear escalation. Great powers are remarkably secure in a MAD world, so the argument goes, and thus there is no good reason for them to compete for security. Nuclear weapons have made great-power war virtually unthinkable and have thus rendered obsolete Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means. In effect, the balance of terror has trivialized the balance of land power.

The problem with this perspective is that it goes to the other extreme on the escalation issue. In particular, it is based on the assumption that it is likely, if not automatic, that a conventional war would escalate to the nuclear level. Furthermore, it assumes that all the great powers think that conventional and nuclear war are part of a seamless web, and thus there is no meaningful distinction between the two kinds of conflict. But as the first school of thought emphasizes, the indisputable horror associated with nuclear weapons gives policymakers powerful incentives to ensure that conventional wars do not escalate to the nuclear level. Consequently, it is possible that a nuclear-armed great power might conclude that it could fight a conventional war against a nuclear-armed rival without the war turning nuclear, especially if
the attacking power kept its goals limited and did not threaten to decisively defeat its opponent. Once this possibility is recognized, great powers have no choice but to compete for security at the conventional level, much the way they did before the advent of nuclear weapons. It is clear from the Cold War that great powers operating in a MAD world still engage in intense security competition, and that they care greatly about conventional forces, especially the balance of land power. The United States and the Soviet Union competed with each other for allies and bases all over the globe from the start of their rivalry after World War II until its finish some forty-five years later. It was a long and harsh struggle. Apparently, neither nine American presidents nor six Soviet leaderships bought the argument that they were so secure in a MAD world that they did not have to pay much attention to what happened outside their borders. Furthermore, despite their massive nuclear arsenals, both sides invested tremendous resources in their conventional forces, and both sides were deeply concerned about the balance of ground and air forces in Europe, as well as in other places around the globe.

There is other evidence that casts doubt on the claim that states with an assured destruction capability are remarkably secure and do not have to worry much about fighting conventional wars. Most important, Egypt and Syria knew that Israel had nuclear weapons in 1973, but nevertheless they launched massive land offensives against Israel. Actually, the Syrian offensive on the Golan Heights, located on Israel's doorstep, briefly opened the door for the Syrian army to drive into the heart of Israel. Fighting also broke out between China and the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in the spring of 1969 and threatened to escalate into a full-blown war. Both China and the Soviet Union had nuclear arsenals at the time. China attacked American forces in Korea in the fall of 1950, despite the fact that China had no nuclear weapons of its own and the United States had a nuclear arsenal, albeit a small one.

Relations between India and Pakistan over the past decade cast further doubt on the claim that nuclear weapons largely eliminate security competition between states and make them feel as though they have abundant security. Although both India and Pakistan have had nuclear weapons since the late 1980s, security competition between them has not disappeared. Indeed, they were embroiled in a serious crisis in 1990, and they fought a major border skirmish (involving more than a thousand battle deaths) in 1999.

Finally, consider how Russia and the United States, who still maintain huge nuclear arsenals, think about conventional forces today. Russia's deep-seated opposition to NATO expansion shows that it fears the idea of NATO's conventional forces moving closer to its border. Russia obviously does not accept the argument that its powerful nuclear retaliatory force provides it with absolute security. The United States also seems to think that it has to worry about the conventional balance in Europe. After all, NATO expansion was predicated on the belief that Russia might someday try to conquer territory in central Europe. Moreover, the United States continues to insist that Russia observe the limits outlined in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed on November 19, 1990, before the Soviet Union collapsed.

Thus, the balance of land power remains the central ingredient of military power in the nuclear age, although nuclear weapons undoubtedly make great-power war less likely. Now that the case for land power's primacy has been detailed, it is time to describe how to measure it.

**Measuring Military Power**

Assessing the balance of land power involves a three-step process. First, the relative size and quality of the opposing armies must be estimated. It is important to consider the strength of those forces in peacetime as well as after mobilization, because states often maintain small standing armies that expand quickly in size when the ready reserves are called to active duty.

There is no simple way to measure the power of rival armies, mainly because their strength depends on a variety of factors, all of which tend to vary across armies: 1) the number of soldiers, 2) the quality of the soldiers, 3) the number of weapons, 4) the quality of the weaponry,
and 5) how those soldiers and weapons are organized for war. Any good indicator of land power should account for all these inputs. Comparing the number of basic fighting units in opposing armies, be they brigades or divisions, is sometimes a sensible way of measuring ground balances, although it is essential to take into account significant quantitative and qualitative differences between those units.

During the Cold War, for example, it was difficult to assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance, because there were substantial differences in the size and composition of the various armies on the central front.\footnote{145} To deal with this problem, the U.S. Defense Department devised the "armored division equivalent," or ADE, score as a basic measure of ground force capability. This ADE score was based mainly on an assessment of the quantity and quality of weaponry in each army.\footnote{146} Political scientist Barry Posen subsequently made an important refinement to this measure, which was a useful indicator of relative army strength in Europe.\footnote{147}

Although a number of studies have attempted to measure force balances in particular historical cases, no study available has systematically and carefully compared force levels in different armies over long periods of time. Consequently, there is no good database that can be tapped to measure military power over the past two centuries. Developing such a database would require an enormous effort and lies beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, when I assess the power of opposing armies in subsequent chapters, I cobble together the available data on the size and quality of the relevant armies and come up with rather rough indicators of military might. I start by counting the number of soldiers in each army, which is reasonably easy to do, and then attempt to account for the other four factors that affect army strength, which is a more difficult task.

The second step in assessing the balance of land power is to factor any air forces that support armies into the analysis.\footnote{148} We must assess the inventory of aircraft on each side, focusing on available numbers and quality. Pilot efficiency must also be taken into account as well as the strength of each side’s 1) ground-based air defense systems, 2) reconnaissance capabilities, and 3) battle-management systems.

Third, we must consider the power-projection capability inherent in armies, paying special attention to whether large bodies of water limit an army’s offensive capability. If there is such a body of water, and if an ally lies across it, one must assess the ability of navies to protect the movement of troops and supplies to and from that ally. But if a great power can cross the water only by directly assaulting territory on the other side of the water that is well-defended by a rival great power, the assessment of naval power is probably unnecessary, because such amphibious assaults are rarely possible. Thus the naval forces that might support that army are rarely useful, and hence judgments about their capabilities are rarely relevant to strategy. In those special circumstances where amphibious operations are feasible against a rival great power's territory, however, it is essential to assess the ability of the relevant navy to project seaborne forces ashore.

**Conclusion**

Armies, along with their supporting air and naval forces, are the paramount form of military power in the modern world. Large bodies of water, however, severely limit the power-projection capabilities of armies, and nuclear weapons markedly reduce the likelihood that great-power armies will clash. Nevertheless, even in a nuclear world, land power remains king.

This conclusion has two implications for stability among the great powers. The most dangerous states in the international system are continental powers with large armies. In fact, such states have initiated most of the past wars of conquest between great powers, and they have almost always attacked other continental powers, not insular powers, which are protected by the water surrounding them. This pattern is clearly reflected in European history over the
past two centuries. During the years of almost constant warfare between 1792 and 1815, France was the main aggressor as it conquered or tried to conquer other continental powers such as Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Prussia attacked Austria in 1866, and although France declared war on Prussia in 1870, that decision was provoked by Prussia, which invaded and conquered France. Germany began World War I with the Schlieffen Plan, which aimed to knock France out of the war so that the Germans could then turn eastward and defeat Russia. Germany began World War II with separate land offensives against Poland (1939), France (1940), and the Soviet Union (1941). None of these aggressors attempted to invade either the United Kingdom or the United States. During the Cold War, the principal scenario that concerned NATO planners was a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

In contrast, insular powers are unlikely to initiate wars of conquest against other great powers, because they would have to traverse a large body of water to reach their target. The same moats that protect insular powers also impede their ability to project power. Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States, for example, has ever seriously threatened to conquer another great power. British policymakers did not contemplate starting a war against either Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, and during the Cold War, American policymakers never seriously countenanced a war of conquest against the Soviet Union. Although the United Kingdom (and France) declared war against Russia in March 1854 and then invaded the Crimean Peninsula, the United Kingdom had no intention of conquering Russia. Instead, it entered an ongoing war between Turkey and Russia for the purpose of checking Russian expansion in the region around the Black Sea.

The Japanese attack against the United States ‘at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might appear to be another exception to this rule, since Japan is an insular state, and it struck first against another great power. However, Japan did not invade any part of the United States, and Japanese leaders certainly gave no thought to conquering it. Japan merely sought to establish an empire in the western Pacific by capturing the various islands located between it and Hawaii. Japan also initiated wars against Russia in 1904 and 1939, but in neither case did Japan invade Russia or even think about conquering it. Instead, those fights were essentially for control of Korea, Manchuria, and Outer Mongolia.

Finally, given that oceans limit the ability of armies to project power, and that nuclear weapons decrease the likelihood of great-power army clashes, the most peaceful world would probably be one where all the great powers were insular states with survivable nuclear arsenals. This concludes the discussion of power. Understanding what power is, however, should provide important insights into how states behave, especially how they go about maximizing their share of world power, which is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Six
Great Powers in Action

My theory offered in Chapter 2 attempts to explain why great powers tend to have aggressive intentions and why they aim to maximize their share of world power. I tried there to provide a sound logical foundation for my claims that status quo powers are rarely seen in the international system, and that especially powerful states usually pursue regional hegemony. Whether my theory is ultimately persuasive, however, depends on how well it explains the actual behavior of the great powers. Is there substantial evidence that great powers think and act as offensive realism predicts?

To answer yes to this question and show that offensive realism provides the best account of great-power behavior, I must demonstrate that 1) the history of great-power politics involves primarily the clashing of revisionist states, and 2) the only status quo powers that appear in the story are regional hegemons—i.e., states that have achieved the pinnacle of power. In other words, the evidence must show that great powers look for opportunities to gain power and take advantage of them when they arise. It must also show that great powers do not practice self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift the balance of power in their favor, and that the appetite for power does not decline once states have a lot of it. Instead, powerful states should seek regional hegemony whenever the possibility arises. Finally, there should be little evidence of policymakers saying that they are satisfied with their share of world power when they have the capability to gain more. Indeed, we should almost always find leaders thinking that it is imperative to gain more power to enhance their state's prospects for survival.

Demonstrating that the international system is populated by revisionist powers is not a simple matter, because the universe of potential cases is vast. After all, great powers have been competing among themselves for centuries, and there is lots of state behavior that is fair game for testing my argument. To make the inquiry manageable, this study takes four different perspectives on the historical record. Although I am naturally anxious to find evidence that supports offensive realism, I make a serious effort to argue against myself by looking for evidence that might refute the theory. Specifically, I try to pay equal attention to instances of expansion and of non-expansion and to show that the cases of non-expansion were largely the result of successful deterrence. I also attempt to employ consistent standards when measuring the constraints on expansion in the cases examined.

First, I examine the foreign policy behavior of the five dominant great powers of the past 150 years: Japan from the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the country's defeat in World War II; Germany from the coming to power of Otto von Bismarck in 1862 until Adolf Hitler's final defeat in 1945; the Soviet Union from its inception in 1917 until its collapse in 1991; Great Britain/the United Kingdom from 1792 until 1945; and the United States from 1800 to 1990. I choose to examine wide swaths of each state's history rather than more discrete time periods because doing so helps show that particular acts of aggression were not instances of aberrant behavior caused by domestic politics, but, as offensive realism would predict, part of a broader pattern of aggressive behavior.

Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union are straightforward cases that provide strong support for my theory. They were almost always looking for opportunities to expand through conquest, and when they saw an opening, they usually jumped at it. Gaining power did not temper their offensive proclivities; it whetted them. In fact, all three great powers sought regional hegemony. Germany and Japan fought major wars in pursuit of that goal; only the United States and its allies deterred the Soviet Union from trying to conquer Europe. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that policymakers in these states talked and thought like offensive realists. It is certainly hard to find evidence of key leaders expressing satisfaction with the existing balance of power, especially when their state had the capability to alter it. In sum,
security considerations appear to have been the main driving force behind the aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

The United Kingdom and the United States, however, might appear to have behaved in ways that contradict offensive realism. For example, the United Kingdom was by far the wealthiest state in Europe during much of the nineteenth century, but it made no attempt to translate its considerable wealth into military might and gain regional hegemony. Thus, it seems that the United Kingdom was not interested in gaining relative power, despite the fact that it had the wherewithal to do so. During the first half of the twentieth century, it looks like the United States passed up a number of opportunities to project power into Northeast Asia and Europe, yet instead it pursued an isolationist foreign policy—hardly evidence of aggressive behavior.

Nonetheless, I will argue that the United Kingdom and the United States did behave in accordance with offensive realism. The United States aggressively pursued hegemony in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century, mainly to maximize its prospects of surviving in a hostile world. It succeeded, and it stands as the only great power in modern history to have achieved regional hegemony. The United States did not attempt to conquer territory in either Europe or Northeast Asia during the twentieth century, because of the great difficulty of projecting power across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Nevertheless, it acted as an offshore balancer in those strategically important areas. The stopping power of water also explains why the United Kingdom never attempted to dominate Europe in the nineteenth century. Because they require detailed discussion, the American and British cases are dealt with in the next chapter.

Second, I examine the foreign policy behavior of Italy from its creation as a unified state in 1861 until its defeat in World War II. Some might concede that the mightiest great powers look for opportunities to gain power, yet still think that the other great powers, especially the weaker ones, behave like status quo powers. Italy is a good test case for this line of argument, because it was clearly "the least of the great powers" for virtually the entire time it ranked as a player in European politics. Despite Italy's lack of military might, its leaders were constantly probing for opportunities to gain power, and when one presented itself, they rarely hesitated to seize it. Furthermore, Italian policymakers were motivated to be aggressive in large part by balance-of-power considerations.

Third, one might concede that "the number of cases in which a strong dynamic state has stopped expanding because of satiation or has set modest limits to its power aims has been few indeed" but nevertheless maintain that those great powers were foolish to behave aggressively, because offense usually led to catastrophe. Those states ultimately would have been more secure if they had concentrated on maintaining the balance of power, not attempting to alter it by force. This self-defeating behavior, so the argument goes, cannot be explained by strategic logic but must instead be the result of misguided policies pushed by selfish interest groups on the home front. Defensive realists often adopt this line of argument. Their favorite examples of self-defeating behavior are Japan before World War II, Germany before World War I, and Germany before World War II: each state suffered a crushing military defeat in the ensuing war. I challenge this general line of argument, paying careful attention to the German and Japanese cases, where the evidence shows that they were not engaged in self-defeating behavior fueled by malign domestic politics.

Finally, I examine the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Defensive realists suggest that once nuclear-armed rivals develop the capability to destroy each other as functioning societies, they should be content with the world they have created and not attempt to change it. In other words, they should become status quo powers at the nuclear level. According to offensive realism, however, those rival nuclear powers will not simply accept mutual assured destruction (MAD) but instead will strive to gain nuclear superiority over the other side. I will attempt to show that the nuclear weapons policies of both superpowers were largely consistent with the predictions of offensive realism.
With the exception of the American and British cases, which are discussed in the next chapter, my four different cuts at the historical record are dealt with here in the order in which they were described above. Therefore, let us begin with an assessment of Japanese foreign policy between the Meiji Restoration and Hiroshima.

The Soviet Union (1917-91)

Russia had a rich history of expansionist behavior before the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917. Indeed, "the Russian Empire as it appeared in 1917 was the product of nearly four centuries of continuous expansion." There is considerable evidence that Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, and their successors wanted to follow in the tsars' footsteps and further expand Soviet borders. But opportunities for expansion were limited in the Soviet Union's seventy-five-year history. Between 1917 and 1933, the country was essentially too weak to take the offensive against rival major powers. After 1933, it had its hands full just trying to contain dangerous threats on its flanks: imperial Japan in Northeast Asia and Nazi Germany in Europe. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies were determined to check Soviet expansion all across the globe. Nevertheless, the Soviets had some chances to expand, and they almost always took advantage of them.

There was a deep-seated and long-standing fear among Russia's rulers that their country was vulnerable to invasion, and that the best way to deal with that problem was to expand Russia's borders. Not surprisingly, Russian thinking about foreign policy before and after the Bolshevik Revolution was motivated largely by realist logic. Describing the "discourse of Russia's statesmen" between 1600 and 1914, William Fuller writes, "They generally employed the cold-blooded language of strategy and analysis. They weighed the international impact of what, they proposed to do; they pondered the strengths and weaknesses of their prospective enemies; and they justified their policies in terms of the benefits they anticipated for Russian power and security. One is struck by the omnipresence of this style of reasoning."

When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they apparently believed that international politics would immediately undergo a fundamental transformation and that balance-of-power logic would be relegated to the boneyard of history. Specifically, they thought that with some help from the Soviet Union, communist revolutions would spread across Europe and the rest of the world, creating like-minded states that would live in peace before finally withering away altogether. Thus, Leon Trotsky's famous quip in November 1917, when he was appointed commissar for foreign affairs: "I shall issue some revolutionary proclamations to the peoples and then close up shop." Similarly, Lenin said in October 1917, "What, are we going to have foreign affairs?"

World revolution never happened, however, and Lenin quickly became "a political realist second to none." In fact, Richard Debo argues that Lenin abandoned the idea of spreading communism so fast that he doubts Lenin ever took the idea seriously. Stalin, who ran Soviet foreign policy for almost thirty years after Lenin died, was also driven in large part by the cold logic of realism, as exemplified by his willingness to cooperate with Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941. Ideology mattered little for Stalin's successors, not simply because they too were deeply affected by the imperatives of life in an anarchic system, but also because "Stalin had undercut deep faith in Marxist-Leninist ideological universalism and killed its genuine advocates; he had reduced the party ideologues to propagandist pawns in his global schemes."

In short, Soviet foreign policy behavior over time was driven mainly by calculations about relative power, not by communist ideology. "In the international sphere," as Barrington Moore notes, "the Communist rulers of Russia have depended to a great extent on techniques that owe more to Bismarck, Machiavelli, and even Aristotle than they do to Karl Marx or Lenin. This
pattern of world politics has been widely recognized as a system of inherently unstable equilibrium, described in the concept of the balance of power.60

This is not to say that communist ideology did not matter at all in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.61 Soviet leaders paid some attention to promoting world revolution in the 1920s, and they also paid attention to ideology in their dealings with the Third World during the Cold War. Moreover, there was often no conflict between the dictates of Marxist ideology and realism. The Soviet Union, for example, clashed with the United States from 1945 until 1990 for ideological as well as balance-of-power reasons. Also, virtually every time the Soviet Union behaved aggressively for security-related reasons, the action could be justified as promoting the spread of communism. But whenever there was a conflict between the two approaches, realism invariably won out. States do whatever is necessary to survive and the Soviet Union was no exception in this regard.

Targets and Rivals

The Soviet Union was concerned mainly with controlling territory and dominating other states in Europe and Northeast Asia, the two regions in which it is located. Until 1945, its principal rivals in those areas were local great powers. After 1945, its main adversary in both Europe and Northeast Asia was the United States, with which it competed all across the globe.

Germany was the Soviet Union's main European rival between 1917 and 1945, although they were allies from 1922 to 1933 and from 1939 to 1941. The United Kingdom and France had frosty and sometimes hostile relations with Moscow from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution until the early years of World War II, when the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union finally came together to fight the Nazis. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies were arrayed against the United States and its Western European allies; indeed, the Soviet Union's chief foreign policy goal over the course of its history was to control Eastern Europe. Soviet leaders surely would have liked to dominate Western Europe as well and become Europe's first hegemon, but that was not feasible, even after the Red Army destroyed the Wehrmacht in World War II, because the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stood squarely in its way.

In Northeast Asia, Japan was the Soviet Union's archenemy from 1917 until 1945. Like tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union sought to control Korea, Manchuria, the Kurile Islands, and the southern half of Sakhalin Island, all of which were dominated by Japan during this period. When World War II ended in 1945, the United States became Moscow's main enemy in Northeast Asia; China became an important Soviet ally after Mao Zedong's victory over the Nationalists in 1949. However, China and the Soviet Union had a serious falling out in the late 1950s, which led China to ally with the United States and Japan against the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union gained control of the Kuriles and all of Sakhalin Island in 1945, and Manchuria came under the firm control of China after 1949, leaving Korea as the region's main battleground during the Cold War.

Soviet leaders were also interested in expanding into the Persian Gulf region, especially into oil-rich Iran, which shared a border with the Soviet Union. Finally, during the Cold War, Soviet policymakers were determined to win allies and gain influence in virtually every area of the Third World, including Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the South Asian subcontinent. Moscow was not bent on conquering and controlling territory in those less-developed regions, however. Instead, it sought client states that would be useful in its global competition with the United States.
The Soviet Union's Record of Expansion

The Soviet Union was engaged in a desperate fight for survival during the first three years of its existence (1917-20). Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin pulled the Soviet Union out of World War I, but in the process he was forced to make huge territorial concessions to Germany in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 15, 1918). Shortly thereafter, the Western allies, who were still fighting against Germany on the western front, inserted ground forces into the Soviet Union. Their aim was to force the Soviet Union to rejoin the war against Germany. That did not happen, however, in large part because the German army was defeated on the battlefield in the late summer and early fall of 1918, and World War I ended on November 11, 1918.

Germany's defeat was good news for the Soviet leaders, because it spelled the death of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, which had robbed the Soviet Union of so much of its territory. Moscow's troubles were far from over, however. A bloody civil war between the Bolsheviks and various rival groups had broken out in the first months of 1918. To make matters worse, the Western allies supported the anti-Bolshevik forces, also known as the "Whites," in their fight with the Bolshevik "Reds" and kept their intervention forces in the Soviet Union until the summer of 1920. Although the Bolsheviks sometimes appeared to be on the verge of losing the civil war, the balance of power shifted decisively against the Whites in early 1920, and it was then only a matter of time before they were defeated. But before that could happen, the newly created state of Poland took advantage of Soviet weakness and invaded the Ukraine in April 1920. Poland hoped to break apart the Soviet Union and make Belorussia and Ukraine independent states. The hope was that those new states would then join a Polish-dominated federation of independent eastern European states.

The Polish army scored major victories in the early fighting, capturing Kiev in May 1920. But later that summer the Red Army turned the tide of battle, so much so that by the end of July, Soviet forces reached the Soviet-Polish border. Amazingly, the Soviets now had an opportunity to invade and conquer Poland, and maybe with help from Germany (the other great power unhappy about Poland's existence), redraw the map of eastern Europe. Lenin quickly seized the opportunity and sent the Red Army toward Warsaw. But the Polish army, with help from France, routed the invading Soviet forces and pushed them out of Poland. Both sides were exhausted from the fighting by then, so they signed an armistice in October 1920 and a formal peace treaty in March 1921. By that point the civil war was effectively over and the Western allies had withdrawn their troops from Soviet territory.

Soviet leaders were in no position to pursue an expansionist foreign policy during the 1920s or early 1930s, mainly because they had to concentrate on consolidating their rule at home and rebuilding their economy, which had been devastated by all the years of war. For example, the Soviet Union controlled a mere 2 percent of European industrial might by 1920 (see Table 3.3). But Moscow did pay some attention to foreign affairs. In particular, it maintained close relations with Germany from April 1922, when the Treaty of Rapallo was signed, until Hitler came to power in early 1933. Although both states were deeply interested in altering the territorial status quo, neither possessed a serious offensive military capability. Soviet leaders also made an effort in the 1920s to spread communism around the globe. But they were always careful not to provoke the other great powers into moving against the Soviet Union and threatening its survival. Virtually all of these efforts to foment revolution, whether in Asia or Europe, came up short.

Probably the most important Soviet initiative of the 1920s was Stalin's decision to modernize the Soviet economy through forced industrialization and the ruthless collectivization of agriculture. He was motivated in large part by security concerns. In particular, he believed that if the Soviet economy continued to lag behind those of the world's other industrialized states, the Soviet Union would be destroyed in a future great-power war. Speaking in 1931, Stalin said,
"We have lagged behind the advanced countries by fifty to a hundred years. We must cover that
distance in ten years. Either we'll do it or they will crush us." A series of five-year plans,
initiated in October 1928, transformed the Soviet Union from a destitute great power in the
1920s into Europe's most powerful state by the end of World War II.

The 1930s was a decade of great peril for the Soviet Union; it faced deadly threats from
Nazi Germany in Europe and imperial Japan in Northeast Asia. Although the Red Army ended
up in a life-and-death struggle with the Wehrmacht during World War II, not with the Japanese
army. Japan was probably the more dangerous threat to the Soviet Union throughout the
1930s. Indeed, Soviet and Japanese troops engaged in a series of border clashes in the late
1930s, culminating in a brief war at Nomonhan in the summer of 1939. Moscow was in no
position to take the offensive in Asia during the 1930s, but instead concentrated on containing
Japanese expansion. Toward that end, the Soviets maintained a powerful military presence in
the region and provided considerable assistance to China after the start of the Sino-Japanese
War in the summer of 1937. Their aim was to keep Japan bogged down in a war of attrition with
China.

The Soviet Union's main strategy for dealing with Nazi Germany contained an important
offensive dimension. Stalin apparently understood soon after Hitler came to power that the
Third Reich was likely to start a great-power war in Europe and that there was not much chance
of reconstituting the Triple Entente (the United Kingdom, France, Russia) to deter Nazi
Germany or fight against it if war broke out. So Stalin pursued a buck-passing strategy.
Specifically, he went to considerable lengths to develop friendly relations with Hitler, so that the
Nazi leader would strike first against the United Kingdom and France, not the Soviet Union.
Stalin hoped that the ensuing war would be long and costly for both sides, like World War I on
the western front, and thus would allow the Soviet Union to gain power and territory at the
expense of the United Kingdom, France, and especially Germany.

Stalin finally succeeded in passing the buck to the United Kingdom and France in the
summer of 1939 with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which Hitler and Stalin
agreed to gang up on Poland and divide it between them, and Hitler agreed to allow the Soviet
Union a free hand in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Finland. This
agreement meant that the Wehrmacht would fight against the United Kingdom and France, not
the Soviet Union. The Soviets moved quickly to implement the pact. After conquering the
eastern half of Poland in September 1939, Stalin forced the Baltic countries in October to allow
Soviet forces to be stationed on their territory. Less than a year later, in June 1940, the Soviet
Union annexed those three tiny states. Stalin demanded territorial concessions from Finland in
the fall of 1939, but the Finns refused to make a deal. So Stalin sent the Red Army into Finland
in November 1939 and took the territory he wanted by force. He was also able to convince
Hitler in June 1940 to allow the Soviet Union to absorb Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina,
which were part of Romania. In short, the Soviet Union made substantial territorial gains in
eastern Europe between the summers of 1939 and 1940.

Nevertheless, Stalin's buck-passing strategy came up short in the spring of 1940 when the
Wehrmacht overran France in six weeks and pushed the British army off the continent at
Dunkirk. Nazi Germany was now more powerful than ever and it was free to invade the Soviet
Union without having to worry much about its western flank. Recalling how Stalin and his
lieutenants reacted to news of the debacle on the western front, Nikita Khrushchev wrote,
"Stalin's nerves cracked when he learned about the fall of France. . . . The most pressing and
deadly threat in all history faced the Soviet Union. We felt as though we were facing the threat
all by ourselves." The German onslaught came a year later, on June 22, 1941.

The Soviet Union suffered enormous losses in the early years of World War II but eventually
turned the tide against the Third Reich and began launching major offensives westward, toward
Berlin, in early 1943. The Red Army, however, was not simply concerned with defeating the
Wehrmacht and recapturing lost Soviet territory. Stalin was also determined to conquer territory
in Eastern Europe that the Soviets would dominate after Germany was defeated. The Red Army had to conquer Poland and the Baltic states to defeat the German army, but the Soviets also launched major military operations to capture Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, even though those offensives were not essential for defeating Germany and probably delayed the final victory.

The Soviet Union's appetite for power and influence in Northeast Asia was also evident during World War II. In fact, Stalin managed to win back more territory than Russia had controlled in the Far East before its defeat by Japan in 1905. The Soviets had managed to keep out of the Pacific war until the final days of that conflict, when the Red Army attacked Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchuria on August 9, 1945. This Soviet offensive was in large part a response to long-standing pressure from the United States to join the war against Japan after Germany was defeated. Stalin, however, demanded a price for Soviet participation, and Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt responded by striking a secret deal with him at Yalta in February 1945. For joining the fight against Japan, the Soviets were promised the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. In Manchuria, they were given a lease on Port Arthur as a naval base and recognition of the Soviet Union's "preeminent interests" over the commercial port of Dairen and the region's two most important railroads.

No firm decision was reached on Korea's future during World War II, although the Red Army occupied the northern part of that country during the closing days of the conflict. In December 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union effectively agreed to jointly administer Korea as a trusteeship. But that plan fell apart quickly, and in February 1946, Stalin began building a client state in North Korea. The United States did the same in South Korea.

With Germany and Japan in ruins, the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as a potential hegemon in Europe and Northeast Asia. If it were possible, the Soviets surely would have moved to dominate both of those regions. Indeed, if ever a state had good reason to want to rule over Europe it was the Soviet Union in 1945. It had been invaded twice by Germany over a thirty-year period, and each time Germany made its victim pay an enormous blood price. No responsible Soviet leader would have passed up an opportunity to be Europe's hegemon in the wake of World War II.

Hegemony was not feasible, however, for two reasons. First, given the enormous amount of damage the Third Reich inflicted on Soviet society, Stalin had to concentrate on rebuilding and recovering after 1945, not fighting another war. Thus, he cut the size of the Soviet military from 12.5 million troops at the end of World War II to 2.87 million by 1948. Second, the United States was an enormously wealthy country that had no intention of allowing the Soviet Union to dominate either Europe or Northeast Asia.

In light of these constraints, Stalin sought to expand Soviet influence as far as possible without provoking a shooting war with the United States and its allies. Actually, the available evidence indicates that he hoped to avoid an intense security competition with the United States, although he was not successful in that endeavor. In short, Stalin was a cautious expansionist during the early part of the Cold War. His four main targets were Iran, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and South Korea.

The Soviets occupied northern Iran during World War II, while the British and the Americans occupied southern Iran. All three great powers agreed at the time to evacuate Iran within six months after the war against Japan ended. The United States pulled its troops out on January 1, 1946, and British troops were on schedule to come out by March 2, 1946. Moscow, however, made no move to leave Iran. Furthermore, it was supporting separatist movements among both the Azeri and the Kurdish populations in northern Iran, as well as Iran's communist Tudeh Party. Both the United Kingdom and the United States put pressure on Stalin to remove his troops from Iran, which he did in the spring of 1946.

Regarding Turkey, which was neutral during World War II until March 1945, Stalin demanded in June 1945 that the Turkish provinces of Ardahan and Kars, which had been part
of Russia from 1878 to 1918, be given back to the Soviet Union. He also asked for military bases on Turkish territory so that the Soviets could help control the Dardanelles, the Turkish straits linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. In support of these demands, Stalin massed Soviet troops on the Turkish border at one point. But these wants were never realized because the United States was determined to prevent Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean.

The principal realm of Soviet expansion in the early Cold War was Eastern Europe, and almost all of it was due to the fact that the Red Army conquered most of the area in the final stages of World War II. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were formally incorporated into the Soviet Union after the war, as was the eastern one-third of Poland, part of East Prussia, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, Czechoslovakia's eastern province of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and three slices of territory on Finland's eastern border (see Map 6.3). Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania were turned into satellite states immediately after the war. Czechoslovakia suffered the same fate in February 1948, and a year later the Soviets created another satellite state in East Germany.

Finland and Yugoslavia were the only states in Eastern Europe to escape complete Soviet domination. Their good fortune was due mainly to two factors. First, both states had clearly demonstrated in World War II that it would be difficult and costly for the Soviet army to conquer and occupy them for an extended period of time. The Soviet Union, which was attempting to recover from the massive damage it had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, already had its hands full occupying the other states in Eastern Europe. Thus, it was inclined to avoid costly operations in Finland and Yugoslavia. Second, both states were willing to maintain a neutral position in the East-West conflict, which meant that they were not a military threat to the Soviet Union. If either Finland or Yugoslavia had shown an inclination to ally with NATO, the Soviet army probably would have invaded it.

The Soviet Union also attempted to gain power and influence in Northeast Asia during the early Cold War, although that region clearly received less attention than did Europe. Despite some distrust between Stalin and Mao, the Soviets provided aid to the Chinese Communists in their fight against the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists won the civil war in 1949 and allied with the Soviet Union against the United States. One year later, the Soviets supported North Korea's invasion of South Korea, which led to a three-year war that left Korea divided along roughly the same line that had divided it before the war.

By the early 1950s, the United States and its allies around the globe had a formidable containment policy firmly in place, and there was little opportunity for further Soviet expansion in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf. In fact, Stalin's decision to back North Korea's invasion of South Korea in late June 1950 was the last case of Soviet-sponsored aggression in any of those critically important areas for the remainder of the Cold War. Soviet efforts at expansion between 1950 and 1990 were confined to the Third World, where it met with occasional success, but always with firm resistance from the United States.

After decades of competition with the United States for control over Europe, the Soviet Union suddenly reversed course in 1989 and abandoned its empire in Eastern Europe. That bold move effectively brought the Cold War to an end. The Soviet Union itself then broke apart into fifteen remnant states in late 1991. With few exceptions, the first wave of scholars to study these events argued that the Cold War ended because key Soviet leaders, especially Mikhail Gorbachev, underwent a fundamental transformation in their thinking about international politics during the 1980s. Rather than seeking to maximize the Soviet Union's share of world power, Moscow's new thinkers were motivated by the pursuit of economic prosperity and liberal norms of restraint in the use of force. Soviet policymakers, in short, stopped thinking and acting like realists and instead adopted a new perspective emphasizing the virtues of cooperation among states.
As more evidence becomes available, however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the first-wave explanation of Soviet behavior at the end of the Cold War is incomplete, if not wrong. The Soviet Union and its empire disappeared in large part because its smokestack economy could no longer keep up with the technological progress of the world's major economic powers. Unless something drastic was done to reverse this economic decline, the Soviet Union's years as a superpower were numbered.

To fix the problem, Soviet leaders sought to gain access to Western technology by greatly reducing East-West security competition in Europe, liberalizing their political system at home, and cutting their losses in the Third World. But that approach backfired because political liberalization unleashed the long-dormant forces of nationalism, causing the Soviet Union itself to fall apart. In sum, the conventional wisdom from the initial wave of scholarship on the end of the Cold War had it backwards: far from abandoning realist principles, the behavior and thinking of Soviet leaders reinforce the pattern of history that states seek to maximize their power in order to remain secure from international rivals..

Self-Defeating Behavior?

The preceding four cases—Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy—support the claim that great powers seek to increase their share of world power. Moreover, these cases also show that great powers are often willing to use force to achieve that goal. Satiated great powers are rare in international politics. This description of how great powers have acted over time is, in fact, not that controversial, even among defensive realists. Jack Snyder, for example, writes that "the idea that security can be achieved through expansion is a pervasive theme in the grand strategy of great powers in the industrial era." Furthermore, in Myths of Empire, he offers detailed case studies of great-power behavior in the past that provide abundant evidence of the offensive proclivities of such states.

One might recognize that history is replete with examples of great powers acting aggressively but still argue that this behavior cannot be explained by the logic of offensive realism. The basis of this claim, which is common among defensive realists, is that expansion is misguided. Indeed, they regard it as a prescription for national suicide. Conquest does not pay, so the argument runs, because states that try to expand ultimately meet defeat. States would be wiser to maintain the status quo by pursuing policies of "retrenchment, selective appeasement, shoring up vital rather than peripheral areas, or simply benign neglect." That states do otherwise is evidence of irrational or nonstrategic behavior, behavior that cannot be prompted by the imperatives of the international system. Rather, this behavior is primarily the result of malign domestic political forces.

There are two problems with this line of argument. As I have already discussed, the historical record does not support the claim that conquest hardly ever pays and that aggressors invariably end up worse off than they were before the war. Expansion sometimes pays big dividends; at other times it does not. Furthermore, the claim that great powers behave aggressively because of pernicious domestic politics is hard to sustain, because all kinds of states with very different kinds of political systems have adopted offensive military policies. It is not even the case that there is at least one type of political system or culture—including democracy—that routinely eschews aggression and works instead to defend the status quo. Nor does the record indicate that there are especially dangerous periods—for example, the nuclear age—during which great powers sharply curtail their offensive tendencies. To argue that expansion is inherently misguided implies that all great powers over the past 350 years have failed to comprehend how the international system works. This is an implausible argument on its face.

There is a more sophisticated fallback position, however, that may be discerned in the writings of the defensive realists. Although they usually argue that conquest rarely pays, they
also admit on other occasions that aggression succeeds a good part of the time. Building on that more variegated perspective, they divide the universe of aggressors into "expanders" and "overexpanders." Expanders are basically the smart aggressors who win wars. They recognize that only limited expansion makes good strategic sense. Attempts to dominate an entire region are likely to be self-defeating, because balancing coalitions invariably form against states with large appetites, and such states end up suffering devastating defeats. Expanders might occasionally start a losing war, but once they see the writing on the wall, they quickly retreat in the face of defeat. In essence, they are "good learners." For defensive realists, Bismarck is the archetypical smart aggressor, because he won a series of wars without committing the fatal error of trying to become a European hegemon. The former Soviet Union is also held up as an example of an intelligent aggressor, mainly because it had the good sense not to try to conquer all of Europe.

Overexpanders, on the other hand, are the irrational aggressors who start losing wars yet do not have the good sense to quit when it becomes apparent that they are doomed to lose. In particular, they are the great powers who recklessly pursue regional hegemony, which invariably leads to their own catastrophic defeat. Defensive realists contend that these states should know better, because it is clear from history that the pursuit of hegemony almost always fails. This self-defeating behavior, so the argument goes, must be the result of warped domestic politics. Defensive realists usually point to three prominent overexpanders: Wilhelmine Germany from 1890 to 1914, Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1941, and imperial Japan from 1937 to 1941. Each of these aggressors started a war that led to a devastating loss. It is not an exaggeration say that the claim that offensive military policies lead to self-defeating behavior rests primarily on these three cases.

The main problem with this "moderation is good" perspective is that it mistakenly equates irrational expansion with military defeat. The fact that a great power loses a war does not necessarily mean that the decision to initiate it was the result of an ill-informed or irrational decision-making process. States should not start wars that they are certain to lose, of course, but it is hard to predict with a high degree of certainty how wars will turn out. After a war is over, pundits and scholars often assume that the outcome was obvious from the start; hindsight is 20-20. In practice, however, forecasting is difficult, and states sometimes guess wrong and get punished as a result. Thus, it is possible for a rational state to initiate a war that it ultimately loses.

The best way to determine whether an aggressor such as Japan or Germany was engaged in self-defeating behavior is to focus on the decision-making process that led it to initiate war, not the outcome of the conflict. A careful analysis of the Japanese and German cases reveals that, in each instance, the decision for war was a reasonable response to the particular circumstances each state faced. As the discussion below makes clear, these were not irrational decisions fueled by malign political forces on the home front.

There are also problems with the related argument that pursuing regional hegemony is akin to tilting at windmills. To be sure, the United States is the only state that has attempted to conquer its region and succeeded. Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan all tried but failed. One out of five is not an impressive success rate. Still, the American case demonstrates that it is possible to achieve regional hegemony. There are also examples of success from the distant past: the Roman Empire in Europe (133 B.C.-235 A.D.), the Mughal Dynasty on the South Asian subcontinent (1556-1707), and the Ch'ing Dynasty in Asia (1683-1839), to name a few. Furthermore, even though Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, and Hitler all lost their bids to dominate Europe, each won major battlefield victories, conquered huge tracts of territory, and came close to achieving their goals. Only Japan stood little chance of winning hegemony on the battlefield. But as we shall see, Japanese policymakers knew that they would probably lose, and went to war only because the United States left them with no reasonable alternative.
Critics of offensive policies claim that balancing coalitions form to defeat aspiring hegemons, but history shows that such coalitions are difficult to put together in a timely and efficient manner. Threatened states prefer to buck-pass to each other rather than form an alliance against their dangerous foe. For example, the balancing coalitions that finished off Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany came together only after these aggressors had conquered much of Europe. Moreover, in both cases, the defensive alliances did not form until after the drive for hegemony had been blunted by a significant military defeat in Russia, which effectively fought both Napoleon and Hitler without allies.\(^{113}\) The difficulty of constructing effective defensive alliances sometimes provides powerful states with opportunities for aggression.

Finally, the claim that great powers should have learned from the historical record that attempts at regional hegemony are doomed is not persuasive. Not only does the American case contradict the basic point, but it is hard to apply the argument to the first states that made a run at regional hegemony. After all, they had few precedents, and the evidence from the earliest cases was mixed. Wilhelmine Germany, for example, could look at both Napoleonic France, which failed, and the United States, which succeeded. It is hard to argue that German policymakers should have read history to say that they were sure to lose if they attempted to conquer Europe. One might concede that point but argue that Hitler certainly should have known better, because he could see that Wilhelmine Germany as well as Napoleonic France had failed to conquer Europe. But, as discussed below, what Hitler learned from those cases was not that aggression did not pay, but rather that he should not repeat his predecessor's mistakes when the Third Reich made its run at hegemony. Learning, in other words, does not always lead to choosing a peaceful outcome.

Thus, the pursuit of regional hegemony is not a quixotic ambition, although there is no denying that it is difficult to achieve. Since the security benefits of hegemony are enormous, powerful states will invariably be tempted to emulate the United States and try to dominate their region of the world…..

**The Nuclear Arms Race**

My final test of offensive realism is to examine whether its prediction that great powers seek nuclear superiority is correct. The opposing position, which is closely identified with the defensive realists, is that once nuclear-armed rivals find themselves operating in a MAD world—that is, a world in which each side has the capability to destroy the other side after absorbing a first strike—they should willingly accept the status quo and not pursue nuclear advantage. States should therefore not build counterforce weapons or defensive systems that could neutralize the other side's retaliatory capability and undermine MAD. An examination of the superpowers' nuclear policies during the Cold War thus provides an ideal case for assessing these competing realist perspectives.

The historical record makes it clear that offensive realism better accounts for the nuclear policies of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Neither superpower accepted the defensive realists' advice about the virtues of MAD. Instead, both sides developed and deployed large, sophisticated counterforce arsenals, either to gain nuclear advantage or to prevent the other side from doing so. Moreover, both sides sought to develop defenses against the other side's nuclear weapons, as well as elaborate clever strategies for fighting and winning a nuclear war.

**U.S. Nuclear Policy**

The nuclear arms race between the superpowers did not become serious until about 1950. The United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly in the early years of the Cold War, and the
Soviet Union did not explode its first nuclear device until August 1949. Thus, concepts such as counterforce were irrelevant in the late 1940s, because the Soviets had no nuclear weapons for the United States to target. The main concern of American strategists during this period was how to stop the Red Army from overrunning Western Europe. They believed that the best way to deal with that threat was to launch a nuclear bombing campaign against the Soviet industrial base.\textsuperscript{155} In essence, the strategy was "an extension" of the American strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War II, although "greatly compressed in time, magnified in effect, and reduced in cost."\textsuperscript{156}

After the Soviets developed the atomic bomb, the United States sought to develop a splendid first-strike capability—that is, a strike that would preemptively destroy all of the Soviets' nuclear capabilities in one fell swoop. American nuclear policy during the 1950s was called "massive retaliation," although that label was probably a misnomer, since the word "retaliation" implies that the United States planned to wait to strike the Soviet Union until after absorbing a Soviet nuclear strike.\textsuperscript{157} In fact, there is considerable evidence that the United States intended to launch its nuclear weapons first in a crisis in order to eliminate the small Soviet nuclear force before it could get off the ground. General Curtis LeMay, the head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), made this point clear in the mid-1950s, when he declared that the vulnerability of SAC's bombers—a cause for worry at the time—did not concern him much, because his script for a nuclear war called for the United States to strike first and disarm the Soviet Union. "If I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack," he said, "I'm going to kick the shit out of them before they take off the ground."\textsuperscript{158} It would thus be more accurate to define U.S. nuclear policy in the 1950s as "massive preemption" rather than massive retaliation. Regardless, the key point is that during the 1950s, the United States was committed to gaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the United States did not achieve a first-strike capability against the Soviet nuclear arsenal during either the 1950s or the early 1960s. Granted, had the United States struck first in a nuclear exchange during that period, it would have inflicted much greater damage on the Soviet Union than vice versa. And American planners certainly did put forth plausible best-case scenarios in which a U.S. first strike eliminated almost all of the Soviet Union's nuclear retaliatory force, thus raising doubts about whether Moscow truly had an assured-destruction capability.\textsuperscript{159} The United States, in other words, was close to having a first-strike capability. Still, most American policymakers at the time believed that the United States was likely to suffer unacceptable damage in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, even if that damage fell short of total destruction of the United States.\textsuperscript{160}

By the early 1960s, however, it was readily apparent that the growing size and diversity of the Soviet nuclear arsenal meant that it would soon be impossible, given existing technology, for the United States seriously to contemplate disarming the Soviet Union with a nuclear first strike.\textsuperscript{161} Moscow was on the verge of developing an invulnerable and robust second-strike capability, which would put the superpowers squarely in a MAD world. How did American policymakers view this development, and how did they respond to it? They were not only deeply unhappy about it, but for the remainder of the Cold War, they devoted considerable resources to escaping MAD and gaining a nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union.

Consider the sheer number of Soviet targets that the United States was planning to strike in a nuclear war, a number that went far beyond the requirements of MAD. It was generally agreed that to have an assured-destruction capability, the United States, after absorbing a Soviet first strike, had to be able to destroy about 30 percent of the Soviet Union's population and about 70 percent of its industry.\textsuperscript{162} That level of destruction could have been achieved by destroying the 200 largest cities in the Soviet Union. This task required about 400 one-megaton weapons, or an equivalent mix of weapons and megatonnage (hereinafter referred to as 400 EMT). However, the actual number of Soviet targets that the United States planned to destroy far exceeded the 200 cities required for assured destruction. For example, SIOP-5, the actual
military plan for employing nuclear weapons that took effect on January 1, 1976, listed 25,000 potential targets. SIOP-6, which the Reagan administration approved on October 1, 1983, contained a staggering 50,000 potential targets.

Although the United States never acquired the capability to hit all of those potential targets at once, it deployed a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, which grew steadily in size from the early 1960s until the Cold War ended in 1990. Moreover, most of those weapons had significant counterforce capability, because American strategic planners were not content merely to incinerate 200 Soviet cities, but were determined to destroy a large portion of the Soviet Union's retaliatory capability as well. For example, 3,127 nuclear bombs and warheads were in the U.S. inventory in December 1960, when SIOP-62 (the first SIOP) was approved. Twenty-three years later, when SIOP-6 was put into effect, the strategic nuclear arsenal had grown to include 10,802 weapons. Although the United States needed a reasonably large retaliatory force for assured-destruction purposes—because it had to assume that some of its nuclear weapons might be lost to a Soviet first strike—there is no question that the size of the American nuclear arsenal during the last twenty-five years of the Cold War went far beyond the 400 EMT required to destroy 200 Soviet cities.

The United States also pushed hard to develop technologies that would give it an advantage at the nuclear level. For example, it went to considerable lengths to improve the lethality of its counterforce weapons. The United States was especially concerned with improving missile accuracy, a concern that its weapons designers allayed with great success. America also pioneered the development of MIRVs (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles), which allowed it to increase significantly the number of strategic warheads in its inventory. By the end of the Cold War, the "hard-target kill capability" of U.S. ballistic missiles—that is, U.S. counterforce capability—had reached the point at which the survivability of the Soviets' land-based missile silos was in question. Washington also invested heavily in protecting its command-and-control systems from attack, thus augmenting its capability to wage a controlled nuclear war. In addition, the United States pushed hard, if unsuccessfully, to develop effective ballistic missile defenses. American policymakers sometimes said that the ultimate purpose of missile defense was to move away from a nuclear world that prized offense to a safer, defense-dominant world, but the truth is that they wanted defenses in order to facilitate winning a nuclear war at a reasonable cost.

Finally, the United States came up with an alternative to the strategy of massive retaliation that, it hoped, would allow it to wage and win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. This alternative strategy was first formulated by the Kennedy administration in 1961 and came to be known as "limited nuclear options." The new policy assumed that neither superpower could eliminate the other side's assured-destruction capability, but that they could still engage in limited nuclear exchanges with their counterforce weapons. The United States would aim to avoid striking Soviet cities so as to limit civilian deaths and would concentrate instead on achieving victory by dominating the Soviet Union in the limited counter-force exchanges that were at the heart of the strategy. It was hoped that the Soviets would fight according to the same rules. This new policy was codified in SIOP-63, which took effect on August 1, 1962. There were four important successor SIOPs over the remainder of the Cold War, and each new SIOP essentially provided smaller, more precise, and more select counterforce options than its predecessor, as well as command-and-control improvements that would facilitate fighting a limited nuclear war. The ultimate aim of these refinements, of course, was to ensure that the United States had an advantage over the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.

In sum, the evidence is overwhelming that the United States did not abandon its efforts to gain nuclear superiority during the last twenty-five years of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it did not gain a meaningful advantage over the Soviets. In fact, it did not come as close to achieving that goal as it had during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Soviet Nuclear Policy

Although we know less about the Soviet side of the story than we do about the American side, it is not difficult to determine whether the Soviets sought nuclear advantage over the United States or were content to live in a MAD world. We not only have details on the size and composition of the Soviet nuclear arsenal during the course of the Cold War, but also have access to a large body of Soviet literature that lays out Moscow's thinking on nuclear strategy.

The Soviet Union, like the United States, built a massive nuclear arsenal with abundant counterforce capability. The Soviets, however, were late bloomers. They did not explode their first nuclear weapon until August 1949, and their arsenal grew slowly in the 1950s. During that decade, the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in developing and deploying nuclear weapons, as well as the systems to deliver them. By 1960 the Soviet inventory contained only 354 strategic nuclear weapons, compared to 3,127 for the United States. But the Soviet force grew rapidly during the 1960s. By 1970 it numbered 2,216; ten years later it numbered 7,480. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" notwithstanding, the Soviet Union added almost 4,000 bombs and warheads to its nuclear inventory during the 1980s, ending up with 11,320 strategic nuclear weapons in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down.

Furthermore, most Soviet strategists apparently believed that their country had to be prepared to fight and win a nuclear war. This is not to say that Soviet leaders were eager to fight such a war or that they were confident that they could gain a meaningful victory. Soviet strategists understood that nuclear war would involve untold destruction. But they were determined to limit damage to the Soviet Union and prevail in any nuclear exchange between the superpowers. There is little evidence to suggest that Soviet leaders bought the defensive realists' arguments about the virtues of MAD and the dangers of counterforce.

American and Soviet strategists did differ, however, on the question of how best to win a nuclear war. It is apparent that Soviet planners never accepted U.S. thinking about limited nuclear options. Instead, they seemed to favor a targeting policy much like the U.S. policy of massive retaliation from the 1950s. Specifically, they maintained that the best way to wage a nuclear war and limit damage to the Soviet Union was to launch a rapid and massive counterforce strike against the entire war-making capacity of the United States and its allies. The Soviets did not emphasize targeting American civilians, as assured destruction demands, although a full-scale nuclear strike against the United States certainly would have killed many millions of Americans.

Thus it seems that both superpowers went to considerable lengths during the Cold War to build huge counterforce nuclear arsenals so that they could gain nuclear advantage over the other. Neither side was content merely to build and maintain an assured-destruction capability.

Misunderstanding the Nuclear Revolution

One may recognize that the superpowers relentlessly sought nuclear superiority but still argue that this behavior was misguided, if not irrational, and that it cannot be explained by balance-of-power logic. Neither side could possibly have gained meaningful nuclear advantage over the other, and, what is more, MAD makes for a highly stable world. Thus, the pursuit of nuclear superiority must have been the result of bureaucratic politics or dysfunctional domestic politics in both the United States and the Soviet Union. This perspective is held by most defensive realists, who recognize that neither superpower accepted its own claims about the merits of MAD and the evils of counterforce.

It is not easy to apply this line of argument to the 1950s and the early 1960s, because the small size of the Soviet arsenal during that period gave the United States a real chance of gaining nuclear superiority. Indeed, some experts believe that the United States did have a "splendid first-strike" capability against the Soviet Union. I disagree with this assessment, but
there is little question that during the early Cold War the United States would have suffered much less damage than its rival in a nuclear exchange. The defensive realists' best case thus covers roughly the last twenty-five years of the Cold War, when both the United States and the Soviet Union had an unambiguous assured-destruction capability. Yet even during this period of strategic parity, each superpower still sought to gain a nuclear advantage over the other.

To begin with, the broad contours of strategic nuclear policy are consistent with the predictions of offensive realism. Specifically, the United States worked hardest at gaining nuclear superiority in the 1950s, when a first-strike capability was arguably within its grasp. Once the Soviet Union approached a secure retaliatory capability, however, the U.S. effort to gain superiority slackened, although it did not disappear. Although American policymakers never embraced the logic of assured destruction, the percentage of U.S. defense spending devoted to strategic nuclear forces declined steadily after 1960. Moreover, both sides agreed not to deploy significant ballistic missile defenses and eventually placed qualitative and quantitative limits on their offensive forces as well. The nuclear arms race continued in a number of different ways, some of which were described above, but neither side made an all-out effort to acquire superiority once MAD was in place.

Moreover, the continuation of the arms race was not misguided, even though nuclear superiority remained an elusive goal. In fact, it made good strategic sense for the United States and the Soviet Union to compete vigorously in the nuclear realm, because military technology tends to develop rapidly and in unforeseen ways. For example, few people in 1914 understood that the submarine would become a deadly and effective weapon during World War I. Few in 1965 foresaw how the brewing revolution in information technology would profoundly affect conventional weapons such as fighter aircraft and tanks. The key point is that nobody could say for sure in 1965 whether some revolutionary new technology might not transform the nuclear balance and give one side a clear advantage.

Furthermore, military competitions are usually characterized by what Robert Pape has called an "asymmetric diffusion of military technology." States do not acquire new technologies simultaneously, which means that the innovator often gains significant, albeit temporary, advantages over the laggard. Throughout the Cold War, for example, the United States maintained a significant advantage in developing technologies to detect the other side's submarines and to hide its own.

Great powers always prefer to be the first to develop new technologies; they have to make sure that their opponents do not beat them to the punch and gain the advantage for themselves. Thus, it made sense for each superpower to make a serious effort to develop counterforce technology and ballistic missile defenses. At a maximum, a successful breakthrough might have brought clear superiority; at a minimum, these efforts prevented the other side from gaining a unilateral advantage. In short, given the strategic benefits that come with nuclear superiority, and the fact that it was hard to know throughout the Cold War whether it was achievable, it was neither illogical nor surprising that both superpowers pursued it.

**Conclusion**

The nuclear arms race between the superpowers and the foreign policy behavior of Japan (1868-1945), Germany (1862-1945), the Soviet Union (1917-91), and Italy (1861-1943) show that great powers look for opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favor and usually seize opportunities when they appear. Moreover, these cases support my claims that states do not lose their appetite for power as they gain more of it, and that especially powerful states are strongly inclined to seek regional hegemony. Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, for example, all set more ambitious foreign policy goals and behaved more aggressively as their power increased. In fact, both Japan and Germany fought wars in an attempt to dominate their
areas of the world. Although the Soviet Union did not follow suit, that was because it was deterred by American military might, not because it was a satiated great power.

The fallback argument, which allows that the major states have relentlessly pursued power in the past but characterizes this pursuit as self-defeating behavior caused by destructive domestic politics, is not persuasive. Aggression is not always counterproductive. States that initiate wars often win and frequently improve their strategic position in the process. Furthermore, the fact that so many different kinds of great powers have sought to gain advantage over their rivals over such broad spans of history renders implausible the claim that this was all foolish or irrational behavior brought about by domestic pathologies. A close look at the cases that might seem to be prime examples of aberrant strategic behavior—the final twenty-five years of the nuclear arms race, imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany—suggests otherwise. Although domestic politics played some role in all of these cases, each state had good reason to try to gain advantage over its rivals and good reason to think that it would succeed.

For the most part, the cases discussed in this chapter involve great powers taking active measures to gain advantage over their opponents—exactly what offensive realism predicts. Let us now turn to the American and British cases, which seem at first glance to provide evidence of great powers ignoring opportunities to gain power. As we shall see, however, each of these cases in fact provides further support for the theory.
Chapter Nine
The Causes of Great Power War

Security competition is endemic to daily life in the international system, but war is not. Only occasionally does security competition give way to war. This chapter will offer a structural theory that accounts for that deadly shift. In effect, I seek to explain the causes of great-power war, defined as any conflict involving at least one great power.

One might surmise that international anarchy is the key structural factor that causes states to fight wars. After all, the best way for states to survive in an anarchic system in which other states have some offensive capability and intentions that might be hostile is to have more rather than less power. This logic, explained in Chapter 2, drives states to strive to maximize their share of world power, which sometimes means going to war against a rival state. There is no question that anarchy is a deep cause of war. G. Lowes Dickinson put this point well in his account of what caused World War I: "Some one state at any moment may be the immediate offender; but the main and permanent offence is common to all states. It is the anarchy which they are all responsible for perpetuating."¹

Anarchy alone, however, cannot account for why security competition sometimes leads to war but sometimes does not. The problem is that anarchy is a constant—the system is always anarchic—whereas war is not. To account for this important variation in state behavior, it is necessary to consider another structural variable: the distribution of power among the leading states in the system. As discussed in Chapter 9, power in the international system is usually arranged in three different ways: bipolarity, balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity. Thus, to explore the effect of the distribution of power on the likelihood of war, we need to know whether the system is bipolar or multipolar, and if it is multipolar, whether or not there is a potential hegemon among the great powers. The core of my argument is that bipolar systems tend to be the most peaceful, and unbalanced multipolar systems are the most prone to deadly conflict. Balanced multipolar systems fall somewhere in between.

Structural theories such as offensive realism are at best crude predictors of when security competition leads to war. They are not capable of explaining precisely how often war will occur in one kind of system compared to another. Nor are they capable of predicting exactly when wars will occur. For example, according to offensive realism, the emergence of Germany as a potential hegemon in the early 1900s made it likely that there would be a war involving all the European great powers. But the theory cannot explain why war occurred in 1914 rather than 1912 or 1916.²

These limitations stem from the fact that nonstructural factors sometimes play an important role in determining whether or not a state goes to war. States usually do not fight wars for security reasons alone. As noted in Chapter 2, for instance, although Otto von Bismarck was driven in good part by realist calculations when he took Prussia to war three times between 1864 and 1870, each of his decisions for war was also influenced by nationalism and other domestic political calculations. And yet structural forces do exert a powerful influence on state behavior. It can be no other way if states care deeply about their survival. Thus, focusing exclusively on structure should tell us a lot about the origins of great-power war.

Many theories about the causes of war have been propounded, which is not surprising, since the subject has always been of central importance to students of international politics. Some of those theories treat human nature as the taproot of conflict, while others focus on individual leaders, domestic politics, political ideology, capitalism, economic interdependence, and the structure of the international system.³ In fact, a handful of prominent theories point to the distribution of power as the key to understanding international conflict. For example, Kenneth Waltz maintains that bipolarity is less prone to war than multipolarity, whereas Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer argue the opposite.⁴ Other scholars focus not on the polarity of the system, but on whether there is a preponderant power in the system. Classical realists such as
Hans Morgenthau argue that peace is most likely when there is no dominant power, but instead a rough balance of power among the leading states. In contrast, Robert Gilpin and A.F.K. Organski argue that the presence of a preponderant power fosters stability.5

Offensive realism, which takes into account polarity as well as the balance of power among the leading states in the system, agrees that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity but goes beyond that assertion by distinguishing between multipolar systems with or without a potential hegemon. This distinction between balanced and unbalanced multipolar systems, I argue, is important for understanding the history of great-power war. Offensive realism also agrees with the classical realists' claim that peace is more likely if there is no preponderant power in the system, but it goes beyond that perspective by emphasizing that stability also depends on whether the system is bipolar or multipolar.

Showing how offensive realism explains great-power war involves a two-step process. In the next three sections, I spell out my theory and show that the causal logic underpinning it is sound and compelling. In the subsequent two sections, the theory is tested to see how well it explains both the outbreak of great-power war and the periods of relative peace in Europe between 1792 and 1990. Specifically, I look to see how much great-power war there was during the periods when Europe was characterized by bipolarity, by balanced multipolarity, and by unbalanced multi-polarity. Finally, my brief conclusion discusses how the presence of nuclear weapons during the Cold War affects the analysis.

**Structure and War**

The main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system. What matters most is the number of great powers and how much power each controls. A system can be either bipolar or multipolar, and power can be distributed more or less evenly among the leading states. The power ratios among all the great powers affect the prospects for stability, but the key ratio is that between the two most formidable states in the system. If there is a lopsided power gap, the number one state is a potential hegemon.6 A system that contains an aspiring hegemon is said to be unbalanced; a system without such a dominant state is said to be balanced. Power need not be distributed equally among all the major states in a balanced system, although it can be. The basic requirement for balance is that there not be a marked difference in power between the two leading states. If there is, the system is unbalanced.

Combining these two dimensions of power produces four possible kinds of systems: 1) unbalanced bipolarity, 2) balanced bipolarity, 3) unbalanced multipolarity, and 4) balanced multipolarity. Unbalanced bipolarity is not a useful category, because this kind of system is unlikely to be found in the real world. I know of none in modern times. It is certainly possible that some region might find itself with just two great powers, one of which is markedly more powerful than the other. But that system is likely to disappear quickly, because the stronger state is likely to conquer its weaker rival, who would have no other great power to turn to for help, since by definition there are no other great powers. In fact, the weaker power might even capitulate without a fight, making the more powerful state a regional hegemon. In short, unbalanced bipolar systems are so unstable that they cannot last for any appreciable period of time.

Thus we are likely to find power apportioned among the leading states in three different patterns. Bipolar systems (this is shorthand for balanced bipolarity) are ruled by two great powers that have roughly equal strength—or at least neither state is decidedly more powerful than the other. Unbalanced multipolar systems are dominated by three or more great powers, one of which is a potential hegemon. Balanced multipolar systems are dominated by three or more great powers, none of which is an aspiring hegemon: there is no significant gap in military strength between the system's leading two states, although some power asymmetries are likely to exist among the great powers.
How do these different distributions of power affect the prospects for war and peace? Bipolar systems are the most stable of the three systems. Great-power wars are infrequent, and when they occur, they are likely to involve one of the great powers fighting against a minor power, not the rival great power. Unbalanced multipolar systems feature the most dangerous distribution of power, mainly because potential hegemons are likely to get into wars with all of the other great powers in the system. These wars invariably turn out to be long and enormously costly. Balanced multipolar systems occupy a middle ground: great-power war is more likely than in bipolarity, but decidedly less likely than in unbalanced multipolarity. Moreover, the wars between the great powers are likely to be one-on-one or two-on-one engagements, not systemwide conflicts like those that occur when there is a potential hegemon.

Let us now consider why bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems, regardless of whether there is a potential hegemon in the mix. Later I will explain why balanced multipolar systems are more stable than unbalanced ones.

**Bipolarity vs. Multipolarity**

War is more likely in multipolarity than bipolarity for three reasons. First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.

**Opportunities for War**

A multipolar system has more potential conflict situations than does a bipolar order. Consider great-great power dyads. Under bipolarity, there are only two great powers and therefore only one conflict dyad directly involving them. For example, the Soviet Union was the only great power that the United States could have fought during the Cold War. In contrast, a multipolar system with three great powers has three dyads across which war might break out between the great powers: A can fight B, A can fight C, and B can fight C. A system with five great powers has ten great-great power dyads.

Conflict could also erupt across dyads involving major and minor powers. In setting up a hypothetical scenario, it seems reasonable to assume the same number of minor powers in both the bipolar and multipolar systems, since the number of major powers should have no meaningful effect on the number of minor powers. Therefore, because there are more great powers in multipolarity, there are more great-minor power dyads. Consider the following examples: in a bipolar world with 10 minor powers, there are 20 great-minor power dyads; in a multipolar system with 5 great powers and the same 10 minor powers, there are 50 such dyads.

This disparity in the number of great-minor power dyads in the two systems probably should be tilted further in favor of bipolarity, because it is generally less flexible than multipolarity. Bipolar systems are likely to be rigid structures. Two great powers dominate, and the logic of security competition suggests that they will be unambiguous rivals. Most minor powers find it difficult to remain unattached to one of the major powers in bipolarity, because the major powers demand allegiance from the smaller states. This tightness is especially true in core geographical areas, less so in peripheral areas. The pulling of minor powers into the orbit of one or the other great power makes it difficult for either great power to pick a fight with minor powers closely allied with its adversary; as a result, the numbers of potential conflict situations is substantially less. During the Cold War, for example, the United States was not about to use military
force against Hungary or Poland, which were allied with the Soviet Union. Thus, there should probably be substantially fewer than 20 great-minor power dyads in our hypothetical bipolar world.

In contrast, multipolar systems are less firmly structured. The exact form multipolarity takes can vary widely, depending on the number of major and minor powers in the system and the geographical arrangement of those states. Nevertheless, both major and minor powers usually have considerable flexibility regarding alliance partners, and minor powers are less likely to be closely tied to a great power than in a bipolar system. This autonomy, however, leaves minor powers vulnerable to attack from the great powers. Thus, the 50 great-minor power dyads in our hypothetical multipolar system is probably a reasonable number.

Wars between minor powers are largely ignored in this study because the aim is to develop a theory of great-power war. Yet minor-power wars sometimes widen and great powers get dragged into the fighting. Although the subject of escalation lies outside the scope of this study, a brief word is in order about how polarity affects the likelihood of great powers' getting pulled into wars between minor powers. Basically, that possibility is greater in multipolarity than in bipolarity, because there are more opportunities for minor powers to fight each other in multipolarity, and thus more opportunities for great-power involvement.

Consider that our hypothetical bipolar and multipolar worlds both contain 10 minor powers, which means that there are 45 potential minor-minor power dyads in each system. That number should be markedly reduced for bipolarity, because the general tightness of bipolar systems makes it difficult for minor powers to go to war against each other. Specifically, both great powers would seek to prevent fighting between their own minor-power allies, as well as conflicts involving minor powers from the rival camps, for fear of escalation. Minor powers have much more room to maneuver in a multipolar system, and thus they have more freedom to fight each other. Greece and Turkey, for example, fought a war between 1921 and 1924, when Europe was multipolar. But they were in no position to fight with each other during the Cold War, when Europe was bipolar, because the United States would not have tolerated a war between any of its European allies, for fear it would have weakened NATO vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Imbalances of Power

Power asymmetries among the great powers are more commonplace in multipolarity than bipolarity, and the strong become hard to deter when power is unbalanced, because they have increased capability to win wars. But even if we assume that the military strength of the great powers is roughly equal, power imbalances that lead to conflict are still more likely in multipolarity than in bipolarity.

Multipolar systems tend toward inequality, whereas bipolar systems tend toward equality, for one principal reason. The more great powers there are in a system, the more likely it is that wealth and population size, the building blocks of military power, will be distributed unevenly among them. To illustrate, let us assume that we live in a world where, regardless of how many great powers populate the system, there is a 50 percent chance that any two great powers will have roughly the same amount of latent power. If there are only two great powers in that world (bipolarity), obviously there is a 50 percent chance that each state will control the same quantity of latent power. But if there are three great powers in that world (multipolarity), there is only a 12.5 percent chance that all of them will have the same amount of latent power. With four great powers (multipolarity), there is less than a 2 percent chance that the ingredients of military might will be distributed evenly among all of them.

One could use a different number for the likelihood that any two states will have equal amounts of latent power—say, 25 percent or 60 percent instead of 50 percent—but the basic story would remain the same. Asymmetries in latent power are more likely to be found among the great powers in multipolarity than in bipolarity, and the more great powers there are in
multipolarity, the more remote the chances of symmetry. This is not to say that it is impossible to have a multipolar system in which the great powers possess equal proportions of latent power, but only that it is considerably less likely than in a bipolar system. Of course, the reason for this concern with latent power is that significant variations in wealth and population size among the leading states are likely to lead to disparities in actual military power, simply because some states will be better endowed to pursue an arms race than are others.9

But even if we assume that all the major states are equally powerful, imbalances in power still occur more often in multipolarity than in bipolarity. Two great powers in a multipolar system, for example, can join together to attack a third great power, as the United Kingdom and France did against Russia in the Crimean War (1853-56), and Italy and Prussia did against Austria in 1866. This kind of ganging up is impossible in bipolarity, since only two great powers compete. Two great powers can also join forces to conquer a minor power, as Austria and Prussia did against Denmark in 1864, and Germany and the Soviet Union did against Poland in 1939. Ganging up of this sort is logically possible in a bipolar world, but it is highly unlikely because the two great powers are almost certain to be archrivals disinclined to go to war as allies. Furthermore, a major power might use its superior strength to coerce or conquer a minor power. This kind of behavior is more likely in multipolarity than in bipolarity, because there are more potential great-minor power dyads in a multipolar system.

One might argue that balance-of-power dynamics can operate to counter any power imbalances that arise in multipolarity. No state can dominate another if the other states coalesce firmly against it.10 Indeed, this might be seen as an advantage that multipolarity has over bipolarity, since great-power balancing coalitions are not feasible in a world with only two great powers. But threatened states rarely form effective balancing coalitions in time to contain an aggressor. As Chapter 8 demonstrated, threatened states prefer buck-passing to balancing, but buck-passing directly undermines efforts to build powerful balancing coalitions.

But even when threatened states do balance together in multipolarity, diplomacy is an uncertain process. It can take time to build a defensive coalition, especially if the number of states required to form a balancing alliance is large. An aggressor may conclude that it can gain its objectives before the opposing coalition is fully formed. Finally, geography sometimes prevents balancing states from putting meaningful pressure on aggressors. For example, a major power may not be able to put effective military pressure on a state threatening to cause trouble because they are separated from each other by a large body of water or another state.11

The Potential for Miscalculation

A final problem with multipolarity lies in its tendency to foster miscalculation. Multipolarity leads states to underestimate the resolve of rival states and the strength of opposing coalitions. States then mistakenly conclude that they have the military capability to coerce an opponent, or if that fails, to defeat it in battle.

War is more likely when a state underestimates the willingness of an opposing state to stand firm on issues of difference. It then may push the other state too far, expecting the other to concede when in fact it will choose to fight. Such miscalculation is more likely under multipolarity because the shape of the international order tends to remain fluid, due to the tendency of coalitions to shift. As a result, the nature of the agreed international rules of the road—norms of state behavior, and agreed divisions of territorial rights and other privileges—tend to change constantly. No sooner may the rules of a given adversarial relationship be worked out than that relationship becomes a friendship, a new rivalry emerges with a previous friend or neutral, and new rules of the road must be established. Under these circumstances, one state may unwittingly push another too far, because ambiguities as to national rights and obligations leave a wider range of issues on which each state may misjudge the other’s resolve. Norms of state behavior can come to be broadly understood and accepted by all states, even in multipolarity,
just as basic norms of diplomatic conduct became generally accepted by the European powers during the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, a well-defined division of rights is generally more difficult when the number of states is large and relations among them are in flux, as is the case with multipolarity.

War is also more likely when states underestimate the relative power of an opposing coalition, either because they underestimate the number of states who will oppose them, or because they exaggerate the number of allies who will fight on their own side. Such errors are more likely in a system of many states, since states then must accurately predict the behavior of many other states in order to calculate the balance of power between coalitions. Even assuming that a state knows who is going to fight with and against it, measuring the military strength of multistate coalitions is considerably more difficult than assessing the power of a single rival.

Miscalculation is less likely in a bipolar world. States are less likely to miscalculate others' resolve, because the rules of the road with the main opponent become settled over time, leading both parties to recognize the limits beyond which they cannot push the other. States also cannot miscalculate the membership of the opposing coalition, since each side faces only one main enemy. Simplicity breeds certainty; certainty bolsters peace.

Balanced vs. Unbalanced Multipolarity

Unbalanced multipolar systems are especially war-prone for two reasons. The potential hegemons, which are the defining feature of this kind of system, have an appreciable power advantage over the other great powers, which means that they have good prospects of winning wars against their weaker rivals. One might think that a marked power asymmetry of this sort would decrease the prospects for war. After all, being so powerful should make the potential hegemon feel secure and thus should ameliorate the need to initiate a war to gain more power. Moreover, the lesser powers should recognize that the leading state is essentially a status quo power and relax. But even if they fail to recognize the dominant power's benign intentions, the fact is that they do not have the military capability to challenge it. Therefore, according to this logic, the presence of a potential hegemon in a multipolar system should enhance the prospects for peace.

This is not what happens, however, when potential hegemons come on the scene. Their considerable military might notwithstanding, they are not likely to be satisfied with the balance of power. Instead they will aim to acquire more power and eventually gain regional hegemony, because hegemony is the ultimate form of security; there are no meaningful security threats to the dominant power in a unipolar system. Of course, not only do potential hegemons have a powerful incentive to rule their region, they also have the capability to push for supremacy, which means that they are a dangerous threat to peace.

Potential hegemons also invite war by increasing the level of fear among the great powers. Fear is endemic to states in the international system, and it drives them to compete for power so that they can increase their prospects for survival in a dangerous world. The emergence of a potential hegemon, however, makes the other great powers especially fearful, and they will search hard for ways to correct the imbalance of power and will be inclined to pursue riskier policies toward that end. The reason is simple: when one state is threatening to dominate the rest, the long-term value of remaining at peace declines and threatened states will be more willing to take chances to improve their security.

A potential hegemon does not have to do much to generate fear among the other states in the system. Its formidable capabilities alone are likely to scare neighboring great powers and push at least some of them to create a balancing coalition against their dangerous opponent. Because a state's intentions are difficult to discern, and because they can change quickly, rival great powers will be inclined to assume the worst about the potential hegemon's intentions,
further reinforcing the threatened states’ incentive to contain it and maybe even weaken it if the opportunity presents itself.

The target of this containment strategy, however, is sure to view any balancing coalition forming against it as encirclement by its rivals. The potential hegemon would be correct to think this way, even though the lesser great powers’ purpose is essentially defensive in nature. Nevertheless, the leading state is likely to feel threatened and scared and consequently is likely to take steps to enhance its security, thereby making the neighboring great powers more scared, and forcing them to take additional steps to enhance their security, which then scares the potential hegemon even more, and so on. In short, potential hegemons generate spirals of fear that are hard to control. This problem is compounded by the fact that they possess considerable power and thus are likely to think they can solve their security problems by going to war.

**Summary**

Thus, bipolarity is the most stable of the different architectures, for four reasons. First, there are relatively fewer opportunities for conflict in bipolarity, and only one possible conflict dyad involving the great powers. When great powers do fight in bipolarity, they are likely to engage minor powers, not the rival great power. Second, power is more likely to be equally distributed among the ‘great powers in bipolarity, an important structural source of stability. Furthermore, there is limited opportunity for the great powers to gang up against other states or take advantage of minor powers. Third, bipolarity discourages miscalculation and thus reduces the likelihood that the great powers will stumble into war. Fourth, although fear is constantly at play in world politics, bipolarity does not magnify those anxieties that haunt states.

Balanced multipolarity is more prone to war than is bipolarity, for three reasons. First, multipolarity presents considerably more opportunities for conflict, especially between the great powers themselves. Wars that simultaneously involve all the great powers, however, are unlikely. Second, power is likely to be distributed unevenly among the leading states, and those states with greater military capability will be prone to start wars, because they will think that they have the capability to win them. There will also be ample opportunity for great powers to gang up on third parties and to coerce or conquer minor powers. Third, miscalculation is likely to be a serious problem in balanced multipolarity, although high levels of fear among the great powers are unlikely, because there are no exceptional power gaps between the leading states in the system.

Unbalanced multipolarity is the most perilous distribution of power. Not only does it have all the problems of balanced multipolarity, it also suffers from the worst kind of inequality: the presence of a potential hegemon. That state both has significant capability to cause trouble and spawns high levels of fear among the great powers. Both of those developments increase the likelihood of war, which is likely to involve all the great powers in the system and be especially costly.

Now that the theory about the causes of war has been presented, let us switch gears and consider how well it explains events in Europe between 1792 and 1990.

**Great-Power War in Modern Europe, 1792-1990**

To test offensive realism's claims about how different distributions of power affect the likelihood of great-power war, it is necessary to identify the periods between 1792 and 1990 when Europe was either bipolar or multipolar, and when there was a potential hegemon in those multipolar systems. It is then necessary to identify the great-power wars for each of those periods.
System structure, we know, is a function of the number of great powers and how power is apportioned among them. The list of European great powers for the two centuries under discussion includes Austria, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Only Russia, which was known as the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1990, was a great power for the entire period. Austria, which became Austria-Hungary in 1867, was a great power from 1792 until its demise in 1918. Great Britain and Germany were great powers from 1792 until 1945, although Germany was actually Prussia before 1871. Italy is considered a great power from 1861 until its collapse in 1943.

What about Japan and the United States, which are not located in Europe, but were great powers for part of the relevant period? Japan, which was a great power from 1895 until 1945, is left out of the subsequent analysis because it was never a major player in European politics. Japan declared war against Germany at the start of World War I, but other than taking a few German possessions in Asia, it remained on the sidelines. Japan also sent troops into the Soviet Union during the last year of World War I, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, who were trying to get the Soviet Union back into the war against Germany. Japan, however, was mainly concerned with acquiring territory in Russia's Far East, not with events in Europe, about which it cared little. Regardless, the intervention was a failure.

The United States is a different matter. Although it is located in the Western Hemisphere, it committed military forces to fight in Europe during both world wars, and it has maintained a large military presence in the region since 1945. In those instances in which the United States accepted a continental commitment, it is considered a major actor in the European balance of power. But for reasons discussed in Chapter 7, America was never a potential hegemon in Europe; it acted instead as an offshore balancer. Much of the work on assessing the relative strength of the great powers during the years between 1792 and 1990, especially regarding the crucial question of whether there was a potential hegemon in Europe, was done in Chapter 8. The missing parts of the story are filled in below.

Based on the relevant distribution of power among the major states, European history from the outbreak of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792 until the end of the Cold War in 1990 can be roughly divided into seven periods:

1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year), balanced multipolarity;
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years), unbalanced multipolarity;
3) Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity;
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903-18 (16 years), unbalanced multipolarity;
5) Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 years), balanced multipolarity;
6) Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 years), unbalanced multipolarity; and
7) Cold War, 1945-90 (46 years), bipolarity.

The list of wars for each of these seven periods is drawn from Jack Levy's well-regarded database of great-power wars. However, one minor adjustment was made to that database: I treat the Russo-Polish War (1919-20) and the Russian Civil War (1918-21) as separate conflicts, whereas Levy treats them as part of the same war. Only wars that involved at least one European great power and were fought between European states are included in this analysis. Wars involving a European great power and a non-European state are excluded. Thus the War of 1812 between the United Kingdom and the United States, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89) are omitted. Also excluded are European wars involving only minor powers. Finally, civil wars are not included in the analysis, unless there was substantial outside intervention by at least one European state, as there was in the Russian Civil War. The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) is omitted, although it is a close call.
Great-power wars are broken down into three categories. "Central wars" involve virtually all of the great powers in the system, and the combatants fight with tremendous intensity. Great power vs. great power wars involve either one-on-one or two-on-one fights. It should be noted that there is no difference between a central war and a great power vs. great power war in either a bipolar system or a multipolar system with three great powers. No such cases exist, however, in modern European history. Finally, there are "great power vs. minor power wars." During the 199-year period of European history under study, there were a total of 24 great-power wars, including 3 central wars, 6 great power vs. great power wars, and 15 great power vs. minor power wars.

**The Napoleonic Era, 1792-1815**

Europe was home to five great powers between 1792 and 1815: Austria, Britain/United Kingdom, France, Prussia, and Russia. Although France was clearly the most powerful state during this period, it was not a potential hegemon until the early fall of 1793, because it did not have the most formidable army in Europe before then. Remember that Austria and Prussia went to war against France in 1792 because it was militarily weak and therefore was considered vulnerable to invasion. France retained its exalted status as a potential hegemon until Napoleon was finally defeated in the spring of 1815. Thus, there was balanced multipolarity in Europe from 1792 until 1793, and unbalanced multipolarity from 1793 until 1815.

The period from 1792 to 1815 was dominated by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The first year of that conflict is categorized as a great power vs. great power war, because it involved only three great powers: Austria, France, and Prussia. Great Britain and Russia sat on the sidelines throughout 1792 and early 1793. The remaining twenty-two years of that conflict are categorized as a central war. France, which was attempting to become Europe's hegemon, fought against Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia — although in different combinations at different times.

There were also three great power vs. minor power wars in the Napoleonic era. The Russo-Turkish War (1806-12) was basically an attempt by Russia to take Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Walachia away from Turkey, which was then called the Ottoman Empire. Russian victories in the last year of that war won Bessarabia, but not the other two regions. The Russo-Swedish War (1808-9) was caused by French and Russian unhappiness over Sweden's alliance with the United Kingdom. Sweden and Denmark went to war against Sweden and were victorious. Sweden had to surrender Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia. The Neapolitan War (1815) was fought between Austria and Naples. In the wake of Napoleon's departure from Italy, Austria was determined to reassert its preeminence in the region, while the Neapolitan forces were bent on pushing Austria out of Italy. Austria won the conflict.

**The Nineteenth Century, 1815-1902**

Six great powers populated the European system for this eighty-eight-year period between the final defeat of Napoleonic France and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Austria/Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, France, Prussia/Germany, and Russia were great powers for the entire period. Italy joined the club in 1861. There was no potential hegemon in Europe between 1815 and 1902. The United Kingdom was clearly the wealthiest state in Europe during that period (see Table 3.3), but it never translated its abundant wealth into military might. In fact, the United Kingdom maintained a small and weak army for most of the period in question. The largest armies in Europe between 1815 and 1860 belonged to Austria, France, and Russia, but none of them possessed an army that was powerful enough to overrun Europe (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). Nor did any of them come close to having enough latent power to qualify as a potential hegemon.
The Prussian army became a formidable fighting force in the 1860s, vying with the Austrian and French armies for the number one ranking in Europe. France occupied that position for the first half of the decade; Prussia held it for the second half. There is little doubt that Germany had the strongest army in Europe between 1870 and 1902, but it was not yet so powerful that it was a threat to the entire continent. Furthermore, Germany did not yet have sufficient wealth to qualify as a potential hegemon. Thus, it seems fair to say that there was balanced multipolarity in Europe during the nineteenth century.

There were four great power vs. great power wars between 1815 and 1902. The Crimean War (1853-56) was initially a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, with the former trying to make territorial gains at the expense of the latter. But the United Kingdom and France entered the war on the Ottoman Empire’s side. Russia was defeated and was forced to make minor territorial concessions. In the War of Italian Unification (1859), France joined forces with Piedmont to drive Austria out of Italy and create a unified Italian state. Austria lost the war and Italy came into being shortly thereafter. In the Austro-Prussian War (1866), Prussia and Italy were arrayed against Austria. Prussia and Austria were essentially fighting to determine which one of them would dominate a unified Germany, while Italy was bent on taking territory from Austria. Austria lost and Prussia made substantial territorial gains at Austria’s expense. But German unification was still not completed. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) was ostensibly fought over Prussian interference in Spain’s politics. In fact, Bismarck wanted the war so he could complete German unification, while France wanted territorial compensation to offset Prussia’s gains in 1866. The Prussian army won a decisive victory.

There were also eight great power vs. minor power wars during the nineteenth century. The Franco-Spanish War (1823) stemmed from a revolt in Spain that removed the reigning king from his throne. France intervened to restore peace and the monarchy. Navarino Bay (1827) was a brief naval engagement with the United Kingdom, France, and Russia on one side and the Ottoman Empire and Egypt on the other. The great powers were helping the Greeks gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the Russo-Turkish War (1828-29), the Russians went to war against the Ottoman Empire to support Greek independence and to make territorial gains in the Caucasus and other places at the Ottoman Empire’s expense. The First Schleswig-Holstein War (1848-49) was an unsuccessful effort by Prussia to take the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein away from Denmark and make them a German state.

In the Austro-Sardinian War (1848), the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia sought to drive Austria out of Italy and create a unified Italy under its own auspices. This attempt at liberation failed. The Roman Republic War (1849) broke out when France sent an army to Rome to restore the pope to power and crush the fledgling republic established there by Giuseppe Mazzini. In the Second Schleswig-Holstein War (1864), Austria and Prussia ganged up to finally take those disputed duchies away from Denmark. Finally, in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), Russia and Serbia sided with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in their effort to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire.

The Kaiserreich Era, 1903-18

There was no change in the lineup of great powers after 1903. The same six great powers remained at the center of European politics, save for the fact that the United States became a major player in 1918, when American troops began arriving on the continent in large numbers. Wilhelmine Germany, as emphasized in Chapter 8, was a potential hegemon during this period; it controlled the mightiest army and the greatest amount of wealth in the region. Thus, there was unbalanced multipolarity in Europe from 1903 to 1918.

This period was dominated by World War I (1914—18), a central war involving all of the great powers and many of the minor powers in Europe. There was also one great power vs. great power war during this period. In the Russian Civil War (1918-21), the United Kingdom,
France, Japan, and the United States sent troops into the Soviet Union in the midst of its civil war. They ended up fighting some brief but intense battles against the Bolsheviks, who nevertheless survived. Finally, there was one great power vs. minor power conflict during this period: the *Italo-Turkish War* (1911-12). Italy, which was bent on establishing an empire in the area around the Mediterranean Sea, invaded and conquered Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in North Africa, which were then provinces in the Ottoman Empire (both are part of Libya today).

**The Interwar Years, 1919-38**

There were five great powers in the European system between the two world wars. Austria-Hungary disappeared at the close of World War I, but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union remained intact. There was no potential hegemon in Europe during these two decades. The United Kingdom was the wealthiest state in Europe during the first few years after the war, but Germany regained the lead by the late 1920s (see Table 3.3). Neither the United Kingdom nor Germany, however, had the most powerful army in the region between 1919 and 1938. Indeed, both states possessed especially weak armies throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. The German army certainly grew more powerful during the late 1930s, but it did not become the strongest army in Europe until 1939. Although it might seem difficult to believe given France’s catastrophic defeat in 1940, France possessed the number one army in Europe during the interwar years. But France had nowhere near the wealth and population to be a potential hegemon. Thus, there was balanced multipolarity in Europe during this period.

There were no great power vs. great power wars between 1919 and 1938, but there was one war between a great power and a minor power. In the *Russo-Polish War* (1919-20), Poland invaded a badly weakened Soviet Union in the wake of World War I, hoping to detach Belorussia and Ukraine from the Soviet Union and make them part of a Polish-led federation. Although Poland failed to achieve that goal, it did acquire some territory in Belorussia and Ukraine.

**The Nazi Era, 1939-45**

This period began with the same five great powers that dominated the interwar years. But France was knocked out of the ranks of the great powers in the spring of 1940, and Italy went the same route in 1943. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the Soviet Union remained great powers until 1945. Also, the United States became deeply involved in European politics after it entered World War II in December 1941. As discussed in Chapter 8, Nazi Germany was a potential hegemon from 1939 until it collapsed in defeat in the spring of 1945. Thus, there was unbalanced multi-polarity in Europe during this period.

*World War II* (1939-45), which was a central war, was obviously the dominating event in Europe during this period. There was also one great power vs. minor power war: the *Russo-Finnish War* (1939-40). In anticipation of a possible Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin had demanded territorial concessions from Finland in the fall of 1939. The Finns refused and the Red Army invaded Finland in late November 1939. Finland capitulated in March 1940 and the Soviet Union took the territory it wanted.

**The Cold War, 1945-90**

There was only one great power left in Europe after World War II: the Soviet Union. The United States, however, was determined to prevent the Soviets from dominating the region, so they maintained a massive military presence in Europe throughout the Cold War. This was the first time in its history that the United States stationed large numbers of troops in Europe during peacetime. Europe was therefore bipolar from 1945 to 1990.
There was no war between the two great powers during this period, but there was one great power vs. minor power war. In the Russo-Hungarian War (1956), the Soviet Union successfully intervened to put down an anticommunist revolt in Hungary.

Analysis

Let us now sort this information to see how much great-power war there was in Europe when it was characterized by bipolarity, by balanced multipolarity, and by unbalanced multipolarity. In particular, let us consider the number of wars, the frequency of war, and the deadliness of the wars in each of those kinds of systems. The number of great-power wars in each period is broken down according to the three types of war described earlier: central, great power vs. great power, and great power vs. minor power. Frequency is determined by adding up the years in each period in which a great-power war was being fought. War need only be fought in some part of a year for that year to be counted as a war year. For example, the Crimean War ran from October 1853 until February 1856, and thus 1853, 1854, 1855, and 1856 are counted as war years. Finally, deadliness is measured by counting the number of military deaths in each conflict; civilian deaths are omitted.

Bipolarity seems to be the most peaceful and least deadly kind of architecture (see Table 9.3). Between 1945 and 1990, which was the only period during which Europe was bipolar, there was no war between the great powers. There was, however, one great power vs. minor power war, which lasted less than a month. Thus war took place in Europe during only one of the 46 years in which it was bipolar. Regarding deadliness, there were 10,000 deaths in that conflict.

Unbalanced multipolarity is by far the most war-prone and deadly distribution of power. During the periods when there was a potential hegemon in a multipolar Europe—1793-1815, 1903-18/1939-45—there were three central wars, one great power vs. great power war, and five great power vs. minor power wars. A war was being fought during 35 of the relevant 44 years, and in 11 of those years two wars were going on at the same time. Finally, there were roughly 27 million military deaths in those conflicts (and probably about as many civilian deaths when all the murder and mayhem in World War II is taken into account).

Balanced multipolarity falls somewhere in between the other two kinds of systems. Consider that there were no hegemonic wars, five great power vs. great power wars, and nine great power vs. minor power wars during the times when Europe was multipolar but without a potential hegemon—1792-93, 1815-1902, 1919-38. In terms of frequency, war took place somewhere in Europe during 20 of the relevant 109 years. Thus, war was going on 18.3 percent of the time in balanced multipolarity, compared with 2.2 percent in bipolarity and 79.5 percent in unbalanced multipolarity. Regarding deadliness, there were approximately 1.2 million military deaths in the various wars fought in balanced multipolarity, which is far less than the 27 million in unbalanced multipolarity, but substantially more than the 10,000 in bipolarity.

Conclusion

These results appear to offer strong confirmation of offensive realism. Nevertheless, an important caveat is in order. Nuclear weapons, which were first deployed in 1945, were present for the entire time that Europe was bipolar, but they were not present in any of the previous multipolar systems. This creates a problem for my argument, because nuclear weapons are a powerful force for peace, and they surely help account for the absence of great-power war in Europe between 1945 and 1990. It is impossible, however, to determine the relative influence of bipolarity and nuclear weapons in producing this long period of stability.

It would be helpful in dealing with this problem if we could turn to some empirical studies that provide reliable evidence on the effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on the likelihood of
war in the absence of nuclear weapons. But there are none. From its beginning until 1945 the European state system was multipolar, leaving this history barren of comparisons that would reveal the differing effects of multipolarity and bipolarity. Earlier history does afford some apparent examples of bipolar systems, including some that were warlike—Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage—but this history is inconclusive because it is incomplete.

This problem does not arise, however, when comparing the two kinds of multipolarity, because there were no nuclear weapons before 1945. It is apparent from the analysis that whether a multipolar system contains a potential hegemon like Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, or Nazi Germany has a profound influence on the prospects for peace. Any time a multipolar system contains a power that has the strongest army as well as the greatest amount of wealth, deadly war among the great powers is more likely.

Little has been said up to this point about international politics after the Cold War. The next and final chapter will consider relations among the great powers in the 1990s, as well as the likelihood of great-power conflict in the century ahead.
Chapter Ten
Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century

A large body of opinion holds that international politics underwent a fundamental transformation with the end of the Cold War. Cooperation, not security competition and conflict, is now the defining feature of relations among the great powers. Not surprisingly, the optimists who hold this view claim that realism no longer has much explanatory power. It is old thinking and is largely irrelevant to the new realities of world politics. Realists have gone the way of the dinosaurs; they just don't realize it. The best that might be said about theories such as offensive realism is that they are helpful for understanding how great powers interacted before 1990, but they are useless now and for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we need new theories to comprehend the world around us.

President Bill Clinton articulated this perspective throughout the 1990s. For example, he declared in 1992 that, "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." Five years later he sounded the same theme when defending the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include some of the formerly communist Warsaw Pact states. Clinton argued that the charge that this expansion policy might isolate Russia was based on the belief "that the great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century," which he rejected. Instead, he emphasized his belief that "enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways . . . and will compel us to cooperate in more constructive ways."

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world.

States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great-power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.

Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

These relatively peaceful circumstances are largely the result of benign distributions of power in each region. Europe remains bipolar (Russia and the United States are the major powers), which is the most stable kind of power structure. Northeast Asia is multipolar (China, Russia, and the United States), a configuration more prone to instability; but fortunately there is no potential hegemon in that system. Furthermore, stability is enhanced in both regions by nuclear weapons, the continued presence of U.S. forces, and the relative weakness of China
and Russia. These power structures in Europe and Northeast Asia are likely to change over the next two decades, however, leading to intensified security competition and possibly war among the great powers.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I analyze the claims that international politics has changed or is about to change in essential ways, thus undermining realism. Because of space limitations, it is impossible to deal with each argument in detail. Nevertheless, it should be apparent from my analysis that the basic structure of the international system did not change with the end of the Cold War, and that there is little reason to think that change is in the offing. I attempt to show in the following section the considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000 that security competition among the great powers is not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia: In the subsequent four sections, I make the case that we are likely to see greater instability in those important regions over the next twenty years. Finally, in a brief conclusion, I argue that a rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century.

**Persistent Anarchy**

The structure of the international system, as emphasized in Chapter 2, is defined by five assumptions about how the world is organized that have some basis in fact: 1) states are the key actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system, 2) great powers invariably have some offensive military capability, 3) states can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions toward them, 4) great powers place a high premium on survival, and 5) states are rational actors who are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival.

These features of the international system appear to be intact as we begin the twenty-first century. The world still comprises states that operate in an anarchic setting. Neither the United Nations nor any other international institution has much coercive leverage over the great powers. Furthermore, virtually every state has at least some offensive military capability, and there is little evidence that world disarmament is in sight. On the contrary, the world arms trade is flourishing, and nuclear proliferation, not abolition, is likely to concern tomorrow's policymakers. In addition, great powers have yet to discover a way to divine each other's intentions. For example, nobody can predict with any degree of certainty what Chinese or German foreign policy goals will be in 2020. Moreover, there is no good evidence that survival is a less important goal for states today than it was before 1990. Nor is there much reason to believe that the ability of great powers to think strategically has declined since the Cold War ended.

This description of continuity in great-power politics has been challenged on a variety of fronts by experts who believe that significant changes have recently occurred in the structure of the international system—changes that portend a welcome peace among the great powers. Although there are sharp differences among these optimists about the root causes of this purported transformation, each argument is essentially a direct challenge to one of the realist assumptions described above. The only claim that the optimists do not challenge is the claim that states are rational actors. Instead, they concentrate their fire on the other four realist beliefs about the international system. Let us consider, in turn, their best arguments against each of those core assumptions.

**Sovereignty at Bay**

Some suggest that international institutions are growing in number and in their ability to push states to cooperate with each other. Specifically, institutions can dampen security competition and promote world peace because they have the capability to get states to reject
power-maximizing behavior and to refrain from calculating each important move according to how it affects their position in the balance of power. Institutions, so the argument goes, have an independent effect on state behavior that at least mitigates and possibly might put an end to anarchy.

The rhetoric about the growing strength of international institutions notwithstanding, there is little evidence that they can get great powers to act contrary to the dictates of realism. I know of no study that provides evidence to support that claim. The United Nations is the only worldwide organization with any hope of wielding such power, but it could not even shut down the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, much less push a great power around. Moreover, what little influence the United Nations (UN) holds over states is likely to wane even further in the new century, because its key decision-making body, the Security Council, is sure to grow in size. Creating a larger council, especially one with more permanent members who have a veto over UN policy, would make it virtually impossible to formulate and enforce policies designed to limit the actions of the great powers.

There is no institution with any real power in Asia. Although there are a handful of impressive institutions in Europe, such as NATO and the European Union, there is little evidence that they can compel member states to act against their strategic interests. What is most impressive about international institutions is how little independent effect they seem to have on great-power behavior.

Of course, states sometimes operate through institutions and benefit from doing so. However, the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain, if not increase, their own share of world power. Institutions are essentially "arenas for acting out power relationships." When the United States decided it did not want Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to head the UN for a second term, it forced him out, despite the fact that all the other members of the Security Council wanted him to stay on the job. The United States is the most powerful state in the world, and it usually gets its way on issues it judges important. If it does not, it ignores the institution and does what it deems to be in its own national interest.

Others argue that the state is being rendered impotent by globalization or by today's unprecedented levels of economic interdependence. In particular, great powers are said to be incapable of dealing with the mighty forces unleashed by global capitalism and are becoming marginal players in world politics. "Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states." For some, the key actor in the market is the multinational corporation (MNC), which is seen as threatening to overwhelm the state.

The fact is that the levels of economic transactions among states today, when compared with domestic economic dealings, are probably no greater than they were in the early twentieth century. The international economy has been buffeting states for centuries, and they have proved remarkably resilient in the face of that pressure. Contemporary states are no exception in this regard; they are not being overwhelmed by market forces or MNCs but are making the adjustments necessary to ensure their survival.

Another reason to doubt these claims about the state's impending demise is that there is no plausible alternative on the horizon. If the state disappears, presumably some new political entity would have to take its place, but it seems that nobody has identified that replacement. Even if the state disappeared, however, that would not necessarily mean the end of security competition and war. After all, Thucydides and Machiavelli wrote long before the birth of the state system. Realism merely requires anarchy; it does not matter what kind of political units make up the system. They could be states, city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, feudal principalities, or whatever. Rhetoric aside, we are not moving toward a hierarchic international system, which would effectively mean some kind of world government. In fact, anarchy looks like it will be with us for a long time.
Finally, there is good reason to think that the state has a bright future. Nationalism is probably the most powerful political ideology in the world, and it glorifies the state. Indeed, it is apparent that a large number of nations around the world want their own state, or rather nation-state, and they seem to have little interest in any alternative political arrangement. Consider, for example, how badly the Palestinians want their own state, and before 1948, how desperately the Jews wanted their own state. Now that the Jews have Israel it is unthinkable that they would give it up. If the Palestinians get their own state, they surely will go to great lengths to ensure its survival.

The usual rejoinder to this perspective is to argue that the recent history of the European Union contradicts it. The states of western Europe have largely abandoned nationalism and are well on their way toward achieving political unity, providing powerful evidence that the state system's days are numbered. Although the members of the European Union have certainly achieved substantial economic integration, there is little evidence that this path will lead to the creation of a superstate. In fact, both nationalism and the existing states in western Europe appear to be alive and well. Consider French thinking on the matter, as reflected in the comments of French president Jacques Chirac to the German Bundestag in June 2000: he said that he envisioned a "united Europe of states rather than a United States of Europe." He went on to say, "Neither you nor we envisage the creation of a European superstate that would take the place of our nation states and end their role as actors on the international stage. ... In the future, our nations will stay the first reference point for our people." But even if Chirac proves wrong and western Europe becomes a superstate, it would still be a state, albeit a powerful one, operating in a system of states.

Nothing is forever, but there is no good reason to think that the sovereign state's time has passed.

The Futility of Offense

Some suggest that great powers no longer have a meaningful offensive military capability against each other, because great-power war has become prohibitively costly. In essence, war is no longer a useful instrument of statecraft. John Mueller maintains that offense had become too costly for rational leaders even before the advent of nuclear weapons. World War I was decisive proof, he argues, that conventional war among the great powers had degenerated to the point where it was essentially senseless slaughter. The main flaw in this line of argument is that great-power conventional wars do not have to be protracted and bloody affairs. Quick and decisive victories are possible, as Germany demonstrated against France in 1940—which means that great powers can still have a viable offensive capability against one another.

The more persuasive variant of this argument is that nuclear weapons make it almost impossible for great powers to attack each other. After all, it is difficult to imagine winning any kind of meaningful victory in an all-out nuclear war. This argument, too, falls apart on close inspection. There is no question that nuclear weapons significantly reduce the likelihood of great-power war, but as discussed in Chapter 4, war between nuclear-armed great powers is still a serious possibility. Remember that during the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies were deeply worried about a Soviet conventional attack into Western Europe, and after 1979 about a Soviet invasion of Iran. The fact that both superpowers had massive nuclear arsenals apparently did not persuade either side that the other had no offensive military capability.

Certain Intentions

Democratic peace theory is built on the premises that democracies can be more certain of each other's intentions and that those intentions are generally benign; thus they do not fight
among themselves. If all the great powers were democracies, each could be certain that the others had friendly intentions, and thus they would have no need to compete for power or prepare for major war. Since democracy appears to be spreading across the globe, it is reasonable to think that the world will eventually become one giant zone of peace.

As challenges to realism go, democratic peace theory is among the strongest. Still, it has serious problems that ultimately make it unconvincing. The theory’s proponents maintain that the available evidence shows that democracies do not fight other democracies. But other scholars who have examined the historical record dispute this claim. Perhaps the most telling evidence against the theory is Christopher Layne’s careful analysis of four crises in which rival democracies almost went to war with each other. When one looks at how the decision not to fight was reached in each case, the fact that both sides were democracies appears to have mattered little. There certainly is no evidence that the rival democracies had benign intentions toward each other. In fact, the outcome each time was largely determined by balance-of-power considerations.

Another reason to doubt democratic peace theory is the problem of backsliding. No democracy can be sure that another democracy will no longer be safe and secure. Prudence dictates that democracies prepare for that eventuality, which means striving to have as much power as possible just in case a friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood bully. But even if one rejects these criticisms and embraces democratic peace theory, it is still unlikely that all the great powers, in the system will become democratic and stay that way over the long term. It would only take a non-democratic China or Russia to keep power politics in play, and both of those states are likely to be non-democratic for at least part of the twenty-first century.

Social constructivists provide another perspective on how to create a world of states with benign intentions that are readily recognizable by other states. They maintain that the way states behave toward each other is not a function of how the material world is structured—as realists argue—but instead is largely determined by how individuals think and talk about international politics. This perspective is nicely captured by Alexander Wendt’s famous claim that "anarchy is what states make of it." Discourse, in short, is the motor that drives international politics. But unfortunately, say social constructivists, realism has been the dominant discourse for at least the past seven centuries, and realism tells states to distrust other states and to take advantage of them whenever possible. What is needed to create a more peaceful world is a replacement discourse that emphasizes trust and cooperation among states, rather than suspicion and hostility.

One reason to doubt this perspective is the simple fact that realism has dominated the international relations discourse for the past seven centuries or more. Such remarkable staying power over a lengthy period that has seen profound change in almost every other aspect of daily life strongly suggests that the basic structure of the international system—which has remained anarchic over that entire period—largely determines how states think and act toward each other. But even if we reject my materialist interpretation, what is going to cause the reigning discourse about world politics to change? What is the causal mechanism that will delegitimize realism after seven hundred years and put a better substitute in its place? What determines whether the replacement discourse will be benign or malign? What guarantee is there that realism will not rise from the dead and once again become the hegemonic discourse? The social constructivists provide no answers to these important questions, which makes it hard to believe that a marked change in our discourse about international politics is in the offing.

Social constructivists sometimes argue that the end of the Cold War represents a significant triumph for their perspective and is evidence of a more promising future. In particular, they maintain that in the 1980s a group of influential and dovish Western intellectuals convinced Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to eschew realist thinking and instead work to foster peaceful relations with the United States and his neighbors in Europe. The result was Soviet
withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, a Soviet Union with an enlightened foreign policy, and fundamental change in the norms that underpin great-power politics.

Although Gorbachev surely played the key role in ending the Cold War, there are good reasons to doubt that his actions fundamentally transformed international politics. As discussed in Chapter 6, his decision to liquidate the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe can be explained by realism. By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the Soviet Union was losing the Cold War and that it had little hope of catching up with the United States, which was in the midst of a massive arms buildup. In particular, the Soviet Union was suffering an economic and political crisis at home that made the costs of empire prohibitive and created powerful incentives to cooperate with the West to gain access to its technology.

Many empires collapsed and many states broke apart before 1989, and many of them sought to give dire necessity the appearance of virtue. But the basic nature of international politics remained unchanged. That pattern certainly appears to be holding up in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consider that Gorbachev has been out of office and without much influence in Russia since the early 1990s, and there is little evidence that his “new thinking” about international politics carries much weight inside Russia today. In fact, contemporary Russian leaders view the world largely in terms of power politics, as discussed below. Moreover, Western leaders, as well as Russia’s neighbors in eastern Europe, continue to fear that a resurgent Russia might be an expansionist state, which explains in part why NATO expanded eastward. In sum, it is not true that the collapse of the Soviet Union was unprecedented, that it violated realist conceptions, or that it is a harbinger of a new, post-realist international system.

**Survival in the Global Commons**

Realist thinking about survival gets challenged in two ways. Proponents of globalization often argue that states today are concerned more with achieving prosperity than with worrying about their survival. Getting rich is the main goal of post-industrial states, maybe even the all-consuming goal. The basic logic here is that if all the great powers are prospering, none has any incentive to start a war, because conflict in today’s interdependent world economy would redound to every state’s disadvantage. Why torpedo a system that is making everyone rich? If war makes no sense, survival becomes a much less salient concern than realists would have you believe, and states can concentrate instead on accumulating wealth.

There are problems with this perspective, too. In particular, there is always the possibility that a serious economic crisis in some important region, or in the world at large, will undermine the prosperity that this theory needs to work. For example, it is widely believed that Asia’s "economic miracle” worked to dampen security competition in that region before 1997, but that the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia helped foster a "new geopolitics.” It is also worth noting that although the United States led a successful effort to contain that financial crisis, it was a close call, and there is no guarantee that the next crisis will not spread across the globe. But even in the absence of a major economic crisis, one or more states might not prosper; such a state would have little to lose economically, and maybe even something to gain, by starting a war. A key reason that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 was that Kuwait was exceeding its oil production quotas (set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC) and driving down Iraq’s oil profits, which the Iraqi economy could ill-afford.

There are two other reasons to doubt the claim that economic interdependence makes great-power war unlikely. States usually go to war against a single rival, and they aim to win a quick and decisive victory. Also, they invariably seek to discourage other states from joining with the other side in the fight. But a war against one or even two opponents is unlikely to do much
damage to a state’s economy, because typically only a tiny percentage of a state’s wealth is tied up in economic intercourse with any other state. It is even possible, as discussed in Chapter 5, that conquest will produce significant economic benefits.

Finally, an important historical case contradicts this perspective. As noted above, there was probably about as much economic interdependence in Europe between 1900 and 1914 as there is today. Those were also prosperous years for the European great powers. Yet World War I broke out in 1914. Thus a highly interdependent world economy does not make great-power war more or less likely. Great powers must be forever vigilant and never subordinate survival to any other goal, including prosperity.

Another challenge to the realist perspective on survival emphasizes that the dangers states face today come not from the traditional kind of military threats that realists worry about, but instead from non-traditional threats such as AIDS, environmental degradation, unbounded population growth, and global warming. Problems of this magnitude, so the argument goes, can be solved only by the collective action of all the major states in the system. The selfish behavior associated with realism, on the other hand, will undermine efforts to neutralize these threats. States surely will recognize this fact and cooperate to find workable solutions.

This perspective raises two problems. Although these dangers are a cause for concern, there is little evidence that any of them is serious enough to threaten the survival of a great power. The gravity of these threats may change over time, but for now they are at most second-order problems. Furthermore, if any of these threats becomes deadly serious, it is not clear that the great powers would respond by acting collectively. For example, there may be cases where the relevant states cooperate to deal with a particular environmental problem, but an impressive literature discusses how such problems might also lead to inter-state war.

In sum, claims that the end of the Cold War ushered in sweeping changes in the structure of the international system are ultimately unpersuasive. On the contrary, international anarchy remains firmly intact, which means that there should not have been any significant changes in great-power behavior during the past decade.

**Great-Power Behavior in the 1990s**

The optimists' contention that international politics has undergone a great transformation applies mainly to relations among the great powers, who are no longer supposed to engage in security competition and fight wars with each other, or with minor powers in their region. Therefore, Europe and Northeast Asia, the areas that feature clusters of great powers, should be zones of peace, or what Karl Deutsch famously calls "pluralistic security communities." Optimists do not argue, however, that the threat of armed conflict has been eliminated from regions without great powers, such as 1) the South Asian subcontinent, where India and Pakistan are bitter enemies armed with nuclear weapons and caught up in a raging dispute over Kashmir; 2) the Persian Gulf, where Iraq and Iran are bent on acquiring nuclear weapons and show no signs of becoming status quo powers; or 3) Africa, where seven different states are fighting a war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that some are calling "Africa's first world war." Nor do optimists claim that great powers no longer fight wars with states in these troubled regions; thus, the American-led war against Iraq in early 1991 is not evidence against their position. In short, great powers are not yet out of the war business altogether, only in Europe and Northeast Asia.

There is no question that security competition among the great powers in Europe and Northeast Asia has been subdued during the 1990s, and with the possible exception of the 1996 dispute between China and the United States over Taiwan, there has been no hint of war between any of the great powers. Periods of relative peacefulness like this one, however, are not unprecedented in history. For example, there was little open conflict among the great powers in Europe from 1816 through 1852, or from 1871 through 1913. But this did not mean
then, and it does not mean now, that the great powers stopped thinking and behaving according to realist logic. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the major states in Europe and Northeast Asia still fear each other and continue to worry about how much relative power they control. Moreover, sitting below the surface in both regions is significant potential for intense security competition and possibly even war among the leading states.

Security Competition in Northeast Asia

In the large literature on security issues in Northeast Asia after the Cold War, almost every author recognizes that power politics is alive and well in the region, and that there are good reasons to worry about armed conflict involving the great powers.31 The American experience in the region since 1991 provides considerable evidence to support this pessimistic perspective. The United States came close to fighting a war against North Korea in June 1994 to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.32 War still might break out between North and South Korea, in which case the United States would automatically become involved, since it has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea to help counter a North Korean invasion. If such a war happened, American and South Korean forces would probably trounce the invading North Korean army, creating an opportunity for them to strike north of the 38th parallel and unify the two Koreas.33 This is what happened in 1950, prompting China, which shares a border with North Korea, to feel threatened and go to war against the United States. This could plausibly happen again if there is a second Korean war.

One might argue that the Korean problem is likely to go away soon, because relations are improving between the two Koreas, and there is actually a reasonable chance they will reunify in the decade ahead. Although future relations between North and South Korea are difficult to predict, both sides are still poised to fight a major war along the border separating them, which remains the most heavily armed strip of territory in the world. Moreover, there is hardly any evidence—at least at this point—that North Korea intends to surrender its independence and become part of a unified Korea. But even if reunification happens, there is no reason to think that it will enhance stability in Northeast Asia, because it will surely create pressures to remove American troops from Korea and will also revive competition among China, Japan, and Russia for influence in Korea.

Taiwan is another dangerous place where China and the United States could end up in a shooting war.34 Taiwan appears determined to maintain its de facto independence from China, and possibly to gain de jure independence, while China seems equally determined to reincorporate Taiwan into China. In fact, China has left little doubt that it would go to war to prevent Taiwanese independence. The United States, however, is committed to help Taiwan defend itself if it is attacked by China, a scenario which could plausibly lead to American troops fighting with Taiwan against China. After all, between July 1995 and March 1996, China fired live missiles into the waters around Taiwan and conducted military exercises off the coast of its Fujian province, just across the strait from Taiwan. China rattled its saber because it thought that Taiwan was taking major steps toward independence. The United States responded by sending two aircraft-carrier battle groups into the waters around Taiwan. Fortunately, the crisis ended peacefully.

The Taiwan problem, however, shows no signs of going away. China is deploying large numbers of missiles (ballistic and cruise) in Fujian province, and it is procuring aircraft and naval ships from Russia that might some day make it risky for the United States to deploy naval forces in the region during a crisis. Furthermore, China issued a document in February 2000 in which it said that it was prepared to go to war before it would allow "the Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely."35 Immediately thereafter, China and the United States exchanged thinly disguised nuclear threats.36 Taiwan, for its part, is shopping for new weapons to counter China’s
growing arsenal, while remaining determined to maintain its independence from China. The United States could therefore get pulled into war with China over both Korea and Taiwan.

More needs to be said about China, the principal great-power rival of the United States in Northeast Asia. Many Americans may think that realism is outmoded thinking, but this is not how China’s leaders view the world. According to one prominent Sinologist, China “may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.” This is not surprising when you consider China’s history over the past 150 years and its present threat environment. It shares borders, a number of which are still disputed, with thirteen different states. China fought over territory with India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979. All of these borders are still contested. China also claims ownership of Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and various island groups in the South China Sea, many of which it does not now control.

Furthermore, China tends to view both Japan and the United States as potential enemies. Chinese leaders maintain a deep-seated fear that Japan will become militaristic again, like it was before 1945. They also worry that the United States is bent on preventing China from becoming the dominant great power in Northeast Asia. "Many Chinese foreign- and defense-policy analysts," according to one scholar, "believe that U.S. alliances with Asian countries, particularly with Japan, pose a serious, long-term challenge, if not a threat, to China’s national security, national unification, and modernization."

It is worth noting that China’s relations with Japan and the United States have gotten worse—not better—since the end of the Cold War. All three states were aligned against the Soviet Union during the 1980s, and they had little cause to fear each other. Even Taiwan was not a major source of friction between China and the United States during the last decade of the Cold War. But times have changed for the worse since 1990, and now China fears Japan and the United States, who, in turn, worry about China. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Japan was confident that growing economic interdependence in Asia would allow it to maintain peaceful relations with China for the indefinite future. By the mid-1990s, however, Japanese views about China had "hardened considerably," and showed evidence of "an anxious realism about China’s strategic intentions."

China certainly has not been quick to employ military force over the past decade, although it has demonstrated more than once that it is willing to employ the sword to achieve particular political goals. Besides the missile firings and military maneuvers during the Taiwan crisis, Chinese military forces in early 1995 seized Mischief Reef, one of the disputed Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. These incidents notwithstanding, the Chinese military has limited power-projection capability, and therefore it cannot be too aggressive toward other states in the region. For example, China does not have the wherewithal to defeat and conquer Taiwan in a war. To rectify that problem, however, China has embarked on a major military modernization program. Indeed, China decided this year (2001) to increase its defense spending by 17.7 percent, which represents its largest expansion in real terms in the last two decades.

Another indicator of security competition in Northeast Asia is the region’s burgeoning arms race in missile technology. North Korea has been developing and testing ballistic missiles throughout the 1990s, and in August 1998 it fired a missile over Japan. In response to the growing North Korean missile threat, South Korea is making moves to increase the range of its own ballistic missiles, while Japan and the United States are moving to build a "theater missile defense" (TMD) system to protect Japan as well as American forces stationed in the region. The United States is also determined to build a "national missile defense" (NMD) system to protect the American homeland from nuclear attacks by small powers such as North Korea. China, however, has made it clear that if Japan and the United States deploy missile defenses of any kind, it will markedly increase its arsenal of ballistic missiles so that it can overwhelm them.

Independent of these developments, China is deploying large numbers of missiles opposite Taiwan, which, not surprisingly, is now trying to acquire defensive systems from the United States. But if the United States aids Taiwan, especially if it helps Taiwan develop its own TMD
system, China is sure to increase its arsenal of missiles, which would force the United States to upgrade its TMD system in the region, which would force China to build more missiles, and so on. How all this missile-building will play out over time is difficult to predict, but the key point is that an arms race centered on ballistic missiles is already underway in Asia and shows few signs of abating.

Finally, the fact that the United States maintains one hundred thousand troops in Northeast Asia contradicts the claim that the region is “primed for peace.” If that were so, those U.S. forces would be unnecessary and they could be sent home and demobilized, saving the American taxpayer an appreciable sum of money. Instead, they are kept in place to help pacify a potentially volatile region.

Joseph Nye, one of the main architects of post-Cold War American policy in Northeast Asia and a scholar with a well-established reputation as a liberal international-relations theorist (not a realist), made this point in an important 1995 article in *Foreign Affairs.* "It has become fashionable," he notes, "to say that the world after the Cold War has moved beyond the age of power politics to the age of geoeconomics. Such cliches reflect narrow analysis. Politics and economics are connected. International economic systems rest upon international political order." He then makes the "pacifier" argument: "The U.S. presence [in Asia] is a force for stability, reducing the need for arms buildsups and deterring the rise of hegemonic forces." Not only do "forward-deployed forces in Asia ensure broad regional stability," they also "contribute to the tremendous political and economic advances made by the nations of the region." In short, "the United States is the critical variable in the East Asia security equation." 

**Security Competition in Europe**

Europe might appear to be a better place than Northeast Asia to make the optimists' case, but on close inspection the evidence shows that security competition and the threat of great-power war remain facts of life in Europe, too. Consider the series of wars that have been fought in the Balkans in the 1990s, and that the United States and its European allies have twice been directly involved in the fighting. American airpower was used against Serb ground forces in Bosnia during the summer of 1995, helping to end the fighting in that embattled country. In the spring of 1999, NATO went to war against Serbia over Kosovo. It was a minor conflict for sure, but the fact remains that in the years since the Cold War ended, the United States has fought a war in Europe, not in Northeast Asia.

The evolution of Russian foreign policy during the 1990s provides further evidence that realism still has a lot to say about inter-state relations in Europe. After the Soviet Union collapsed, it was widely believed that Russia's new leaders would follow in Mikhail Gorbachev's footsteps and eschew the selfish pursuit of power, because they recognized that it made Russia less, not more, secure. Instead, they would work with the United States and its NATO allies to create a peaceful order that reached across all of Europe.

But this is not what has happened. NATO's actions in the Balkans and its expansion eastward have angered and scared the Russians, who now view the world clearly through realist lenses and do not even pay lip service to the idea of working with the West to build what Gorbachev called "a common European home." Russia's hardheaded view of its external environment is reflected in "The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," a seminal policy document that Russian president Vladimir Putin signed on January 10, 2000. "The formation of international relations," it states, "is accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and violence remain substantial aspects of international relations."

Russia also made it clear in 1993 that it would initiate nuclear war if its territorial integrity was threatened, thus abandoning the Soviet Union's long-standing pledge not to be the first
state to use nuclear weapons in a war. Russia's military weakness, however, sharply limits what it can do outside of its borders to challenge the United States over issues such as NATO expansion and NATO policy in the Balkans. Nevertheless, Russia's actions in the breakaway republic of Chechnya make clear that it is willing to wage a brutal war if it thinks its vital interests are threatened.

More evidence that great-power war remains a serious threat in Europe arises from the fact that the United States maintains one hundred thousand troops in the region, and its leaders often emphasize the importance of keeping NATO intact. If Europe is "primed for peace," as many claim, NATO would surely be disbanded and American forces would be sent home. Instead, they are kept in place. In fact, NATO has moved eastward and incorporated the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into its ranks. Why? Because there is potential for dangerous security competition in Europe, and the United States is determined to keep the forces of trouble at bay. Otherwise why would it be spending tens of billions of dollars annually to maintain a large military presence in Europe?

There is considerable evidence that the pacifier argument is widely accepted among policymakers and scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, President Clinton told the West Point graduating class of 1997, "Some say we no longer need NATO because there is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in part because NATO is there." That same year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the U.S. Senate at her confirmation hearing, "We have an interest in European security, because we wish to avoid the instability that drew five million Americans across the Atlantic to fight in two world wars." It appears that many Europeans also believe in the pacifier argument. Between 1990 and 1994, Robert Art conducted more than one hundred interviews with European political-military elites. He found that most believed that "if the Americans removed their security blanket from Europe . . . the Western European states could well return to the destructive power politics that they had just spent the last forty-five years trying to banish from their part of the continent." Presumably that perspective is even more tightly held today, since the early 1990s was the heyday of optimism about the prospects for peace in Europe.

Finally, it is worth noting that Art, Michael Mandelbaum, and Stephen Van Evera, all prominent scholars who believe that Europe is primed for peace, favor keeping American troops there and maintaining a formidable NATO. Might it be that they are ultimately guided by pacifier logic, not their stated belief that great-power war is no longer a danger in Europe?

Structure and Peace in the 1990s

There is no question that the presence of U.S. troops in Europe and Northeast Asia has played an important role in moderating security competition and promoting stability over the past decade. But periods of relative peace in those regions cannot be explained simply by the presence or absence of American forces. After all, there were no U.S. troops in Europe during the nineteenth century; yet there were long periods of relative peace. Moreover, even if the United States had committed military forces to Europe in the late 1930s, there still would have been intense security competition among the great powers, and Nazi Germany might have started a major war anyway.

To understand why the great powers were so tame in the 1990s, it is necessary to consider the overall distribution of power in each area, which means determining how much power is controlled by each major state in the region, as well as by the United States. In essence, we need to know whether the system is bipolar or multipolar, and if it is multipolar, whether it is unbalanced by the presence of a potential hegemon. Bipolar systems, as we saw in Chapter 9, tend to be the most peaceful, whereas unbalanced multipolar systems are the most prone to conflict. Balanced multipolar systems fall somewhere in between.
Europe remains bipolar in the wake of the Cold War, with Russia and the United States as the region’s principal rivals. There are three particular aspects of Europe’s bipolarity that make it especially stable. First, both Russia and the United States are armed with nuclear weapons, which are a force for peace. Second, the United States behaves as an offshore balancer in Europe, acting primarily as a check on any local great power that tries to dominate the region. It has no hegemonic aspirations beyond the Western Hemisphere, which significantly reduces the threat it presents to the states of Europe. Third, Russia, which is a local great power that might have territorial ambitions, is too weak militarily to cause serious trouble outside of its own borders.58

Northeast Asia, on the other hand, is now a balanced multipolar system; China, Russia, and the United States are the relevant great powers, and none has the markings of a potential hegemon. Balanced multipolarity tends to be less stable than bipolarity, but the same three factors that enhanced the prospects for peace in bipolar Europe do likewise in multi-polar Northeast Asia. First, China, Russia, and the United States all have nuclear arsenals, which makes them less likely to initiate war with each other. Second, although the United States is clearly the most powerful actor in the region, it is an offshore balancer without territorial aspirations. Third, neither the Chinese nor the Russian military has much power-projection capability, making it difficult for them to behave aggressively toward other states in the area.

There are two possible objections to my description of how power is distributed in Europe and Northeast Asia. Some might argue that the post-Cold War world is unipolar, which is another way of saying that the United States is a global hegemon. If true, there would be hardly any security competition in Europe and Northeast Asia, because there would be no great powers in those areas—by definition—to challenge the mighty United States. This is certainly the state of affairs in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States is the only great power, and it is not involved in security competition with any of its neighbors. Canada and Mexico, for example, pose no military threat whatsoever to the United States. Nor does Cuba, which is a minor political irritant, not a serious threat to American security.

But the international system is not unipolar. Although the United States is a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, it is not a global hegemon. Certainly the United States is the preponderant economic and military power in the world, but there are two other great powers in the international system: China and Russia. Neither can match American military might, but both have nuclear arsenals, the capability to contest and probably thwart a U.S. invasion of their homeland, and limited power-projection capability. They are not Canada and Mexico.

Furthermore, hardly any evidence indicates that the United States is about to take a stab at establishing global hegemony. It certainly is determined to remain the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but given the difficulty of projecting power across large bodies of water, the United States is not going to use its military for offensive purposes in either Europe or Northeast Asia. Indeed, America’s allies worry mainly that U.S. troops will be sent home, not that they will be used for conquest. This lack of a hegemonic impulse outside the confines of the Western Hemisphere explains why no balancing coalition has formed against the United States since the Cold War ended.62

Others might argue that America’s allies from the Cold War—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan—should count as great powers, an accounting that would produce markedly different power distributions in Europe and Northeast Asia. There is little doubt that these states, especially Germany and Japan, have the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers (see Tables 10.1 and 10.2). They do not qualify for that ranking, however, because they depend in large part on the United States for their security; they are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers. In particular, Germany and Japan have no nuclear weapons of their own and instead rely on the American nuclear deterrent for protection.

In addition, America’s allies have little maneuver room in their foreign policy, because of the presence of U.S. troops on their territory. The United States continues to occupy Western
Europe and to dominate NATO decision-making, much the way it did during the Cold War, not only making war among its members unlikely, but also making it difficult for any of those states (especially Germany) to cause trouble with Russia. Finally, the United States continues to maintain a formidable military presence in Japan, making it difficult for that potentially powerful state to engage in serious security competition with China.

In sum, a good deal of evidence indicates that power politics has not been stamped out of Europe and Northeast Asia, and that there is potential for serious trouble involving the great powers. Nevertheless, both regions have been largely free of intense security competition and great-power war during the 1990s. The taproot of that stability is the particular distribution of power that has emerged in each area since the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. The question we must now ask is whether the structure of power in each of those regions is likely to remain intact over the next two decades.

Trouble Ahead

Predicting what the distribution of power will look like in Europe and Northeast Asia by 2020 involves two closely related tasks: 1) reckoning the power levels of the main actors located in each region, paying special attention to whether there is a potential hegemon among them; and 2) assessing the likelihood that the United States will remain militarily engaged in those regions, which depends largely on whether there is a potential hegemon among the local great powers that can be contained only with American help. It is difficult to predict the balance of power in a region, because it depends in good part on determining how fast each state's economy will grow, as well as its long-term political viability. Unfortunately, we do not have theories that can anticipate economic and political developments with high confidence. For example, it is hard to know how powerful the Chinese and Russian economies will be in 2020, or whether China will survive as a single political entity or break apart like the Soviet Union.

It is still possible, however, to make informed judgments about the architectures that are likely to emerge in Europe and Northeast Asia over the next twenty years. We can start with the conservative assumption that there will be no fundamental change in the relative wealth or political fortunes of the principal states in each region. In other words, the existing distribution of potential power remains essentially intact for the next two decades. Alternatively, we can assume significant change in state capabilities, focusing on the most weighty scenarios in each region, such as the complete collapse of Russian power or China's transformation into an economic superpower. The future of the American military presence in each region will depend on whether there is a potential hegemon.

I believe that the existing power structures in Europe and Northeast Asia are not sustainable through 2020. Two alternative futures loom on the horizon, both of which are likely to be less peaceful than the 1990s. If there is no significant change in the relative wealth or the political integrity of the key states located in each region, the United States is likely to bring its troops home, because they will not be needed to contain a potential hegemon. Removing American forces from either region, however, would change the structure of power in ways that would make conflict more likely than it is today. The structural change would be greater in Europe than in Northeast Asia, as would the likelihood of intensified security competition.

But if fundamental economic or political change occurs in either region and a potential hegemon emerges that the local powers cannot contain, U.S. troops are likely to remain in place or come back to the region to balance against that threat. Should that happen, an intense security competition would likely ensue between the potential hegemon and its rivals, including the United States. In short, either the United States will leave Europe or Northeast Asia because it does not have to contain an emerging peer competitor, in which case the region would become less stable, or the United States will stay engaged to contain a formidable rival in what is likely to be a dangerous situation. Either way, relations between the great powers are likely to
become less peaceful than they were during the 1990s. Before analyzing future power structures in Europe and Northeast Asia, it is necessary to look more closely at the claim that only the presence of a potential hegemon can keep the United States militarily engaged in those regions. A widely touted alternative perspective claims that American troops will stay put in the absence of a potential hegemon, because peace in those strategically important areas is a vital U.S. interest, and it would be difficult to achieve without the American pacifier. This claim needs to be examined.

The Future of the American Pacifier

The central aim of American foreign policy, as emphasized in Chapter 5, is to be the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and have no rival hegemon in either Europe or Northeast Asia. The United States does not want a peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers remain firmly committed to that goal. Consider the following excerpt from an important Pentagon planning document that was leaked to the press in 1992: "Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival . . . that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. . . . Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor."64

In pursuit of this goal, the United States has historically behaved as an offshore balancer in Europe and Northeast Asia. As pointed out in Chapter 7, it has committed troops to those areas only when there was a potential hegemon in the neighborhood that the local great powers could not contain by themselves. In effect, the United States has traditionally pursued a buck-passing strategy when faced with a potential peer competitor. Therefore, the future of the U.S. military commitments to Europe and Northeast Asia hinge on whether there is a potential hegemon in either of those regions that can be contained only with American help. If not, the one hundred thousand U.S. troops in each region would likely leave in the near future. As discussed below, no great power is likely to be in a position to overrun either Europe or Northeast Asia anytime soon, with the possible exception of China. Therefore, the United States will probably bring its troops home in the first decade or so of the new century.65

America the Peacekeeper

Nevertheless, a different rationale has emerged for maintaining a robust American military presence in those regions. The United States, so the argument goes, has a deep-seated interest in maintaining peace in Europe and Northeast Asia, and bringing its troops home would probably lead to instability, and maybe even great-power war.66 Peace in these regions is said to be of vital importance to the United States for two reasons. For one thing, American economic prosperity would be undermined by a major war in either area. Given the high levels of economic interdependence among the world's wealthiest powers, a great-power war would not only badly damage the economies of the warring states, it would also seriously hurt the American economy, even if the United States managed to stay out of the fighting.

Moreover, the United States invariably gets dragged into distant great-power wars, which means it is an illusion for Americans to think that they can sit out a big war in either Europe or Northeast Asia. It therefore makes sense for the United States to maintain forces in those regions and preserve the peace, so that large numbers of Americans do not die in a future war. Presumably this perspective leads to an open-ended commitment of U.S. troops across both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

There is little doubt that peace in Europe and Northeast Asia is a desirable goal for the United States. The key issue, however, is whether peace is important enough to justify putting U.S. troops in harm's way, which is the risk the United States runs if it stations troops in those regions. In fact, peace in these two wealthy regions is not a vital American interest. The
rationale for this alternative perspective is unconvincing and it receives little support from the historical record.

Consider the claim that a war in Europe or Northeast Asia would undermine American prosperity. It is based on assertion, not analysis. Indeed, the only study I know of on the subject contradicts that claim. It concludes that "the primary effect of overseas wars on the economies of neutral countries is to redistribute wealth from belligerents to non-combatants, enriching neutrals rather than impoverishing them."67 In essence, the United States would probably become more prosperous in the event of an Asian or a European war, and it would probably also gain relative power over the warring great powers. This is what happened to the United States when it was neutral in World War I: after some initial problems, the American economy flourished, while the economies of the European great powers were badly damaged.68 There is little reason to think that a major war in Europe or Northeast Asia today would seriously damage the American economy, as it is "roughly as vulnerable to a major great power war in Asia as it was to World War I, but it is only half as vulnerable today to disruptions in Europe as it was early in the 20th Century."69

But even if this analysis is wrong and a great-power war in Europe or Northeast Asia would make Americans less prosperous, the United States is still unlikely to fight a major war just to ensure continued economic prosperity. Two prominent cases in recent times support this point. The United States did not use, or even seriously consider using, military force against any of the members of OPEC during the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, even though OPEC's actions at the time undermined American prosperity.70 Furthermore, in the fall of 1990, the administration of President George H. W. Bush briefly tried to justify the impending Persian Gulf War on the grounds that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had to be reversed because it threatened American jobs. This argument was heavily criticized and quickly abandoned.71 If the United States was unwilling to fight a war against weak oil-producing states for the sake of economic prosperity, it is hard to imagine it engaging in a great-power war for the same purpose.

The claim that the United States invariably gets drawn into great-power wars in Europe and Northeast Asia is also not persuasive. Both the United Kingdom and the United States are offshore balancers who get pulled into great-power conflicts only when there is a potential hegemon in the region that the local great powers cannot contain by themselves. For example, both the United Kingdom and the United States were content to sit out the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), because neither was a hegemonic war. Moreover, the United States would not have entered World War I or World War II if the European great powers had been able to contain Germany by themselves. But in early 1917, and again in the summer of 1940, Germany threatened to overrun Europe, forcing the United States to accept a continental commitment.

One might counter that, if the United States stays put in Europe and Northeast Asia, there would be no great-power war and therefore no danger that Americans might have to suffer the horrible costs of war. But there are two related problems with this line of argument. Although an American military presence would probably make war less likely, there is no guarantee that a great-power conflict would not break out. For example, if the U.S. military stays put in Northeast Asia, it could plausibly end up in a war with China over Taiwan. Furthermore, if a great-power war did occur, the United States would surely be involved from the start, which does not make good strategic sense. It would be best for the United States either not to become involved in the fighting or, if it had to join the war, to do so later rather than earlier. That way the United States would pay a much smaller price than would the states that fought from start to finish, and it would be well-positioned at the war's end to win the peace and shape the postwar world to its advantage.

Putting these different rationales aside, what does the historical record tell us about American willingness to play the role of peacemaker or peacekeeper in Europe and Northeast Asia? As we saw in Chapter 7, hardly any evidence before 1990 shows that the United States is
willing to commit troops to those regions to maintain peace. American armies were sent there to
prevent the rise of peer competitors, not to maintain peace. One might concede this history but
argue that the more relevant evidence is what happened during the 1990s, when American
troops remained in Europe and Northeast Asia even though no great power threatened to
dominate either region.

The 1990s: Anomaly or Precedent?

This is all true, of course, and what has happened so far does appear to contradict the
predictions of offensive realism. A closer look at the situation, however, reveals that too little
time has passed since the Cold War ended to make a judgment about whether U.S. forces will
stay put in Europe and Northeast Asia in the absence of the Soviet Union or an equivalent
great-power threat. The Soviet Union broke apart at the end of 1991, only ten years ago, and
the last Russian troops were removed from the former East Germany in 1994, a mere seven
years ago. Given the suddenness of the Soviet collapse, as well as its profound effect on the
balance of power in Europe and Northeast Asia, there was no question that the United States
would need time to figure out what the new architectures in each region meant for American
interests. To give some historical perspective on this matter, remember that although World War
I ended in 1918, U.S. troops were not completely withdrawn from Europe until 1923, and British
troops remained on the continent until 1930 (twelve years after the war ended).

Simple inertia is also an important factor in delaying the American withdrawal. The United
States has deployed large-scale military forces in Europe since 1943, when it invaded Italy
during World War II, and in Northeast Asia since 1945, when it occupied Japan at the end of
World War II. Moreover, both NATO and the American alliance structure in Northeast Asia are
institutions with deep roots that helped win a spectacular victory in the Cold War. The United
States would not walk away from them overnight. Furthermore, maintaining forces in Europe
and Northeast Asia since the 1990s has been relatively cheap and painless for the United
States. Not only has the American economy flourished during that period, generating large
budget surpluses in the process, but China and Russia have been easy to contain, because
they are much weaker than the United States.

This matter of a lag time aside, there is considerable evidence that the United States and its
allies from the Cold War are "drifting apart." This trend is most apparent in Europe, where
NATO's 1999 war against Serbia and its messy aftermath have damaged transatlantic relations
and prompted the European Union to begin building a military force of its own that can operate
independently of NATO—which means independently of the United States. The United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy are slowly but inexorably realizing that they want to
provide for their own security and control their own destiny. They are less willing to take orders
from the United States than they were during the Cold War. Japan, too, is showing signs of
independent behavior. Moreover, the American commitment to defend Europe and Northeast
Asia shows signs of weakening. Public opinion polls and congressional sentiment seem to
indicate that the United States is at best a "reluctant sheriff" on the world stage, and that over
time America's military role in those two strategically important areas is likely to diminish, not
increase.

Given that the United States is widely recognized to be a pacifying force in Europe and
Northeast Asia, one might wonder why its allies would assert their independence from the
United States, a move that is almost certain to cause transatlantic friction, if not a divorce. Some
might say that this is evidence that America's former allies are balancing against the mighty
United States. But that response is not convincing, because the United States has no appetite
for conquest and domination outside of the Western Hemisphere; offshore balancers do not
provoke balancing coalitions against themselves. Indeed, their main mission is to balance
against dangerous rivals.
No, America’s Cold War allies have started to act less like dependents of the United States and more like sovereign states because they fear that the offshore balancer that has protected them for so long might prove to be unreliable in a future crisis. The reliability of the United States was not a serious problem during the Cold War, because the Soviet threat provided a powerful incentive for the United States to protect its allies, who were too weak to defend themselves against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. Without that galvanizing threat, however, America has begun to look like a less dependable ally to states such as Germany and Japan, which are capable of protecting themselves from any threat in their own region.

One source of concern among America’s allies in Europe and Northeast Asia is the widespread belief that it will inevitably draw down its forces in those regions; this belief raises doubts about the seriousness of the U.S. commitment, as well as the ability of the United States to act in a crisis to defend its allies. The United States is also sure to pursue policies that will raise doubts about whether it is a wise and reliable ally, if only because U.S. interests are not identical to those of its allies. For example, President Clinton, hoping to improve Sino-American relations, visited China for nine days in 1998 without stopping in Japan. This trip’s itinerary was seen by Japanese leaders as evidence that their alliance with the United States was weakening. In Europe, the ongoing Kosovo crisis has raised doubts about American leadership. Moreover, the United States and its European allies have conflicting views about Middle East policy, about employing NATO forces outside of Europe, and especially about developing a national missile defense. Over time, differences of this sort are likely to cause America’s allies to provide for their own security, rather than rely on the United States for protection. The international system, as emphasized in Chapter 2, is a self-help world.

In sum, the brief history of the 1990s is not a good indicator of what the future holds for American military involvement in Europe and Northeast Asia. That issue will be resolved in the early years of the twenty-first century, and the determining factor will be whether there is a potential hegemon in either region that the United States must help contain. Only the threat of a peer competitor is likely to provide sufficient incentive for the United States to risk involvement in a distant great-power war. The United States is an offshore balancer, not the world’s sheriff.

**Structure and Conflict in Tomorrow’s Europe**

Five European states now have sufficient wealth and population to be a great power: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Furthermore, Germany has the earmarking of a potential hegemon. Among European states, it is clearly the wealthiest, has the largest population save for Russia, and has the most powerful army in the region (see Table 10.2). Nevertheless, Germany is not a great power today, much less a potential hegemon, because it has no nuclear weapons of its own and because it is heavily dependent on the United States for its security. But if American troops were pulled out of Europe and Germany became responsible for its own defense, it would probably acquire its own nuclear arsenal and increase the size of its army, transforming itself into a potential hegemon.

To illustrate Germany’s potential military might, consider the population and wealth differentials between Germany and Russia during the twentieth century. Although Russia has always enjoyed a significant population advantage over Germany, its present advantage is smaller than at any other time in the past hundred years. For example, Russia had approximately 2.6 times as many people as Germany in 1913 (175 million vs. 67 million), one year before World War I broke out, and twice as many people in 1940 (170 million vs. 85 million), one year before Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This population disadvantage notwithstanding, Germany was a potential hegemon in both of those years. In 1987, a representative year of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had roughly 4.7 times as many people as West Germany (285 million vs. 61 million). Russia today, however, has only about 1.8 times as many people as Germany (147 million vs. 82 million).
Despite its smaller population, Germany was a potential hegemon in Europe from 1903 to 1918 and from 1939 to 1945, primarily because it had a marked advantage in wealth over Russia. For example, Germany enjoyed roughly a 3.6:1 advantage in industrial might over Russia in 1913, and an approximately 1.3:1 advantage over the Soviet Union in 1940. Today, Germany has a startling 6.6:1 advantage in wealth over Russia. Thus, Germany now has a significant advantage in latent military power over Russia, much like it had in the early twentieth century, when it was the dominant military power in Europe.

Regarding actual military might, the German army is superior to the Russian army. The size of Germany’s standing army is 221,100 soldiers, and it can be quickly augmented by 295,400 reserves, thus creating a highly effective fighting force of more than half a million soldiers. Russia has about 348,000 soldiers in its standing army, and although it has a large pool of reserves, they are poorly trained and Russia would have great difficulty mobilizing any of them quickly and efficiently in a crisis. Thus, those reserves contribute little to Russia’s fighting power, and Germany therefore has a somewhat larger army than Russia. In terms of quality, the German army is well-trained and well-led, whereas the Russian army is neither. Only on the nuclear front does Russia dominate, but Germany has the wherewithal to rectify this asymmetry if it decides to acquire its own nuclear deterrent.

Although Germany is likely to become a potential hegemon if it has to provide for its own security, the United States is still likely to pull its forces out of Europe. Despite Germany’s significant military potential, the other European powers should be able to keep it from dominating Europe without help from the United States. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Russia together have about three times as many people as Germany, and their combined wealth is roughly three times greater than Germany’s. Plus, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia have nuclear weapons, which should be a strong deterrent against an expansionist Germany, even if it has its own nuclear weapons.

Yet Europe may not remain peaceful without the American pacifier. Indeed, there is likely to be intense security competition among the great powers, with the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves, because upon American withdrawal Europe would go from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multi-polar. And as we saw above, Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of trouble in the new Europe.

To illustrate the kind of trouble that might lie ahead, consider how particular German measures aimed at enhancing its security might nevertheless lead to instability. As discussed above, Germany would likely move to acquire its own nuclear arsenal if the United States removed its security umbrella from over western Europe. Not only are nuclear weapons an excellent deterrent, a point widely recognized by Germany’s governing elites during the Cold War, but Germany would be surrounded by three nuclear-armed states—the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—leaving it vulnerable to nuclear coercion. During the proliferation process, however, Germany’s neighbors would probably contemplate using force to prevent it from going nuclear.

Furthermore, without the American military on its territory, Germany would probably increase the size of its army and it certainly would be more inclined to try to dominate central Europe. Why? Germany would fear Russian control of that critically important buffer zone between them, a situation that would directly threaten Germany. Of course, Russia would have the same fear about Germany, which would likely lead to a serious security competition between them for control of central Europe. France would undoubtedly view such behavior by Germany with alarm and take measures to protect itself from Germany. For example, France might increase its defense spending and establish closer relations with Russia. Germany would likely view these actions as hostile and respond with measures of its own.
So, the United States is likely to pull its troops back across the Atlantic Ocean in the years immediately ahead, if there is no significant change in the present distribution of potential power, even though that move is likely to intensify security competition in Europe and render it less peaceful.

Europe's future could turn out differently, however. The two most consequential scenarios involve Russia. In the first, Russia, not Germany, will become Europe's next potential hegemon. For that to happen, Russia, which already has a larger population than Germany, must also become the wealthier of the two states. Although it is difficult to predict the future of the Russian economy, it is hard to imagine Russia becoming wealthier than Germany in the next twenty years. But in the unlikely event that happens and Russia is once again a potential hegemon, the other European powers—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy—should be able to contain Russia without help from the United States. After all, Germany is now unified and wealthy, and Russia has only about half the population of the former Soviet Union, which makes it almost impossible for Russia to build a military machine as powerful as the Soviet army was in its heyday. Of course, a wealthy Russia would not be a paper tiger, it would simply not be so formidable that American troops would be needed to contain it.

In the other scenario, the Russian economy collapses, possibly causing severe political turmoil, and Russia is effectively removed from the ranks of the great powers. Thus it will be able to do little to help contain Germany. This alternative future is not likely, either, but should it come to pass, U.S. troops would surely remain in Europe to help the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Russia check German expansion. Both of these scenarios involve a potential hegemon (either Russia or Germany) in a multipolar Europe, a situation that is likely to result in dangerous security competition among the great powers.

**Structure and Conflict in Tomorrow’s Northeast Asia**

Three Northeast Asian states presently have sufficient population and wealth to be great powers: China, Japan, and Russia. But none is a potential hegemon. Japan is by far the wealthiest state in the region. Its gross national product (GNP) is about 3.5 times as large as China's and more than 12 times as large as Russia's (see Table 10.1). Nevertheless, Japan is not in a position to convert its substantial wealth into a decisive military advantage that could be used to threaten the rest of Northeast Asia. Although Japan has much greater wealth than do either China or Russia, it has a relatively small population, especially compared to China's. In fact, China's population is almost ten times larger than Japan's, and it appears that the gap between them will widen further over the next fifty years. Thus, it would be almost impossible for Japan to build an army that is more powerful than China's army. Japan could certainly build an army that is qualitatively superior to China's, but not so much better that it would offset the 10:1 advantage in numbers that China could maintain because of its huge population.

Japan would also face a serious power-projection problem if it tried to overrun Northeast Asia. It is an insular state that is physically separated from the Asian mainland by a substantial body of water. Thus, unless Japan is able to secure a foothold on the Asian continent—which is unlikely—it would have to invade the Asian mainland from the sea to conquer it. This was not a problem between 1895 and 1945, because China and Korea were so weak that Japan had little difficulty establishing and maintaining a large army on the continent. China and Korea are much more formidable adversaries today, and they would surely use their armies to oppose a Japanese invasion of the Asian mainland. Amphibious operations against territory controlled by China and Korea would be a daunting task. In short, if Japan shakes loose the United States and becomes a great power in the next decade or so, it is more likely to look like the United Kingdom in mid-nineteenth-century Europe than Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.

There is also little chance that Russia will become a potential hegemon in Northeast Asia by 2020. It is hard to imagine Russia building a more powerful economy than Japan's anytime
soon. But even if Russia experiences spectacular economic growth, it still has essentially the same population problem vis-a-vis China that Japan faces. Specifically, China has more than eight times as many people as Russia and the gap between them is likely to widen over time. Thus, not even a wealthy Russia is likely to be able to field an army more powerful than China’s. Russia’s problems are further compounded by the fact it has significant security concerns in Europe and on its southern borders, which limit the military resources it can devote to Northeast Asia.

China is the key to understanding the future distribution of power in Northeast Asia. It is clearly not a potential hegemon today, because it is not nearly as wealthy as Japan. But if China’s economy continues expanding over the next two decades at or near the rate it has been growing since the early 1980s, China will likely surpass Japan as the wealthiest state in Asia. Indeed, because of the vast size of China's population, it has the potential to become much wealthier than Japan, and even wealthier than the United States.

To illustrate China's potential, consider the following scenarios. Japan's per capita GNP is now more than 40 times greater than China's. If China modernizes to the point where it has about the same per capita GNP as South Korea does today, China would have a GNP of $10.66 trillion, substantially larger than Japan's $4.09 trillion economy (see Table 10.3). If China's per capita GNP grew to be just half of Japan's present per capita GNP, China would have a GNP of $20.04 trillion, which would make China almost five times as wealthy as Japan. Finally, if China had about the same per capita GNP as Japan, China would be ten times as wealthy as Japan, because China has almost ten times as many people as Japan.

Another way of illustrating how powerful China might become if its economy continues growing rapidly is to compare it with the United States. The GNP of the United States is $7.9 trillion. If China's per capita GNP equals Korea's, China's overall GNP would be almost $10.66 trillion, which is about 1.35 times the size of America's GNP. If China's per capita GNP is half of Japan's, China's overall GNP would then be roughly 2.5 times bigger than America's. For purposes of comparison, the Soviet Union was roughly one-half as wealthy as the United States during, most of the Cold War (see Table 3.5). China, in short, has the potential to be considerably more powerful than even the United States.

It is difficult to predict where the Chinese economy is headed in the twenty-first century and thus whether China will overtake Japan and become a potential hegemon in Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, the principal ingredients of military power in that region are likely to be distributed in one of two ways in the decades ahead.

First, if China's economy stops growing at a rapid pace and Japan remains the wealthiest state in Northeast Asia, neither would become a potential hegemon and the United States would likely bring its troops home. If that happened, Japan would almost surely establish itself as a great power, building its own nuclear deterrent and significantly increasing the size of its conventional forces. But there would still be balanced multipolarity in the region: Japan would replace the United States, and China and Russia would remain the region's other great powers. In short, an American exit would not change the basic structure of power in Northeast Asia, and presumably would not make war more or less likely than it is today.

Nevertheless, substituting Japan for the United States would increase the likelihood of instability in Northeast Asia. Whereas the United States has a robust nuclear deterrent that contributes to peace, Japan has no nuclear weapons of its own and would have to build its own nuclear arsenal. That proliferation process, however, would be fraught with dangers, especially because China, and maybe Russia, would be tempted to use force to prevent a nuclear Japan. In addition, the deep-seated fear of Japan in Asia that is a legacy of its behavior between 1931 and 1945 would surely be fanned if Japan acquired a nuclear deterrent, intensifying security competition in the region. Furthermore, as an offshore balancer, the United States has hardly any interest in conquering territory in Northeast Asia. As noted above, Japan would face profound limits on its ability to project power onto the Asian mainland as long as China remains
a great power. Still, Japan has territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands, with Korea over the Takeshima/Tokyo Islets, and with Russia over the Kurile Islands.
Finally, although China is militarily too weak to fight a major war with the mighty United States,
China is not likely to be as outgunned by Japan, which simply does not have the population nor
the wealth to fully replace America's military power.

The second possible distribution of power would result if China's economy continues
growing at a robust pace and it eventually becomes a potential hegemon. The United States
would either remain in Northeast Asia or return someday to make sure that China does not
become a peer competitor. Japan and Russia together are unlikely to have the wherewithal to
contain China, even if India, South Korea, and Vietnam were to join the balancing coalition. Not
only would China be much wealthier than any of its Asian rivals in this scenario, but its huge
population advantage would allow it to build a far more powerful army than either Japan or
Russia could. China would also have the resources to acquire an impressive nuclear arsenal.
Northeast Asia would obviously be an unbalanced multipolar system if China threatened to
dominate the entire region; as such it would be a far more dangerous place than it is now.
China, like all previous potential hegemons, would be strongly inclined to become a real
hegemon, and all of its rivals, including the United States, would encircle China to try to keep it
from expanding. Engagement policies and the like would not dull China's appetite for power,
which would be considerable.

In sum, although the power structures that are, now in place in Europe and Northeast Asia
are benign, they are not sustainable over the next twenty years. The most likely scenario in
Europe is an American exit coupled with the emergence of Germany as the dominant state. In
effect, the region will probably move from its present bipolarity to unbalanced multi-polarity,
which will lead to more intense security competition among the European great powers. In
Northeast Asia, the power structure is likely to evolve in one of two ways: 1) If China does not
become a potential hegemon, the United States is likely to pull its troops out of the area,
causing Japan to become a formidable great power. The system, however, would remain
multipolar and balanced. Still, security competition would be somewhat more intense than it is
today because of problems associated with Japan's replacing the United States in the regional
lineup of great powers. 2) If China emerges as a potential hegemon, Northeast Asia's
multipolarity would become unbalanced and the United States would keep forces in the region
to contain China.

Conclusion

What are the implications of the preceding analysis for future American national security
policy? It is clear that the most dangerous scenario the United States might face in the early
twenty-first century is one in which China becomes a potential hegemon in Northeast Asia. Of
course, China's prospects of becoming a potential hegemon depend largely on whether its
economy continues modernizing at a rapid pace. If that happens, and China becomes not only a
leading producer of cutting-edge technologies, but the world's wealthiest great power, it would
almost certainly use its wealth to build a mighty military machine. Moreover, for sound strategic
reasons, it would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the Western
Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. So we would expect China to attempt to dominate
Japan and Korea, as well as other regional actors, by building military forces that are so
powerful that those other states would not dare challenge it. We would also expect China to
develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States. Just as the
United States made it clear to distant great powers that they were not allowed to meddle in the
Western Hemisphere, China will make it clear that American interference in Asia is
unacceptable.
What makes a future Chinese threat so worrisome is that it might be far more powerful and dangerous than any of the potential hegemons that the United States confronted in the twentieth century. Neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union had nearly as much latent power as the United States had during their confrontations (see Tables 3.5 and 6.2). But if China were to become a giant Hong Kong, it would probably have somewhere on the order of four times as much latent power as the United States does, allowing China to gain a decisive military advantage over the United States in Northeast Asia. In that circumstance, it is hard to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a peer competitor. Moreover, China would likely be a more formidable superpower than the United States in the ensuing global competition between them.

This analysis suggests that the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, however, the United States has pursued a strategy intended to have the opposite effect. The United States has been committed to "engaging" China, not "containing" it. Engagement is predicated on the liberal belief that if China could be made both democratic and prosperous, it would become a status quo power and not engage in security competition with the United States. As a result, American policy has sought to integrate China into the world economy and facilitate its rapid economic development, so that it becomes wealthy and, one would hope, content with its present position in the international system.

This U.S. policy on China is misguided. A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony. This is not because a rich China would have wicked motives, but because the best way for any state to maximize its prospects for survival is to be the hegemon in its region of the world. Although it is certainly in China's interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen.

China is still far away from the point where it has enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony. So it is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China. In fact, the structural imperatives of the international system, which are powerful, will probably force the United States to abandon its policy of constructive engagement in the near future. Indeed, there are signs that the new Bush administration has taken the first steps in this direction.

Of course, states occasionally ignore the anarchic world in which they operate, choosing instead to pursue strategies that contradict balance-of-power logic. The United States is a good candidate for behaving in that way, because American political culture is deeply liberal and correspondingly hostile to realist ideas. It would be a grave mistake, however, for the United States to turn its back on the realist principles that have served it well since its founding.
Notes

CHAPTER ONE


3. The balance of power is a concept that has a variety of meanings. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 2; and Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" World Politics 5, No. 4 (July 1953), pp. 442-77. I use it to mean the actual distribution of military assets among the great powers in the system.


5. Nevertheless, the theory has relevance for smaller powers, although for some more than for others. Kenneth Waltz puts the point well when he writes, "A general theory of international politics . . . once written also applies to lesser states that interact insofar as their interactions are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system, whether by the relative indifference of the latter or by difficulties of communication and transportation." Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 73.


7. There is little disagreement among scholars about which states qualified as the great powers between 1792 and 1990. See Levy, War, chap. 2; and J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: Wiley, 1972), p. 23. I have accepted the conventional wisdom because it appears to be generally consistent with my definition of a great power, and to analyze each potential great power "on a case-by-case basis would be prohibitive in time and resources, and in the end it might make little difference." Levy, War, p. 26. Russia (the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991) is the only state that was a great power for the entire period. The United Kingdom and Germany (Prussia before 1870) were great powers from 1792 to 1945, and France was a great power from 1792 until it was defeated and occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940. Some scholars label the United Kingdom, France, and Germany as great powers after 1945 and classify the much more powerful Soviet Union and United States as superpowers. I do not find these labels useful. Although I sometimes refer to the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers, they were the great powers in the system during the Cold War, when the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (as well as China and Japan) lacked the military capability to qualify as great powers. Italy is treated as a great power from 1861 until 1943, when it collapsed in World War II. Austria-Hungary (Austria before 1867) was a great power from 1792 until it disintegrated in 1918. Japan is considered a great power from 1895 until 1945, and the United States is usually designated a great power from 1898 until 1990. Regarding the period from 1991 to 2000, China (which is treated as a great power from 1991 onward), Russia, and the United States are considered great powers for reasons discussed in Chapter 10.


14. Although NATO employed a defensive strategy vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War, Samuel Huntington argued instead for an offensive strategy in an article that generated considerable controversy within the security community. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983-84), pp. 32-56.


27. Although realists believe that the international system allows for little variation in the external conduct of great powers, they recognize that there are sometimes profound differences in how governments deal with their own people. For example, although the Soviet Union and the United States behaved similarly toward each other during the Cold War, there is no question that the leaders of each superpower treated their citizens in fundamentally different ways. Thus, one can rather easily distinguish between good and bad states when assessing internal conduct. Such distinctions, however, tell us relatively little about international politics.

28. Morgenthau is something of an exception regarding this second belief. Like other realists, he does not distinguish between good and bad states, and he clearly recognizes that external environment shapes state behavior. However, the desire for power, which he sees as the main driving force behind state behavior, is an internal characteristic of states.


30. Michael J. Smith notes in *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986) that Carr does not "explain why politics always involves power, an explanation vital to any attempt to channel the exercise of power along lines compatible with an ordered social existence. Is a lust for power basic to human nature—the view of Niebuhr and Morgenthau—-. . . [or] is it the result of a security dilemma?" (p. 93).

31. George P. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Smith writes, "Kennan nowhere offers a systematic explanation of his approach to international politics or of his political philosophy in general: he is a diplomat turned historian, not a theologian or a political theorist, and he is concerned neither to propound a doctrine of

32. Human nature realism lost much of its appeal in the early 1970s for a variety of reasons. The backlash against the Vietnam War surely contributed to its demise, since any theory that saw the pursuit of military power as inevitable was likely to be unpopular on university campuses by 1970. [Ironically, Morgenthau was an early and vocal critic of the Vietnam War. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Vietnam and the United States* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs, 1965); and "Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau," in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers, eds., *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Ham J. Morgenthau* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), pp. 382-84.] Furthermore, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the oil shock of 1973, and the growing power of multinational corporations (MNCs) led many to think that economic issues had become more important than security issues, and that realism, especially Morgenthau's brand, had little to say about questions of international political economy. Some even argued in the early 1970s that MNCs and other transnational forces were threatening the integrity of the state itself. "Sovereignty at bay" was a widely used phrase at the time. Finally, human nature realism was essentially a philosophical theory that was out of sync with the behavioral revolution that was overwhelming the study of international politics in the early 1970s. Morgenthau intensely disliked modern social science theories, but he was badly outnumbered in this war of ideas and his theory lost much of its legitimacy. For Morgenthau's views on social science, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). For a recent but rare example of human nature realism, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-71. Also see Bradley A. Thayer, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics," *International Security* 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 124-51.

33. See Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*; and Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*. Although Morgenthau is the most famous human nature realist, Reinhold Niebuhr was also a major intellectual force in this school of thought. See Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1932). Friedrich Meinecke made the case for human nature realism at considerable length well before Morgenthau began publishing his views on international politics in the mid-1940s. See Meinecke's *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), which was originally published in Germany in 1924 but was not published in English until 1957. Morgenthau, who was educated in Germany, was familiar with *Machiavellism*, according to his former student Kenneth W. Thompson. Correspondence with author, August 9, 1999. Also see Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), pp. 207-26.


35. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, p. 192. Despite his claim that "the desire to attain a maximum of power is universal" (*Politics among Nations*, p. 208), Morgenthau distinguishes between status quo and revisionist powers in his writings. *Politics among Nations*, pp. 40-44, 64-73. But there is an obvious problem here: if all states have a "limitless aspiration for power" (*Politics among Nations*, p. 208), how can there be status quo powers in the world? Moreover, although Morgenthau emphasizes that the drive for power is located in human nature, he also recognizes that the structure of the international system creates powerful incentives for states to pursue offense. He writes, for example, "Since ... all nations live in constant fear lest their rivals deprive them, at the first opportune moment, of their power position, all nations have a vital interest in anticipating such a development and doing unto the others what they do not want the others to do unto them" (*Politics among Nations*, p. 208). However, if all states have a vital interest in taking advantage of each other whenever the opportunity presents itself, how can
there be status quo powers in the system? Indeed, this incentive structure would seem to leave no room for satiated powers. Again, Morgenthau provides no explanation for this apparent contradiction. Arnold Wolfers notes this same problem in Morgenthau's work. See Wolfers's *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 84-86.


37. Structural theories emphasize that the configuration of the international system sharply constrains the behavior of the great powers and forces them to act in similar ways. Thus, we should expect to find common patterns of great-power behavior in anarchic systems. Nevertheless, anarchic systems themselves can be configured differently, depending on the number of great powers and how power is distributed among them. As discussed in subsequent chapters, those structural differences sometimes cause important variations in state behavior.

38. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126. Also see ibid., pp. 118, 127; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507, which builds directly on Waltz's claim that states are mainly concerned with preserving their share of world power.


41. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 8; and Waltz, "Origins of War."


44. Jervis has a more qualified view on this point than either Snyder or Van Evera. See Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp. 22-24; Van Evera, *Causes of War*, pp. 118, 191, 255.


46. Some defensive realists emphasize that great powers seek to maximize security, not relative power. "The ultimate concern of states," Waltz writes, "is not for power but for security." Waltz, "Origins of War," p. 40. There is no question that great powers maximize security, but that claim by itself is vague and provides little insight into actual state behavior. The important
question is, How do states maximize security? My answer: By maximizing their share of world power. Defensive realists' answer: By preserving the existing balance of power. Snyder puts the point well in Myths of Empire when he writes that both offensive and defensive realists "accept that security is normally the strongest motivation of states in international anarchy, but they have opposite views about the most effective way to achieve it" (pp. 11-12).


51. Quoted in Wight, Power Politics, p. 29.


54. See Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism."


57. Morgenthau, Scientific Man, p. 201.


63. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 79. For evidence that this kind of hypocrisy is not limited to Anglo-Saxons, see Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-66.


CHAPTER TWO


3. Terry Moe makes a helpful distinction between assumptions that are simply useful simplifications of reality (i.e., realistic in themselves but with unnecessary details omitted), and assumptions that are clearly contrary to reality (i.e., that directly violate well-established truths). See Moe, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, No. 1 (February 1979), pp. 215-43.


5. Although the focus in this study is on the state system, realist logic can be applied to other kinds of anarchic systems. After all, it is the absence of central authority, not any special characteristic of states, that causes them to compete for power. Markus Fischer, for example, applies the theory to Europe in the Middle Ages, before the state system emerged in 1648. See Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Confictual Practices," *International Organization* 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-66. The theory can also be used to explain the behavior of individuals. The most important work in this regard is Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1986). Also see Elijah Anderson, "The Code of the Streets," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1994, pp. 80-94; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47; and Robert J. Spitzer, *The Politics of Gun Control* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 6.


7. The claim that states might have benign intentions is simply a starting assumption. I argue subsequently that when you combine the theory's five assumptions, states are put in a position in which they are strongly disposed to having hostile intentions toward each other.

8. My theory ultimately argues that great powers behave offensively toward each other because that is the best way for them to guarantee "their security in an anarchic world. The assumption here, however, is that there are many reasons besides security for why a state might behave aggressively toward another state. In fact, it is uncertainty about whether those non-security causes of war are at play, or might come into play, that pushes great powers to worry about their survival and thus act offensively. Security concerns alone cannot cause great powers to act aggressively. The possibility that at least one state might be motivated by non-security calculations is a necessary condition for offensive realism, as well as for any other structural theory of international politics that predicts security competition. Schweller puts the point well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival, why would they feel threatened? Why would they engage in balancing behavior? In a hypothetical world that has
never experienced crime, the concept of security is meaningless." Schweller, "Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias," p. 91. Herbert Butterfield makes essentially the same point when he writes, "Wars would hardly be likely to occur if all men were Christian saints, competing with one another in nothing, perhaps, save self-renunciation." C. T. McIntire, ed., *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 73. Also see Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 2.


13. If one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic. Offensive realism, which assumes international anarchy, has little to say about politics under hierarchy. But as discussed later, it is highly unlikely that any state will become a global hegemon, although regional hegemony is feasible. Thus, realism is likely to provide important insights about world politics for the foreseeable future, save for what goes on inside in a region that is dominated by a hegemon.

14. Although great powers always have aggressive intentions, they are not always aggressors, mainly because sometimes they do not have the capability to behave aggressively. I use the term “aggressor” throughout this book to denote great powers that have the material wherewithal to act on their aggressive intentions.


16. The following hypothetical example illustrates this point. Assume that American policymakers were forced to choose between two different power balances in the Western Hemisphere. The first is the present distribution of power, whereby the United States is a hegemon that no state in the region would dare challenge militarily. In the second scenario, China replaces Canada and Germany takes the place of Mexico. Even though the United States would have a significant military advantage over both China and Germany, it is difficult to imagine any American strategist opting for this scenario over U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.


21. Waltz maintains that in Hans Morgenthau’s theory, states seek power as an end in itself; thus, they are concerned with absolute power, not relative power. See Waltz, "Origins of War," pp. 40-41; and Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 126-27. Although Morgenthau occasionally makes statements that appear to support Waltz’s charge, there is abundant evidence in Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973) that states are concerned mainly with the pursuit of relative power.


23. In short, the key issue for evaluating offensive realism is not whether a state is constantly trying to conquer other countries or going all out in terms of defense spending, but whether or not great powers routinely pass up promising opportunities to gain power over rivals.


27. Relatedly, some defensive realists interpret the security dilemma to say that the offensive measures a state takes to enhance its own security force rival states to respond in kind, leaving all states no better off than if they had done nothing, and possibly even worse off. See Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. Given this understanding of the security dilemma, hardly any security competition should ensue among rational states, because it would be fruitless, maybe even counterproductive, to try to gain advantage over rival powers. Indeed, it is difficult to see why states operating in a world where aggressive behavior equals self-defeating behavior would face a "security dilemma." It would seem to make good sense for all states to forsake war and live in peace. Of course, Herz did not describe the security dilemma this way when he introduced it in 1950. As noted, his original rendition of the concept is a synoptic statement of offensive realism.

28. Although threatened states sometimes balance efficiently against aggressors, they often do not, thereby creating opportunities for successful offense. This matter will be discussed at length in Chapters 8 and 9. Snyder appears to be aware of this problem, as he adds the important qualifier "at least in the long run" to his claim that "states typically form balancing alliances to resist aggressors." *Myths of Empire*, p. 11. Aggressors, however, will be tempted to win victory in the short term, hoping they can use their success to shape the long term to their advantage. Regarding the offense-defense balance, it is an amorphous concept that is especially difficult for scholars and policymakers to define and measure. See "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," *International Security* 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 179-206; Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219-38; Kier A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and


30. Although Snyder and Van Evera maintain that conquest rarely pays, both concede in subtle but important ways that aggression sometimes succeeds. Snyder, for example, distinguishes between expansion (successful offense) and overexpansion (unsuccessful offense), which is the behavior that he wants to explain. See, for example, his discussion of Japanese expansion between 1868 and 1945 in *Myths of Empire*, pp. 114-16. Van Evera allows for variation in the offense-defense balance, to include a few periods where conquest is feasible. See *Causes of War*, chap. 6. Of course, allowing for successful aggression contradicts their central claim that offense hardly ever succeeds.


32. In subsequent chapters, the power-projection problems associated with large bodies of water are taken into account when measuring the distribution of power (see Chapter 4). Those two factors are treated separately here, however, simply to highlight the profound influence that oceans have on the behavior of great powers.


34. See note 8 in this chapter.


40. Nikita Khrushchev makes a similar point about Stalin's policy toward Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek during World War II: "Despite his conflict with the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek was fighting against Japanese imperialism. Therefore, Stalin—and consequently the Soviet government—considered Chiang a progressive force. Japan was our number one enemy in the East, so it was in the interests of the Soviet Union to support Chiang. Of course, we supported him only insofar as we didn't want to see him defeated by the Japanese—in much the same way that Churchill, who had been our enemy since the first days of the Soviet Union, was sensible enough to support us in the war against Hitler." Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 237-38.

41. See Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 5, 266-68.


43. For an overview of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry, see Jack S. Levy, "The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1689," in William R. Thompson, ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 172-200; and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Alien Lane, 1976), chap. 2. This example has direct bearing on the earlier discussion of relative versus absolute power. Specifically, without the Navigation Act, both England and Holland probably would have made greater absolute gains, because their economies would have benefited from open trade. England, however, probably would not have gained much of a relative advantage over Holland. With the Navigation Act, England gained a significant relative advantage over Holland, but both sides suffered in terms of absolute gains. The bottom line is that relative power considerations drive great-power behavior.


45. Bradley Thayer examined whether the victorious powers were able to create and maintain stable security orders in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II, or whether they competed among themselves for power, as realism would predict. In particular, he looked at the workings of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, which were purportedly designed to limit, if not eliminate, realist behavior by the great powers. Thayer concludes that the rhetoric of the triumphant powers notwithstanding, they remained firmly committed to gaining power at each other's expense. See Bradley A. Thayer, "Creating Stability in New World Orders," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, August 1996. Also see Korina Kagan, "The Myth of the European Concert," Security Studies 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 1-57. She concludes that the Concert of Europe "was a weak and ineffective institution that was largely irrelevant to great power behavior" (p. 3).


47. For a discussion of American efforts to undermine Soviet control of Eastern Europe, see Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000); Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin's, 1997); and Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the
48. For a synoptic discussion of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the late 1980s that
cites most of the key sources on the subject, see Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlfirth,

49. The editors of a major book on the Treaty of Versailles write, "The resulting reappraisal,
as documented in this book, constitutes a new synthesis of peace conference scholarship. The
findings call attention to divergent peace aims within the American and Allied camps and
underscore the degree to which the negotiators themselves considered the Versailles Treaty a

50. This paragraph draws heavily on Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace; and Marc

51. The failure of American policymakers during the early Cold War to understand where the
security competition in Europe was leading is summarized by Trachtenberg, who asks the
rhetorical question, "Had anyone predicted that a system of this sort would emerge, and that it
would provide the basis for a very durable peace?" His answer: "The predictions that were
made pointed as a rule in the opposite direction: that Germany could not be kept down forever;
that the Federal Republic would ultimately . . . want nuclear forces of her own; that U.S. troops
could not be expected to remain in ... Europe. . . . Yet all these predictions — every single one
— turned out to be wrong." Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 23 1-32. Also see
Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp. vii-viii.

52. For more discussion of the pitfalls of collective security, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The
False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994-95),
pp. 26-37.


54. For evidence of relative gains considerations thwarting cooperation among states, see
Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon,
1994), chap. 3.


56. See Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107. See also the works cited in
note 59 in this chapter.


59. For information on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 and the ensuing
60. Waltz maintains that structural theories can explain international outcomes—i.e., whether war is more likely in bipolar or multipolar systems—but that they cannot explain the foreign policy behavior of particular states. A separate theory of foreign policy, he argues, is needed for that task. See Theory of International Politics, pp. 71-72, 12.1-23. Colin Elman challenges Waltz on this point, arguing that there is no logical reason why systemic theories cannot be used as a theory of foreign policy. The key issue, as Elman notes, is whether the particular structural theory helps us understand the foreign policy decisions that states make. I will attempt to show that offensive realism can be used to explain both the foreign policy of individual states and international outcomes. See Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?"; Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy"; and Colin Elman, "Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz," in Security Studies 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-61.

CHAPTER FOUR


3. This is not to deny that the United States and its allies maintained formidable ground forces in Europe during most of the Cold War, which is why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood a good chance of thwarting a Soviet conventional attack. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; and Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984—85), pp. 47-88. Nevertheless, unlike the Soviet army, the U.S. army was never in a position to overrun Europe. In fact, it was probably only the third most powerful standing army on the continent, behind the Soviet and West German armies. On or near the central front of the Cold War were roughly 26 Soviet divisions, 12 West German divisions, and slightly fewer than 6 American divisions. U.S. divisions, however, were bigger and more formidable than their West German and Soviet counterparts. But even allowing for these differences, the American army was still the third most powerful fighting force in Europe. Regarding the relative combat potential of American, West German, and Soviet divisions, see William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1983), pp. 105-25.

4. And marines are essentially small armies that go by a different name.

5. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; rpt, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1888), p. 16. Corbett also writes that "it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone" (p. 15).


7. On command of the sea, see Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 91-106. For a good primer on naval strategy, see Geoffrey Till et al., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).

8. States also aim to command the sea and the air so they can protect their own homeland from attack by the enemy.


11. *Raids* are a fourth kind of amphibious operation. Raids are where a navy briefly places troops on an enemy's coast to destroy particular targets but then takes them back to sea when the mission is completed (or fails). The disastrous Allied landing along the French coast at Dieppe in August 1942 is an example of a raid. See Brian L. Villa, *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Another example is the British operation at Zeebrugge in April 1918. See Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 411-16. I largely ignore raids, not because they usually fail, but because they are trivial operations that have little influence on the outcomes of wars.


14. John Lehman, who was secretary of the navy in the administration of President Ronald Reagan, frequently asserted that, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, American aircraft carriers would move close to the Soviet mainland, specifically the Kola Peninsula, and strike important military targets. But hardly an admiral could be found to support that idea. Adm. Stansfield Turner wrote that Lehman "advocates a strategy for the Navy of 'maneuver, initiative, and offense.' Presumably, he is reaffirming his many public statements that our Navy is going to be capable of carrying the war right to the Soviets' home bases and airfields. This sounds stirring and patriotic. The only problem is that I have yet to find one admiral who believes that the U.S. Navy would even attempt it." Letter to the editor, *Foreign Affairs* 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982-83), p. 457. Submarines, however, can now deliver conventionally armed cruise missiles to a rival's homeland with relative impunity. See Owen R. Cote, Jr., *Precision Strike from the Sea: New Missions for a New Navy*, Security Studies Program Conference Report (Cambridge: MIT, July 1998); and Owen R. Cote, Jr., *Mobile Targets from under the Sea: New Submarine Missions in the New Security Environment*, Security Studies Program Conference Report (Cambridge: MIT, April 2000).


16. Two other cases rarely mentioned in the literature on blockade but that might be included in this list are Germany's efforts in World Wars I and II to use its geographic advantage and its navy to stop Russian/Soviet trade with the outside world. I did not include these cases,
however, because Germany made only a minor effort to isolate Russia in both conflicts. Nevertheless, the German blockades had little effect on the outcome of either war, and thus they support my argument about the limited utility of independent sea power.


29. The quotations in this and the next paragraph are from pp. 132-33 and 142 of Olson, *Economics of the-Wartime Shortage*.


36. The line between interdiction operations that reach far behind an adversary's front lines (deep interdiction) and strategic bombing is sometimes murky. Air forces can also help navies implement a blockade.

38. There are two main differences between blockade and strategic bombing. First, blockades are indiscriminate in the sense that they aim to cut off all of an enemy's imports and exports. Strategic bombers, as noted earlier, can be employed more selectively: they can strike directly at specific industries and ignore others. Second, if the aim is to punish an adversary's civilian population, blockades can do that only indirectly by wrecking the enemy's economy, which would eventually hurt the civilian population. Airpower, on the other hand, can perform that task directly by targeting civilians.


47. Overy emphasizes that the air war played a key role in defeating Nazi Germany by forcing Hitler to divert precious resources away from the ground war against the Allies and especially the Red Army. See Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 20, 127-33. The Allies, however, also had to divert enormous resources away from the ground war to the air war. See General Marshall's Report: The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945
There is no evidence that the Allies diverted fewer resources to fighting the air war than did the Germans. In fact, I believe a convincing case can be made that the Allies diverted greater resources to the air war than did the Germans.


49. The Allied air forces compounded the Italian army's problems with an interdiction campaign against the transportation network that supported its frontline forces.


52. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports that the entire air campaign (conventional and nuclear) destroyed about 43 percent of Japan's 66 largest cities, killed roughly 900,000 civilians, and forced the evacuation of more than 8.5 million people from urban areas. USSBS, *Japanese Morale*, pp. 1-2. Two of those 66 cities (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were destroyed by atomic bombs, not conventional attacks. Moreover, a total of about 115,000 civilians died in the two nuclear attacks. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, p. 105. The firebombing also hurt the Japanese economy somewhat, although the blockade had effectively devastated it by the time the bombers began torching Japan's cities.


57. Eliot A. Cohen et al., *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); and Pape, *Bombing to Win*, chap. 7. The strategic bombing campaign was directed at targets in Iraq such as the city of Baghdad and is distinct from the air attacks directed against Iraqi military targets in Kuwait. The latter campaign inflicted heavy losses on Iraq's army and helped the Allied ground forces win a quick and decisive victory in late February 1991.

58. The U.S. air force's own study of its attacks on Iraqi leadership targets concludes, "The results of these attacks clearly fell short of fulfilling the ambitious hope, entertained by at least some airmen, that bombing the L [leadership] and CCC [command, control, and communications] target categories might put enough pressure on the regime to bring about its


65. William H. Arkin, "Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56, No. 3 (May-June 2000), p. 49. The Yugoslav government claims that the number of civilians killed was 2,000. See Posen, "War for Kosovo," p. 81.


67. There is also some evidence in the public domain that a decapitation strategy was employed against Yugoslavia in 1999. Specifically, it appears from some of the targets that NATO struck (TV stations, Milosevic's house, important government buildings, party headquarters, high-level military headquarters, and the businesses of Milosevic's close friends) that it aimed either to kill him or to precipitate a coup. There is no evidence, however, that this strategy worked.

68. See Pape, *Bombing to Win*, pp. 79-86.


71. Corbett says of the Battle of Trafalgar, "By universal assent Trafalgar is ranked as one of the decisive battles of the world, and yet of all the great victories there is not one which to all appearance was so barren of immediate result. It had brought to a triumphant conclusion one of the most masterly and complex sea campaigns in history, but insofar as it was an integral part of the combined campaign its results are scarcely to be discerned. It gave to England finally the dominion of the seas, but it left Napoleon dictator of the Continent. So incomprehensible was its apparent sterility that to fill the void a legend grew up that it saved England from invasion." Julian S. Corbett, *The Campaign of Trafalgar* (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), p. 408. Also see Edward Ingram, "Illusions of Victory: The Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar Revisited," *Military Affairs* 48, No. 3 (July 1984), pp. 140-43.


74. See Potter and Nimitz, *Sea Power*, chap. 19; and the works cited in Chapter 6, note 18 of this book.

75. The Reagan administration's "Maritime Strategy" contained some schemes for using the U.S. navy to influence events on the central front, but those operations were concerned mainly with shifting the strategic nuclear balance against the Soviet Union. Of course the U.S. navy was also concerned with maintaining command of the sea in wartime, so that it could transport troops and supplies across the Atlantic Ocean. See John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security* 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3-57; and Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), chaps. 4-5.

76. This point is widely accepted by prominent naval strategists. For example, Adm. Herbert Richmond, one of Britain's leading naval thinkers in the first half of the twentieth century, wrote, "An invasion by sea of a great modern military state may be dismissed as impracticable, even if there were no opposition at sea. The number of men which can be transported would never be sufficient to conduct an invasion in the face of the opposition of the military forces of any great power." Herbert Richmond, *Sea Power in the Modern World* (London: G. Bell, 1934), p. 173.

77. The problem of projecting power across a large body of water is not simply a problem of operating over a long distance. There is a fundamental difference between moving an army over water and moving it over land. A great power separated from an adversary by a large stretch of
land can conquer and occupy that land and then move its army and air force right up to the border of its rival, where it can launch a massive ground invasion. (Consider how Napoleonic France conquered the various states that separated it from Russia in the early 1800s and then invaded Russia with a huge army in 1812.) Great powers, however, cannot conquer and occupy water. The sea, as Corbett notes, "is not susceptible to ownership. . . . [Y]ou cannot subsist your armed forces upon it as you can upon enemy's territory." Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 93. (Napoleon could not capture the English Channel and station troops on it, which explains in part why he did not invade the United Kingdom). Therefore, navies have to move armies across the sea to strike an adversary. But navies usually cannot project large and powerful armies into enemy territory, and therefore the striking power of seaborne invasion forces is sharply limited.


79. Raids, on the other hand, were commonplace in great-power wars during the age of sail. For example, Great Britain launched four raids against French port cities in 1778, during the Seven Years' War. See Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power, p. 53. Although Britain had a penchant for raids, they were often unsuccessful. Looking at Lisbon (1589), Cadiz (1595 and 1626), Brest (16-96), Toulon (1707), Lorient (1746), Rochefort (1757), and Walcheren (1809), Michael Howard sees "an almost unbroken record of expensive and humiliating failures." Howard, British Way in Warfare, p. 19. Even the successful raids, however, had little effect on the balance of power.


81. Quoted in Brodie, Sea Power, p. 49.


89. Hartmann and Truver, Weapons That Wait, p. 15.
91. Describing British strategy against France during the Napoleonic Wars, Piers Mackesy writes, "No major landing in Western Europe could ever be contemplated unless there was an active war front in the east to hold down the major forces of the French." Mackesy, Problems of an Amphibious Power, p. 21.
95. Quoted in Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, p. 201.
97. Describing American war plans for the period between 1945 and 1950, Steven Ross writes, "Early plans, therefore, called for a rapid retreat from Europe and contained no concept of a second Normandy. Against the might of the Red Army there was little or no prospect of success by direct attack." Steven Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950 (New York: Garland, 1988), pp. 152-53.
100. The United Kingdom kept a small contingent of troops in Portugal, which had regained its sovereignty in the wake of the British invasion. The British navy transported additional troops to friendly Portugal in April 1809, and those forces, under Lord Wellington's command, played an important role in winning the war on the Iberian Peninsula.
101. See Piers Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, 1801: The End of Napoleon's Conquest (London: Routledge, 1995); Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power, chap. 7; and Rodger, War of the Second Coalition, chaps. 1-9, esp. chap. 16. Britain and France also conducted a handful of small-scale amphibious operations in the West Indies during the French Revolutionary Wars. See Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
102. Among the best works on the Crimean War are Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856 (London: Arnold, 1999); John S. Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979); David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (New York:
103. The numbers in this paragraph are from Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power, p. 234; and Hew Strachan, "Soldiers, Strategy and Sebastopol," Historical Journal 21, No. 2 (June 1978), p. 321.


105. Among the best works on Gallipoli are C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, 2 vols., Official British History of World War I (London: Heinemann, 1929); Robert R. James, Gallipoli (London: B. T. Batsford, 1965); and Michael Hickey, Gallipoli (London: John Murray, 1995). Also, the Russians conducted some small-scale amphibious operations against the Turks in the Black Sea region. See Halpern, Naval History of World War I, pp. 238-46.


108. On Anzio, see Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, chaps. 17-18, 20, 22, 24.


110. Italy was technically still a great power when the Allies invaded Sicily in mid-1943, and Italian as well as German troops were located on that island. But as noted, the Italian army was in tatters and incapable of putting up a serious fight against the Allies. In fact, the Wehrmacht was largely responsible for Italy's defense at the time of the Sicily operation. Italy was out of the war when the Allies invaded the Italian mainland and Anzio.)


113. "Major U.S. Amphibious Operations—World War II, "memorandum, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, December 15, 1960. Each of the fifty-two invasion forces was at least the size of a regimental combat team. Operations involving smaller units are not included. Also, the Australian military conducted three amphibious operations against Japanese forces on Borneo between May and July 1945. These mopping-up campaigns succeeded for essentially the same reasons that the American seaborne invasions gained their objective. See Peter Dennis et al, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 109-16.

114. USSBS, Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 19.


116. USSBS, Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 61.


118. On the disparity in size between the Japanese and American economies, see Table 6.2; Adelman, Prelude, pp. 139, 202-3; and Jonathan R. Adelman, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1985), pp. 130-31.

119. By mid-1945, there were about 2 million soldiers in Japan's home army. Dear, ed., Oxford Companion to World War II, p. 623. At the same time, there were roughly 900,000 Japanese soldiers in China, 250,000 in Korea, 750,000 in Manchuria, and 600,000 in Southeast Asia. These numbers are from Adelman, Revolution, p. 147; Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1959), p. 173; and Douglas J. MacEachin, The Final Months of the War with Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1998), attached document no. 4.

120. Although the invading American forces would surely have conquered Japan, they undoubtedly would also have suffered significant casualties in the process. See Frank, Downfall; and MacEachin, Final Months.

121. Insular powers, however, might be attacked over land by a rival great power if that adversary can deploy troops on the territory of a minor power in the insular state's backyard. As will be discussed in the next chapter, insular great powers worry about this possibility and seek to ensure that it never happens.


127. As noted, the Allies invaded northwestern France in June 1944 and southern France in August 1944. But France was not a sovereign state at that point—it was part of the Nazi empire.

128. One noteworthy case is left out of this analysis. In the final year of World War I, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States inserted troops into the newly established Soviet Union at Archangel (August 2, 1918), Baku (August 4, 1918), Murmansk (March 6 and June 23, 1918), and Vladivostok (April 5 and August 3, 1918). Those troops eventually fought some battles against the Bolsheviks. This case is not relevant, however, because the Allies' entrance into the Soviet Union was not an invasion in any meaningful sense of that term. The Soviet Union had just been decisively defeated by Germany and was in the midst of a civil war. Consequently, the Bolshevik army did not oppose the coming of Allied forces. In fact, the Allies were welcomed into Baku and Archangel. See John Swettenham, *Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1967); and Richard H. Ullman, *Intervention and the War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).


130. After listening to a Strategic Air Command (SAC) briefing on March 18, 1954, a U.S. navy captain used these words to describe what SAC planned to do to the Soviet Union in the event of war. David Alan Rosenberg, "'A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-1955," *International Security* 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 11, 25.


135. During the Cold War, some experts argued that it is possible to achieve nuclear superiority even in a MAD world. Specifically, they claimed that it was possible for the superpowers to fight a limited nuclear war with their counterforce weapons (nuclear weapons designed to destroy other nuclear weapons, rather than cities), while leaving each other's assured destruction capability intact. Each superpower would also try to minimize civilian deaths on the other side. The superpower that emerged from this limited nuclear exchange with an advantage in counterforce weapons would be the winner, having gained significant coercive leverage over the loser. See Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security* 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87; and Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 195-210. The case for limited nuclear options, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, it is not likely that such a war would remain limited. The destruction to each side's society would be enormous, making it difficult to distinguish a limited counterforce strike from an all-out attack. Furthermore, we do not know much about escalation dynamics in a nuclear war, especially regarding how command-and-control systems would perform in a nuclear attack. Second, even if it were possible to fight a limited nuclear war and minimize casualties, the side with a counterforce advantage would not win a meaningful victory, as the following example illustrates. Assume that the Soviets won a counterforce exchange between the superpowers; they were left with 500 counterforce warheads, the United States had none. In the process, both sides suffered 500,000 casualties, and their assured destruction capabilities remained intact. The Soviets are purportedly the victors because they have a counterforce advantage of 500:0. In fact, that advantage is meaningless, because there are no targets left in the United States that the Soviets can use their 500 counter-force weapons against, unless they want to strike at America's cities or its assured destruction capability and get annihilated in the process. In short, the result of this limited nuclear war is that both sides suffer equal casualties, both sides have their assured destruction capabilities intact, and the Soviet Union has 500 counterforce weapons that it cannot use in any meaningful military way. That is a hollow victory. Among the best works criticizing limited nuclear options are Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy*, chap. 7; and Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 617-33.


139. Robert Jervis is probably the most articulate proponent of this perspective. He writes, "The implications of mutual second-strike capability are many and far-reaching. If nuclear weapons have had the influence that the nuclear-revolution theory indicates they should have, then there will be peace between the superpowers, crises will be rare, neither side will be eager to press bargaining advantages to the limit, the status quo will be relatively easy to maintain, and political outcomes will not be closely related to either the nuclear or the conventional balance. Although the evidence is ambiguous, it generally confirms these propositions." Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p. 45. Also see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988).

140. Assume, for example, that Mexico becomes a great power with a survivable nuclear deterrent. Also assume that Mexico becomes interested in conquering a large expanse of territory in the southwestern United States, but otherwise has no interest in conquering American territory. Mexican policymakers might conclude that they could achieve their limited aims without causing the United States to start a nuclear war. In the event, they probably would prove correct. American policy-makers, however, would be much more likely to use nuclear weapons if Mexico tried to inflict a decisive defeat on the United States. Shai Feldman makes essentially the same point regarding the decision by Egypt and Syria to attack a nuclear-armed Israel in 1973. Arab policymakers, he argues, thought that Israel would not use its nuclear weapons, because the Arab armies were not bent on conquering Israel but were merely aiming to recapture territory lost to Israel in the 1967 war. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), chap. 3. But as Feldman points out, the state that loses a slice of its territory is likely to think that the victor will want to take another slice, and then another slice, and that such "salami tactics" will ultimately lead to its destruction. Ibid., pp. 111-12. The best way to avoid this predicament is to have powerful conventional forces that can deter the initial attack; this once again highlights the importance of the balance of land power.


145. As noted in Chapter 3, note 11, full-scale net assessments require more than just measuring the size and quality of the opposing forces. It is also necessary to consider the strategy that both sides would employ and what is likely to happen when the rival forces collide.


149. The prospects for peace would also be enhanced if each of those states had an ethnically homogeneous population, because then there would be no ethnic civil wars.

CHAPTER SIX

1. Only one study deals directly with offensive realism's claim that status quo powers are seldom seen in the international system. Eric Labs examined the war aims of Prussia during the Austro-Prussian War (1866), of Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), of the United Kingdom during World War I (1914-18), and of the United States in the Korean War (1950-53). He sought to determine whether security concerns drove those states to jump at war aims, or whether they were content to maintain the status quo. In other words, do war aims tend to remain fixed over the course of a conflict, or are they more likely to expand? He found that all four cases "provide strong support" for offensive realism. "Statesmen expanded their war aims ... [and] pushed the international system for all its worth," he argued, because they believed that maximizing their relative power was the best way "to secure their interests ... in a postwar world." Eric J. Labs, "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims," Security Studies 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49. The quotes are from pp. 21, 46.

2. Although the United States was not a great power until the end of the nineteenth century, its behavior during that entire century is of direct relevance for assessing offensive realism. Also, Japan was not a great power until 1895. However, I consider its behavior between the Meiji Restoration (in 1868) and 1895 because it has direct bearing on events after 1895. For reasons of space, I do not examine the actions of the complete universe of great powers between 1792 and 1990. Specifically, I omit Austria/Austria-Hungary (1792-1918), France (1792-1940), Prussia (1792-1862), and Russia (1792-1917). However, I am confident that a survey of the foreign policy behavior of these states would not contradict—indeed, would support—the main tenets of offensive realism.


30. This phase of Japanese expansion is discussed in detail later in this chapter.


95. Hitler’s most comprehensive writings on foreign policy are found not in Mein Kampf, but in Hitler’s Secret Book, trans. Salvator Attanasio (New York: Bramhall House, 1986).


36. See Chapter 8.


41. Kennan, Decline, p. 338.


43. See Chapters.

44. Among the best overviews of European politics between 1900 and 1914 are Albertini, Origins of the War, vol. I, chaps. 3-10; Geiss, German Foreign Policy, chaps. 8-17; David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Rich, Holstein, vol. 2, pts. 5-6; Snyder, Alliance Politics; Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War; and Taylor, Struggle, chaps. 17-22.

45. At the start of the crisis in July 1914, Germany wanted a local war in the Balkans involving Austria-Hungary and Serbia. It was willing, however, to accept a continental war that pitted Austria-Hungary and Germany against France and Russia. It did not want a world war, however, which would mean British involvement in the conflict. See Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 154-61. As the crisis evolved, it became increasingly clear that Europe was headed for either a continental or a world war, not a local war. Germany, which had played the key role in fueling the crisis from the start, made little effort to end it as war loomed closer. In fact, Germany saw a major war with France and Russia as an opportunity to 1) break its encirclement by the Triple Entente, 2) crush Russia, which it feared would grow more powerful than Germany in the near future, and 3) establish hegemony in Europe. For evidence that these goals dominated German thinking, see, for example, Copeland, Origins of Major War, chaps. 3-4; Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975), chaps. 22-23; Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York: Norton, 1974); Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History 2, No. 1 European History 2, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 48-76; Wayne C. Thompson, In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany (Ames: University of Iowa Press, 1980), chaps. 2-3; and the works cited in note 35 of this chapter.


47. On Germany's fear of Poland, see Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 561-63; and Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 101-10. The case of Poland in the years immediately after World War I appears to provide additional support for offensive realism. That newly created state briefly enjoyed a marked military advantage over Germany and the Soviet Union, which were both devastated by defeat in World War I. Sensing an opportunity to gain power and enhance its security, Poland set out to break apart the Soviet Union and create a powerful Polish-led federation that included Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine. Poles "dreamed of a reestablishment of the powerful and vast country which once was the Kingdom of Poland." Josef Korbel, Poland between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 33. Also see the sources cited in Chapter 3, note 41, of this book.


52. On the growth of the German military in the 1930s, see Chapter 8.


54. Fuller, Strategy and Power, p. 132. Also see pp. 34, 125-27, 134-39, 174-75; and Hosking, Russia, pp. 3-4, 41.


56. This phrase is from Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 3, describing the scholarly consensus on Lenin's foreign policy.


59. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p. 139.


64. See Chapter 4, note 128, of this book.

65. See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, chaps. 13-14; James M. McCann, "Beyond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920," Soviet Studies 36, No. 4 (October 1984), pp. 475-93; and the sources cited in Chapter 3, note 41, of this book. This case supports Eric Labs's claim that states expand their war aims whenever opportunities to conquer territory arise during the fighting. See Labs, "Offensive Realism."

66. As noted earlier, Japan kept its troops in Siberia until 1922 and in northern Sakhalin until 1925.


68. See the sources cited in note 49 in this chapter.


71. See Chapter 8.
72. See the sources cited in Chapter 5, note 28.
77. In 1948, however, American policymakers believed that there were 4 million people serving in the Soviet armed forces, not 2.87 million. See Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security* 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 110-38; and the articles by Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, John S. Duffield, and Matthew Evangelista in "Assessing the Soviet Threat to Europe: A Roundtable," *Diplomatic History* 22, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 399-449. Despite these inflated U.S. intelligence estimates, Western policymakers in the late 1940s thought it was unlikely that the Red Army would strike into Western Europe. Fear of a Soviet blitzkrieg became a serious concern after North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. See Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, pp. 404, 438, 498.
78. Douglas Macdonald writes, "The oral memoirs of both Khrushchev and Molotov, as well as much of the other new evidence, confirm that Stalin's fear of U.S. power was the most important constraint on Soviet expansionism." Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion," p. 161.
82. The Soviet Union also reached an agreement with the West in 1955 to pull Soviet and NATO forces out of Austria and make it a neutral state in the East-West conflict. But there were good strategic reasons for the Soviets to cut this deal, as Audrey K. Cronin makes clear in *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).


89. Offensive realism would be falsified if an economically healthy Soviet Union had opted to abandon Eastern Europe because its leaders were convinced that security competition was no longer an important aspect of international politics.


91. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*, p. viii. Also see Ottavio Barie, "Italian Imperialism: The First Stage," *Journal of Italian History* 2, No. 3 (Winter 1979), pp. 531-65; and


98. Smith, *Modern Italy*, p. 89.


104. Smith, *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, p. 60. Also see p. 16.


110. Snyder, for example, maintains in *Myths of Empire* that the aggressive behavior of great powers can be explained largely by "logrolling" among selfish interest groups on the home front. Van Evera ascribes their ill-advised behavior to militarism. See Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Misperception and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).


113. As discussed in Chapter 8, the balancing coalition that defeated Napoleon came together in 1813, after the French army that had invaded Russia in 1812 had been routed and destroyed. The balancing coalition that ultimately defeated Hitler came together in December 1941, at roughly the same time that the Red Army was stopping the German blitzkrieg outside of Moscow. At that point, a good number of Wehrmacht commanders thought that the war against the Soviet Union was already lost.


115. Charles Kupchan, who accuses Wilhelmine Germany of causing its own encirclement, allows that Germany did not start behaving aggressively until 1897. Kupchan, *Vulnerability of Empire*, p. 360. However, there is a problem with this argument: Germany was encircled by France and Russia well before 1897. Thus, according to Kupchan's own timeline, the formation of the first and most important leg of the Triple Entente cannot be explained by aggressive German behavior. The same problem is found in Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp. 68, 72.


117. Geiss, *German Foreign Policy*, p. 52. Waller makes the same argument in *Bismarck*, p. 118.


119. Hillgruber, *Germany*, p. 13, is excellent on this point. Even if there had been no Moroccan crisis, Russia's defeat by itself would probably have caused the formation of the Triple Entente. However, that crisis alone would not have been enough to prompt the United Kingdom to join forces with France and Russia.

120. Herrmann, *Arming of Europe*, chap. 2.


131. Haffner, Meaning of Hitler, p. 49.

132. The phrase is Joachim Pest's, who uses the date 1938 rather than 1940 to make the same point. Fest, Hitler, p. 9.


135. See Chapter 8.

136. All quotes in this paragraph are from Haffner, Meaning of Hitler, pp. 104-5.

137. This is a key theme in Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987).


142. The key work on this point is Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*. Also see Michael A. Barnhart, "Historiography, the Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific: Synthesis Impossible?" *Diplomatic History* 20, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 241-60; Feis, *Road to Pearl Harbor*; Morley, ed., *Final Confrontation*; and Schroeder, *Axis Alliance*.


145. The United States clearly demanded that Japan exit China and Indochina but was ambiguous about Manchuria. Nevertheless, there was good reason for Japan to think that the United States would demand that Manchuria also be abandoned. See Feis, *Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 276; Morley, ed., *Final Confrontation*, pp. xxviii-xxx, 318, 321-22; and Schroeder, *Axis Alliance*, pp. 35-36.


150. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Schroeder, *Axis Alliance*, which should be read in conjunction with Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, chaps. 4-7. Heinrichs shows how German battlefield successes on the eastern front between June and December 1941 hardened the U.S. negotiating position against Japan.

151. As Heinrichs notes, it is difficult to believe that Roosevelt did not understand that his policies would eventually lead to war between Japan and the United States. Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, p. 159.


167. They included the Ford administration's SIOP-5 (which took effect January 1, 1976); the Carter administration's SIOP-5F (October 1, 1981); the Reagan administration's SIOP-6 (October 1, 1983); and the George H.W. Bush administration's SIOP-6F (October 1, 1989). For a summary chart describing the differences among these SIOPs, see Ball and Toth, "Revising the SIOP," p. 67.

168. Desmond Ball, a leading expert on the history of American nuclear planning, succinctly summarizes American nuclear policy between 1961 and 1990: "Since the early 1960s, the overriding objective of U.S. strategic nuclear policy has been the development of a strategic posture designed to enable the United States to control any nuclear exchange in order to limit damage at the lowest possible levels while ensuring that the outcomes are favorable to the United States." Desmond Ball, "Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P. Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1986), p. 49. For evidence that the Soviets thought that the United States was deploying counterforce weapons to gain military advantage, see Henry A. Trofimenko, "Illusion of a Panacea," International Security 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 28-48. All the emphasis on limited nuclear options notwithstanding, "the doctrine of the overwhelming massive strike still had a strong hold" in some quarters of the U.S. national security establishment. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," p. 233. Given that the Soviet Union rejected the notion of fighting limited nuclear wars and instead favored massive nuclear strikes against the United States (see the next section of this chapter), this residual interest in massive retaliation is not surprising.

169. During the late 1960s and throughout much of the 1970s, it was fashionable on both the right and the left to argue that the United States had abandoned counterforce targeting and adopted a straightforward MAD strategy in its place. Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), for example, wrote in 1979 that "over the past fifteen years, at least four American Presidents, and their leading defense advisers, have built weapons and cast strategic plans well nigh exclusively
for the purpose of inflicting damage upon the enemy's society." Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," Strategic Review 7, No. 4 (Fall 1979), p. 13. It is now well established among students of the nuclear arms race that this claim is a groundless myth perpetrated by experts and policymakers who surely knew better. The seminal piece exposing this myth is Desmond Ball, Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration (Santa Monica: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December 1974). Also see Leitenberg, "Presidential Directive (PD) 59"; Mlyn, The State: and Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine."

170. Henry Rowen writes, "Over the years the number of weapons in both the U.S. and Soviet forces has increased enormously, as has the number of targets assigned to these weapons, but the number of urban-industrial targets . . . has increased little." Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," p. 220. As discussed later in this section, Soviet strategists did not emphasize the concept of assured destruction, and therefore they did not spell out criteria for achieving that mission. However, based on U.S. criteria, the Soviets faced roughly the same task confronting the United States. Specifically, they had to destroy the 200 largest American cities, which contain about 33 percent of the U.S. population and 75 percent of the industrial base. That task probably could have been accomplished with 400 EMT, if not half that number. See Ashton B. Carter, "BMD Applications: Performance and Limitations," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984), pp. 103, 163, 168-69.


176. See note 159 in this chapter.


CHAPTER NINE


2. To the best of my knowledge, no existing theory has the capability to predict exactly when war will occur.


6. For a more complete definition of a potential hegemon, see Chapter 2.


8. Although a balance of power is more likely to produce deterrence than is an imbalance of power, balanced power does not guarantee that deterrence will work. As discussed in Chapter 3, states sometimes design innovative military strategies that allow them to win wars, even though they have no advantage in the size and quality of their fighting forces. Furthermore, the broader political forces that move states toward war sometimes force leaders to pursue highly risky military strategies, compelling states to challenge opponents of equal or even superior strength. See John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), esp. chap. 2.

9. A second argument is sometimes made to support the claim that power disparities are more common in multipolarity than in bipolarity. States in multipolarity facing a more powerful adversary are likely to pursue buck-passing, which usually means that they are content to live with an imbalance of power, because they believe that another state will deal with the threat. But even when states balance in multipolarity, they are often tempted to seek security through alliances rather than by building up their own strength. External balancing of this sort is attractive because it is cheaper than the alternative. Nevertheless, it leaves the original power imbalance largely intact and hence leaves in place the dangers that such a power gap creates. The number two state in a bipolar system, on the other hand, can hope to balance against the leader only by mobilizing its own resources, since it has no great-power alliance partners or buck-catchers. Internal balancing of this sort is likely to produce a rough balance of power between the opposing great powers. In fact, I made this argument in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 13-19. But there are two problems with this line of argument. As Dale Copeland notes, it contradicts my claim that states maximize their share of world power. If
states are power maximizers, they are not going to tolerate imbalances of power that they have
the capability to rectify. See Dale C. Copeland, "The Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New
Furthermore, while there is no question that buck-passing is a popular option among threatened
states in multipolarity (see Chapter 8), buck-passing is most likely to succeed if the threatened
state also builds formidable military forces and erases any power gap that might exist between it
and the aggressor (see Chapter 5).
10. There is one exception to this general point: if there were only three great powers in a
multipolar system, two of them could gang up on the third, and there would be no allies
available for the victim state.
11. Balancing coalitions are most likely to form when there is a potential hegemon that can
be contained only by the joint efforts of all the threatened great powers. But as discussed in the
next section, war is highly likely when there is a potential hegemon in a multipolar system.
12. This point is the central theme of Waltz, "Stability of a Bipolar World." Also see Geoffrey
13. The claim that multipolarity is more stable than bipolarity is often based on the belief that
as the number of states in a system increases, the amount of attention that states can focus on
each other diminishes, because other states demand attention as well. See, for example,
Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems," pp. 396-400. This claim, however, assumes
rough equality in the size and strength of the relevant actors. But in multipolar systems with a
potential hegemon, the other great powers are surely going to pay an inordinate amount of
attention to that especially powerful state, largely vitiating the claim that multipolarity means
"limited attention capability."
14. To review my criteria for selecting great powers, see Chapter 1, note 7.
15. See Chapter 6.
Press of Kentucky, 1983), chap. 3.
17. The other great-power wars that are excluded because they involve a non-European
state include the Anglo-Persian War (1856-57), the Franco-Mexican War (1862-67), the Sino-
French War (1883-85), the Sino-Soviet War (1929), the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-36), the
Soviet-Japanese War (1939), and the Sinai War (1956).
18. Levy uses the term "general war" instead of "central war," whereas Copeland refers to
these conflicts as "major wars." See Copeland, Origins, pp. 27-28; and Levy, War, pp. 3, 52, 75.
Others refer to them as "hegemonic wars," because they usually involve a state that is
attempting to dominate the entire system.
20. Although the Russian army was more than twice as large as the Austrian and French
armies, it had significant qualitative deficiencies, which became more acute over time and
account in good part for Russia's defeat by the United Kingdom and France in the Crimean War
(1853-56). See John S. Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas 1,1825-1855 (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1965); and William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-
1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992), chaps. 6-7. On the Austrian army, see Istvan Deak,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 29-41; and Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of
Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976), chaps. 1-4. On the French
army, see Paddy Griffith, Military Thought in the French Army, 1815-1851 (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 1989); and Douglas Porch, Army and Revolution, 1815-1848
22. See Chapter 8.
23. See Chapter 8.
CHAPTER TEN


2. See the sources cited in Chapter 1, note 25.


13. See the works cited in Chapter 1, note 24.


15. For evidence of backsliding, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), chaps. 5-6; and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).


20. See the works cited in Chapter 6, note 86.


22. See the sources listed in Chapter 1, note 23.


46. The phrase "primed for peace" was coined by Stephen Van Evera to describe post-Cold War Europe. See Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 7-57.

48. The argument that the United States can serve as a "pacifier" in regions such as Europe and Northeast Asia was first laid out in Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-82.

49. Gorbachev, Perestroika, pp. 194-95.

50. The document was originally published in Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye on January 14, 2000. For key translated excerpts, from which this quote is taken, see "Russia's National Security Concept," Arms Control Today 30, No. 1 (January-February 2000), pp. 15-20. For a discussion of the evolution of Russian thinking about security during the 1990s, see Celeste A. Wallander, "Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium," Arms Control Today 30, No. 2 (March 2000), pp. 7-12. It should be emphasized, however, that rhetoric aside, Russia has been acting like a traditional great power since the early 1990s. See the sources cited in Mearsheimer, "False Promise," p. 46 (n. 175, 176).

51. See Serge Schmemann, "Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms," New York Times, November 4, 1993. NATO, which has always rejected a no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons, remains firmly wedded to that policy. For example, the "NATO Alliance Strategic Concept," which was approved by the North Atlantic Council on April 24, 1999, states that "the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus they remain essential to preserve peace. . . . They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option."


55. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-6. The views of Christoph Bertram, a former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and one of Germany's foremost strategic thinkers, are also instructive on this point. He wrote in 1995 that "to disband NATO now would throw Europe into deep insecurity. . . . It would be a strategic disaster." He goes on to say that "if the United States turned its back on Europe, NATO would collapse and the European Union would be strained to the point of disintegration. Germany would stand out as the dominant power in the West of the continent, and Russia as the disturbing power in the East. The United States would lose much of its international authority as well as the means to help prevent European instability from igniting international conflict once again." Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 17-18, 85. Also see pp. 10-11.


57. President Clinton put this point well when he noted that although there are good reasons to be critical of American foreign policy in the twentieth century, "no one suggests that we ever


60. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, No. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 35-49. Also see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79. Wohlforth, who makes the most compelling case for unipolarity, defines it as "a structure in which one state's capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced." Wohlforth, "Stability," p. 9. Although I agree with that definition, I take issue with his assessment that China and Russia do not have the wherewithal to stand up to the United States.

61. On what defines a great power, see Chapter 1.

62. China and Russia have been on friendly terms in recent years, and both have made clear their displeasure with different aspects of American foreign policy. But they have not formed a serious balancing coalition against the United States, and few believe that they will do so in the future. See Jennifer Anderson, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership*, Adelphi Paper No. 315 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1997); Mark Buries, *Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999); and "Can a Bear Love a Dragon?" *Economist*, April 26, 1997, pp. 19-21. Also, there is a potential source of serious trouble between China and Russia: large-scale illegal immigration from China into Russia for the past decade, which could lead to ethnic conflict or territorial disputes. See David Hale, "Is Asia's High Growth Era Over?" *National Interest*, No. 47 (Spring 1997), p. 56; and Simon Winchester, "On the Edge of Empires: Black Dragon River," *National Geographic*, February 2000, pp. 7-33.

63. Many argue that it is difficult to imagine security competition, much less war, between France and Germany. The current happy situation, however, did not come about because those longtime rivals, who fought wars against each other in 1870-71, 1914-18, and 1940, suddenly learned to like and trust each other in 1945. The presence of a large American army in Western Europe since World War II has made it almost impossible for France and Germany to fight with each other and thus has eliminated the main cause of fear between them. In essence, hierarchy replaces anarchy in areas directly controlled by U.S. forces. Josef Joffe puts the point well: "Only the permanent intrusion of the United States into the affairs of the Continent changed the terms of state interaction to the point where West Europeans no longer had to conduct their business in the brooding shadow of violence. By promising to protect Western Europe against others and against itself, the United States swept aside the rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past." Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p. 72.


66. The Clinton administration certainly bought this view. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, for example, told the U.S. Senate that "European stability depends in large measure on continued American engagement and leadership. And as history attests, European stability is also vital to our national interests. As a result we will remain engaged." Madeleine Albright, prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 8, 1997. This perspective also enjoys broad support among academics. For example, see Art, "Why Western Europe"; Bertram, *Europe in the Balance*; Mandelbaum, *Dawn of Peace*; Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters"; and Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 5-53, esp. note 14. Also see Mark S. Sheetz, "Exit Strategies: American Grand Designs for Postwar European Security," *Security Studies* 8, No. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 1-3, which describes the broad appeal of this perspective.


69. Gholz and Press, "Economic Externalities." This analysis assumes that a great-power war in Europe or Northeast Asia would be protracted and involve virtually all of the regional powers—i.e., a central war like World War I. However, a future great-power war, like many of those in the past, might be short or might involve only two major states. A more limited conflict of this sort would surely have less effect (positive or negative) on the U.S. economy than would a central war.


74. The negative consequences for NATO of the Kosovo war are captured in the following comment from Der Spiegel: "After ten weeks of war in Yugoslavia, one thing has become clear across Europe: the hegemony of the U.S. and NATO is limited as a model for the future."

75. For example, Japan, which has the second largest defense budget in the world, is developing its own spy satellites, against American wishes. Moreover, each house of Japan's Diet has established a commission to review its pacifist constitution, a move widely seen as a victory for Japan's nationalists. An important defense official, Shingo Nishimura, was forced to resign in October 1999, because he suggested that Japan develop its own nuclear deterrent. See "Japan's Naval Power: Responding to New Challenges," International Institute for Strategic Studies' Strategic Comments 6, No. 8 (October 2000); "Japan Reviews Pacifism," London Times, January 21, 2000; Clay Chandler, "Japanese Official Forced to Quit after Endorsing Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, October 21, 1999; Howard French, "Japan Signals Peaceful Intentions, but Reaffirms Armament Plans," New York Times, April 28, 2001; and "Satellite Program Endorsed as a Response to N. Korean Rocket," Chicago Tribune, November 7, 1998. Also see Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance," pp. 74-80; and Milton Ezrati, Kawari: How Japan's Economic and Cultural Transformation Will Alter the Balance of Power among Nations (Reading, MA: Perseus, 1999), chaps. 7-8.

76. The phrase "reluctant sheriff" is from Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997). An important source of evidence of America's waning commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia is John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). The study finds, for example, that only 44 percent of the public and 58 percent of U.S. leaders think that "defending our allies' security" is a "very important" goal. Furthermore, if Russia invaded Poland, a NATO member, a mere 28 percent of the American public favors using U.S. ground troops to defend Poland. Ibid., pp. 16, 26. Also see James M. Lindsay, "The New Apathy: How an Uninterested Public Is Reshaping Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 79, No. 5 (September-October 2000), pp. 2-8.


78. See Ted Galen Carpenter, "Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors," Foreign Affairs 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 2-6. The United States raised suspicions about its reliability earlier in 1996 when it said that its security guarantee to Japan did not apply to any crisis arising over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, which both China and Japan claim. See Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 401-15.

79. It is apparent from this discussion that even if I am wrong and the United States assumes the role of peacekeeper in Europe and Northeast Asia, there is still likely to be fundamental change in the power structures in those regions. In particular, America's allies, especially Germany and Japan, are not likely to remain wards of the United States, but instead are likely to establish themselves as great powers.

80. These population numbers are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1915 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, February 1993). Jonathan Adelman writes that the Russians had a 2.7:1 advantage in 1914 (180 million vs. 67.5 million) and a 2.4:1 advantage in 1941 (187 million vs. 78 million).

81. These population figures are from Table 10.2; and *The Military Balance 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 33.

82. These figures are drawn from Tables 3.3 and 10.2.


85. As noted, the Soviet Union had about 285 million people in 1987, whereas Russia's present population is about 147 million.


87. As noted in Table 10.1, Japan has 126 million people, and China has 1.24 billion. The United Nations forecasts that Japan's population will shrink to roughly 100 million by 2050, while China's population will increase to about 1.5 billion by that date. "Emerging Market Indicators," *Economist*, February 1, 1997, p. 108.

88. As noted in Table 10.1, Russia has 147 million people, China has 1.24 billion. The United Nations forecasts that Russia's population will shrink to roughly 120 million by 2050, while China's population will increase to about 1.5 billion by that date. "Emerging Market Indicators," *Economist*, February 1, 1997, p. 108.


But China has roughly five times as many people as the United States and is projected to maintain that advantage over the first half of the new century. Also see Table 10.3 for some alternative scenarios involving a wealthy China.